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Abstract 
In this paper, I examine the effectiveness of ‘naming and shaming’ by human 
rights organizations (HROs) on the enforcement of economic and social rights. I ask 
whether this method, initially developed to address civil and political rights, contributes 
to the realization of economic and social rights and to the reduction of economic and 
social inequities. To answer my research question, I focus on the right to housing in the 
case of Kenya. I do a qualitative analysis of naming and shaming efforts by HROs and 
the varied responses of the state to these efforts. In this case, I find that while naming and 
shaming encourages the state to make tactical concessions and even comply with certain 
norms, violations continue de facto. Moreover, noting that HROs have targeted the right 
to housing generally as well as specific violations, I find that while Kenya moves towards 
more progressive policies, laws and even Constitutions in general, this does not 
necessarily translate into progress at the level of specific violations. My research, then, 
reveals the benefits and limitations of naming and shaming on the enforcement of 
economic and social rights that I hope will help HROs understand the effects of their 
actions and allocate resources accordingly. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The beginning of the twenty first century heralded the end of the Cold War. With 
the fall of the Soviet Union, the decades-long polarization of civil and political rights 
(CPR) and economic and social rights (ESR)1 could finally come to an end. 
Subsequently, human rights organizations (HROs), the United Nations, and other 
international institutions established the ‘universal, indivisible, interdependent, and 
interrelated’ nature of all rights, thereby, adopting ESR more concretely in their 
frameworks.2 Doing this, HROs and other international organizations have taken on a 
wide, new array of duties that would normally fall under the jurisdiction of development 
or private charity. ESR, formally enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) (1948) and the legally binding International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966), run the gamut from the right to work and to form trade 
unions to the right to an adequate standard of living, education, and health care. A rights-
based approach to ESR violations brings with it a new framework and language that 
alters both the perception of these problems and potentially their solutions. Problems, like 
poverty, are no longer blamed on the sufferers, but rather, international actors, 
particularly states, have a duty and an obligation to aid the poor and prevent the 
propagation of the problem. 
Even though HROs have formally accepted ESR, they still struggle in practice to 
incorporate these rights into their everyday operations. Thus far, the human rights 
                                                          
1 Explained in further detail in the next section. 
2 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, "Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action." United 
Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, June 25, 1993. 
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movement has sought to do this by repurposing traditional, legal-focused structures for 
CPR enforcement to apply to ESR. There are two major strategies HROs adopt in this 
regard. The first is to directly “pursue some judicial or quasi-judicial process.”3 This, 
most often, benefits only countries that already have constitutional provisions protecting 
ESR, such as South Africa, and/or have judges who are receptive to the plight of those 
suffering from ESR violations, such as India. Here, NGOs aid an individual or a group to 
lobby for their rights through national courts in selectively chosen cases, those most 
likely to succeed and those that set important precedent. Doing this can also allow INGOs 
to spread awareness of the justiciability of ESR and work to translate these rights into 
national law.4 Many empirical studies have addressed the limited efficacy of this 
approach, most prominently Gauri and Brinks, who inspect five cases of judicial 
enforcement of ESR in South Africa, Brazil, India, Nigeria, and Indonesia.5 They find 
mixed results, arguing that although judicial enforcement is often successful in the cases 
themselves (in that the court rules in favor of the afflicted party), this does not always 
translate into policies that benefit a greater number of people than those immediately 
involved. They note, “precisely because courts need social and political partners to 
change policy and distribute social and economic goods, the choices and outcomes 
resulting from legalization will not stray far from dominant national trends.”6 Legal 
mobilization, moreover, may not even benefit the people intended and may worsen their 
situation. Pieterse, for one, describes how states use the indeterminacy of the language of 
                                                          
3Ladawn Haglund and Rimjhim Aggarwal, "Test of Our Progress: The Translation of Economic and Social 
Rights Norms into Practice," Journal of Human Rights, (2011): 494-520. 
4Daniel P. L. Chong, Freedom from Poverty: NGOs and Human Rights Praxis (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 40. 
5 Varun Gauri and Daniel M. Brinks, Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and 
Economic Rights in the Developing World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
6Ibid: (34-5). 
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rights to repurpose the aims of social movements and actively deny rights while 
maintaining the illusion that they guarantee them.7 In a prominent housing case in South 
Africa, in 2000, the Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v Grootboom 
and others, even as the court’s decision in favor of promoting the right to housing 
prompted more housing policy (as various HROs have commended), the state failed to 
implement and enforce the court’s ruling. It did not, then, even aid Mrs. Grootboom and 
other members of her community, let alone bolster the right for South Africans as a 
whole. Hohmann describes Grootboom as a “victory for the enforcement of positive, 
socio-economic rights, with the Constitutional Court declaring the government’s long 
term housing plan unreasonable… (but also) a great disappointment and a wasted 
opportunity in the quest for social justice.”8 Legalization, then, presents many potential 
costs and benefits.  
The other strategy, often considered the most powerful tactic international HROs 
have, is naming and shaming, the practice of publicly exposing a state’s violation of 
certain rights to hold the state accountable for its action (or inaction). Kenneth Roth, 
executive director of Human Rights Watch (HRW), describes that “the strength of 
organizations like Human Rights Watch is not their rhetorical voice but their shaming 
                                                          
7Marius Pieterse, "Eating Socioeconomic Rights: The Usefulness of Rights Talk in Alleviating Social 
Hardship Revisited," Human Rights Quarterly, (2007): 796-822. 
8Jessie Hohmann, The Right to Housing: Law, Concepts, Possibilities, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014). 
 The case involved the state’s forced eviction of a community of informal settlers for the development of an 
area in South Africa without making alternate provisions for the residents. The court instated the 
‘reasonableness approach’ to evaluate the case, indicating that the state must implement measures and 
ensure accommodations for the displaced that are ‘reasonable.” Hohmann notes, “the Court held that 
reasonable legislative and other measures included the creation of a public housing plan, which must take 
into account short, medium, and long term aim, and which must not ignore significant segments of the 
population, particularly those worst off” (99). However, implementation of the court’s ruling and actual 
enforcement proved problematic, with Mrs. Grootboom herself dying in 2008, still housed waiting for 
‘adequate’ housing from the government. 
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methodology—their ability to investigate misconduct and expose it to public 
opprobrium.”9 The efficacy of naming and shaming, concerning ESR, is heavily debated, 
though, with some, like Amnesty International’s Irene Khan and the scholar Audrey 
Chapman, extolling its benefits and others, prominently Roth, concerned with its 
significant limitations.10 Still, very little empirical research focuses on this issue. One 
notable exception is Hertel’s investigation of the relative success of the “Right to Food 
Campaign” in India.11 However, Hertel focuses on local NGOs instead of shaming by 
INGOs even though majority of the theoretical literature on shaming recognizes it as a 
global phenomenon furthered by transnational networks. Centering myself in the 
theoretical debate and noting the lack of empirical research, then, for my honors project, I 
investigate the effectiveness of naming and shaming practices, as conducted by HROs, 
the UN and other international institutions, on the realization of ESR. My research 
question is: Does “naming and shaming” violations of economic and social rights 
contribute to the realization of these rights and reduce economic and social inequities? If 
it does, how effective are “naming and shaming” efforts?12 To answer my question, I will 
do a qualitative analysis, focusing on the specific case of housing in the context of 
Kenya. Here, I trace the effectiveness of shaming by noting the extent and frequency of 
HROs’ shaming attempts and the state’s response to these.  
                                                          
9Kenneth Roth, "Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an 
International Human Rights Organization," Human Rights Quarterly, (2004): 63-73. 
10 More detail on this present in the Section highlighting the theoretical and empirical findings on naming 
and shaming 
11Shareen Hertel, "Why Bother? Measuring Economic Rights: The Research Agenda," International 
Studies Perspectives, (2006): 215-230. 
12Here, I evaluate the extent to which states fulfill their economic and social rights obligations as listed in 
the International Covenant of Economic and Social Rights. 
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I choose to do a qualitative analysis for many reasons. For one, I consider the 
limited amount of information available, making it difficult to conduct an adequate 
quantitative study, but most importantly, I wish to illustrate which potential pathway or 
hypothesis plays out and for what reasons, requiring a more in-depth analysis of a case to 
generate theories. In their ability to account for details and report fully, Odell notes, “case 
methods allow stronger empirical grounding for a hypothesis for the cases studied. They 
allow greater confidence in the validity of the hypothesis for the cases studied than 
statistical methods can provide for the same cases.”13 Qualitative case studies, though, do 
not allow for the easy drawing of causal inferences, which is not the aim of this study but 
a potential for future research. While looking at attempts at naming and shaming by 
various HROs and the diverse responses of the state to these shaming attempts, I apply 
Risse and Sikkink’s prominent model (2013) on naming and shaming to my case.14 
The case I select broadly is the right to housing, which appears in Article 11 of 
the ICESCR as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living.15 Within the 
right, I look to two different methods of shaming: one involves HROs shaming the entire 
right in general that takes into account the allocation of resources and the other, an issue 
closer to civil and political and negative rights, the case of evictions, involving the 
shaming of specific violations via urgent actions or focused news releases. I selected the 
right to housing in part because the media does not traditionally consider it an urgent and 
immediate problem as cases of health or food, for example, might be, and so it receives 
                                                          
13John Odell, "Case Study Methods in International Political Economy," International Studies Perspectives, 
(2001): 170. 
14 Details of the model appear in the naming and shaming section of the Literature Review and further in 
the Analysis of the case of Kenya.  
15 UN, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, New York: United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, December 16, 1966. 
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less press outside of that led by HROs. For this reason, too, housing has received less 
attention from scholars who often focus on the right to health and the right to education, 
leaving a dearth in scholarship on the issue. More importantly, though, I selected housing 
because one of the most prominent international HROs, Amnesty International (AI), 
opted, in its campaign for the right to be free from poverty, termed the Global Campaign 
for Human Dignity, to operationalize poverty (and in turn ESR) as the right to adequate 
health care (with an emphasis on maternal health) and as the right to adequate housing.16 
In practice, they have focused overwhelmingly on the latter, presumably finding the 
former harder to shame in the context of limited resources. The justification AI has given 
for their emphasis on housing is the right’s close relationship and influence on the 
realization of other rights, including the right to safe drinking water and education. AI 
operationalizes violations of the right to housing narrowly, making the issue easier to 
shame, defining it as “forced evictions or policies that give certain people no option but 
to be homeless, such as dwellings becoming uninhabitable due to environmental 
degradation or climate change.”17 In a similar vein, the other major international HRO, 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), focuses on shaming violations of the right to health, 
education, and housing in instances of “arbitrariness or discrimination.”18 Notable UN 
bodies, including UN-HABITAT, and the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a 
                                                          
16The link between poverty, inequality and ESR is explicated later in the paper. The formal goals of the 
campaign are to “pressure governments and international agencies to ensure that those who live in poverty 
have equal access to rights, and that non-discrimination is respected, gender inequalities are eliminated and 
the most vulnerable are prioritised. In brief, Amnesty International's three key demands will be: 
accountability of those in positions of power; equal access to rights for all to redress exclusion and 
discrimination; and empowerment of those whose rights have been violated.”  
Amnesty International, HUMAN RIGHTS FOR HUMAN DIGNITY., n.d., 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/living-in-dignity/ (accessed January 20, 2017). 
17Ibid.  
18Kenneth Roth, "Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an 
International Human Rights Organization," Human Rights Quarterly, (2004): 63-73. 
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component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-
discrimination in this context also present insights into the issue and advocate for the 
right.  
I look at housing in the case of Kenya as a typical representative state. There are 
many potential factors that could influence a state’s responses to shaming by international 
organizations and actors and Kenya falls on these measures where most other countries 
that are shamed do (and hence, presumably responds in a similar way that most such 
countries would).19 For the case, I will inspect shaming by noting the press releases, the 
annual reports, and specific campaign documents released by major INGOs on the issue, 
the relationship of local HROs to the international effort, the UN’s reports on the country 
in reference to the right being shamed, statements in the Universal Periodic Review or 
resolutions related to the right if any, and any references in the international news media. 
To trace the effects these efforts at shaming have on the country, I note the country’s 
responses whether in press releases or by instituting laws or enforcing laws already in 
place. I also note any other way the country has sought to increase its emphasis on the 
right in general including by passing policies or creating draft guidelines related to the 
right to housing.  
In investigating this case, I find that while shaming encourages Kenya to make 
tactical concessions and even comply with certain norms, violations of the right to 
housing continue de facto. Particularly, noting that HROs have two methods of shaming, 
either addressing the right to housing more generally or focusing on specific violations, 
                                                          
19I elaborate on this in the section detailing the context and background of my case.  
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commonly evictions, I find that while Kenya might in general move towards more 
progressive policies, laws and even Constitutions, this does not often translate to specific 
cases of violations shamed so that evictions continue unabated despite decades of 
shaming attempts. Although my research focuses on a particular right in one country, it 
has potential implications for ESR more broadly, revealing the benefits and limitations of 
naming and shaming ESR that I hope will help HROs understand the effects of their 
actions and allocate resources accordingly. 
Although focusing on only the right to housing in the case of Kenya, I begin with 
an account of ESR more broadly as part of my literature review chapter. First, then, I 
delve into the background and context of the rise of ESR in the present decade, including 
the relative efficacies of alternative mechanisms used to enforce ESR and of using a 
rights-based framework to address economic and social problems at the outset. Next, I 
give an account of research and theories on naming and shaming, divided in two camps 
with the ‘optimists’20 asserting its potential for change and realists and critiques resisting 
this assertion. Following, I go into a brief background of my case, focusing on the 
appearance of the right to housing in international law and in the case of Kenya more 
specifically. Succeeding, I outline my actual analysis of shaming attempts over the years, 
both in general directed at the country and in particular cases and the state’s responses to 
these attempts. Finally, I end with a conclusion section, summarizing my findings, and 
indicating their implications as well as addressing the possible limitations of my study 
 
                                                          
20 A term I coin since liberal, the term used most often in the literature, does not fit all scholars that fall into 
this category even if it fits most. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
In this section, I begin with a brief account of the history of ESR up to HROs’ 
current use of it to address economic and social problems. Next, I discuss the theoretical 
and the empirical literature on naming and shaming. Establishing this literature sets the 
stage for my subsequent analysis of my case. 
Economic and Social Rights: background and context  
I begin by describing how ESR first came about and then, depict how HROs and 
other international institutions interact with it. This helps explicate my subsequent 
discussion on naming and shaming and my analysis 
Where did ESR come from? 
International law first recognized ESR implicitly in 1919 with the creation of the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) under the League of Nations.21 In the 
Declaration, concerning the aims and purposes of the ILO, the first article establishes a 
commitment to addressing the problem of poverty alongside an obligation to uphold a 
conventional CPR, the freedom of expression. It affirms,  
“(a) labour is not a commodity; 
(b) freedom of expression and of association are essential to sustained progress; 
(c) poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere; 
(d) the war against want requires to be carried on with unrelenting vigour within 
each nation, and by continuous and concerted international effort in which the 
representatives of workers and employers, enjoying equal status with those of 
                                                          
21The ILO is now a United Nations organization dedicated to the rights of laborers. 
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governments, join with them in free discussion and democratic decision with a view 
to the promotion of the common welfare.”22 
The first international human rights treaty that explicitly provided for ESR 
(alongside CPR), though, was the UDHR, signed in 1945. Article 17 of the declaration 
attests the right to own property while Articles 22 to 27 comprise all other ESR, including 
the right to social security and leisure and the right to an adequate standard of living and 
education.23 In signing the UDHR, states implicitly affirmed the universality and 
importance of both ESR and CPR. Eide notes, “the realization, particularly in the West, 
that the political upheavals and the emergence of totalitarian regimes in the period 
between the two World Wars had been due to the widespread unemployment and poverty 
led to a genuine interest in securing economic and social rights, not only for their own 
sake but also for the preservation of individual freedom and democracy.”24 In the United 
States, President Roosevelt had already elucidated the four freedoms in his 1941 State of 
the Union speech wherein he highlighted the importance not only of freedom of speech 
and expression, freedom of religion, and freedom from fear, but also freedom from 
want.25 Still, Glendon notes, as delegates debated the draft UDHR treaty’s incorporation 
                                                          
22 ILO Constitution, May 10, 1944, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::No:62:P62_LISt_eNtrIe_ID:2453907:No (accessed 
February 10, 2017). 
23United Nations General Assembly, "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," United Nations, December 
10, 1948, http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (accessed March 10, 2017). 
24Absjorn Eide, "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights," In Human Rights in the World 
Community, by Richard Pierre Claude, & Burns H. Weston, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2006): 172. 
25 In a later State of the Union in 1944, Roosevelt reiterated his commitments to ESR, including the right to 
an education, a job, medical care, and decent housing. To that effect, his first New Deal policies sought 
primarily to apply a relief program for unemployment. As part of the second New Deal, he instituted social 
security and welfare. At the same time, despite this “whole-hearted” support, as Eleanor Roosevelt put it, 
the United States did not consider the articles in the UDHR to “imply an obligation on governments to 
assure the enjoyment of these rights by direct governmental action.”  
Mary Ann Glendon, "The Nations Have their Say: Chang and Malik Navigate the Shoals," In A World 
Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by Mary Ann Glendon, 
(New York: Random House, 2001). 
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of ESR, tension persisted in the struggle to determine whether and to what extent states 
should provide ESR. Moreover, she states, “the struggles over the social and economic 
articles were mainly between representatives of liberal democracies such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom, who wanted to leave more room for individual initiative 
and collective bargaining, and delegates who thought the state should play a greater role 
in regulating wages and working conditions,” where the latter group consists not only of 
Communist country representatives but also of other social democracies. These early 
divisions would later lead to the separation of ESR and CPR. Nevertheless, at this time, 
despite the debate, each provision passed with an overwhelming majority.26  
Despite the initial acceptance of ESR, as time passed, the intensification of Cold 
War politics led to the separation of the two group of rights so that they became 
enshrined in two separate legally binding human rights treaties, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic and Social Rights (ICESCR). In an explanation of its decision to separate the 
two treaties, the UN outlined a distinction between “positive” and “negative” rights, 
where the former (CPR) involve justiciable legal obligations to refrain and the latter 
(ESR) are non-justiciable, programmatic commitments to provide. The document notes, 
“generally speaking, the former were rights of the individual ‘against’ the state, that is, 
against unlawful and unjust action of the state while the latter were rights which the state 
                                                          
26 The delegate from Cuba was essential in these discussions, stressing the equal importance of CPR and 
ESR in the treaty. One of the most consistent supporters of these rights was a Chilean delegate. China 
consistently too insisted on their deep regard for ESR as did the Norwegian and French delegates. 
Glendon discusses, too, the dissonance created in applying the language of rights and entitlement to 
welfare. She describes how more often in national debates, welfare appears as obligations on the state 
rather than concrete entitlements and rights, but that it was the “Human Rights Commission’s desire for 
consistency of style” that led to the use of the language of rights for welfare. 
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would have to take positive action to promote.”27 Here, where ESR demand significant 
resources to implement, CPR do not. For example, one CPR, the right to be free from 
torture calls on the state to stop torturing its citizens and others, and/or to halt potential 
third parties from torturing its residents while an ESR, the right to free and adequate 
education, demands the state assure the provision of the good to all its residents. Because 
of this divide and the contention that ESR are not legal rights, in fact, the UN considered 
not creating a legal treaty for economic and social rights at all.28 Another factor 
influencing the reluctance to accept ESR is the belief that these rights are “second 
generation rights,” requiring first the acceptance of “first generation rights,” CPR, before 
their fulfilment can be addressed. Under this viewpoint, once a state grants CPR, 
provisions for ESR automatically follow.29  
A major driving force behind the creation of this dichotomy, though, was simply 
ideology, where ESR became relegated ‘communist’ rights, those requiring unwarranted 
interference with free market mechanisms, and CPR were individual rights. The US and 
many other Western countries (and importantly donors) subsequently proceeded to reject 
ESR. In turn, non-Western, communist, and Islamic countries rejected CPR on the 
grounds of paternalism, arguing that these rights draw too heavily from Western 
ideologies.30 Despite their claims to neutrality, most major human rights institutions 
                                                          
27 The document quoted in: Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston, and Ryan Goodman, "Comment on Historical 
Origins of Economic and Social Rights," In International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals: 
Text and Material, by Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston, & Ryan Goodman, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 270. 
28 Ibid, 262 
29 Katharine G. Young, Constituting Economic and Social Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
30 Absjorn Eide, "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights," In Human Rights in the World 
Community, by Richard Pierre Claude, & Burns H. Weston, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2006). 
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legitimated the divide, by implicitly endorsing Western capitalism, and ignoring 
violations of ESR, in part, to sustain funding and support from primarily Western donors.  
After the Cold War, scholars and activists made an opening for ESR, noting the 
inconsistency in the division between “negative” and “positive” rights. Just as CPR could 
fail if states did not expend sufficient resources on proper courts with due process 
provisions, ESR could be violated when governments forcibly evicted residents from 
their houses. Both rights, in fact, involve “positive” and “negative” obligations. Officially 
recognizing this, the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna deemed both 
rights ‘universal, indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated.’ Despite continued 
opposition from certain prominent scholars, like Michael Ignatieff, both rights, the UN 
concluded, impose equal obligations to respect, to protect, and to promote. Here, 
respecting rights involves refraining “from interfering with the enjoyment of the right.”31 
A state’s refusal to conduct medical experiments on citizens is an example of a way in 
which states strives to respect the right to health. Protecting rights involves preventing 
“others from interfering with the enjoyment of the right.” For example, protecting the 
right to education involves preventing third parties, such as private schools, from 
discriminating on racial grounds. Promoting rights involves adopting “appropriate 
measures towards the full realization of the right,” including both facilitation (making use 
of knowledge available and reforming preexisting systems), and provision (making 
resources available).32 For example, promoting the right to social security could involve 
                                                          
31Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Frequently Asked Questions on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Fact Sheet No. 33," Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, December 2008, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet33en.pdf (accessed February 10, 2017). 
32Ibid. 
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state provision and regulation of these benefits on a large scale. At the same time, though, 
ESR reduces the burden on the state as “the individual is expected, whenever possible 
through his or her own effort and by use of one’s own resources to find ways to ensure 
the satisfaction of his or her own needs, individually or in association with others.”33 
Thus, although the obligation to enforce the right rests on the state, a country may adopt 
mechanisms that involve the private provision of these rights by third parties rather than 
the state itself and still be meeting its treaty obligations.  
Alongside the end of the Cold War, a reason behind the renewed acceptance of 
ESR is a sharp rise in inequality, beginning in the 1990s, which led to “increasingly 
urgent calls coming from the global South for human rights organizations to take 
subsistence rights more seriously.”34 Subject to this pressure from developing countries, 
more and more HROs began to realize that what most intended beneficiaries of rights 
programs needed and wanted often more than CPR were ESR and that ESR, in 
empowering individuals (particularly women), encourage them to demand that their civil 
and political rights be respected as well. 
Subsequently, major HROs initially only addressing CPR broadened their 
missions to include ESR and new organizations dedicated solely to ESR arose. The new 
HROs consist of FIAN International, the Center for Economic and Social Rights, the 
Center on Housing Rights and Evictions and others. In the early 2000s, two major HROs, 
HRW and AI, both officially expanded their scope to include violations of ESR, 
                                                          
33 Absjorn Eide, "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights," In Human Rights in the World 
Community, by Richard Pierre Claude, & Burns H. Weston, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2006): 175. 
34Daniel P. L Chong, Freedom from Poverty: NGOs and Human Rights Praxis (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 38. 
Beenish Riaz Honors Project: Political Science 
Page 19 of 168 
 
cementing the recognition of these rights. Where HRW decided to officially shame 
violations of ESR along with CPR in 2003, AI had a longer process, beginning to 
consider ESR in the 1990s, under the leadership of Pierre Sane, but only in 2001 at its 
International Council Meeting in Dakar, particularly with insistence from its chapters in 
the global South, did AI adopt ESR. In 2007, under Irene Khan’s leadership, AI’s mission 
statement officially encompassed the “full spectrum” of rights and in 2008, the 
organization launched its campaign for human dignity, with a specific focus on the right 
to adequate housing and healthcare.35 
While the human rights movement accepted ESR, development organizations 
simultaneously sought to integrate rights more firmly in their framework. Beginning in 
1986 with the passing of the Declaration on the Right to Development, this trend took 
root firmly in the early 2000s under the leadership of then-Secretary General of the 
United Nations, Kofi Annan. Annan insisted that human rights along with ESR become a 
part of every UN agency and program, including the UN development program, the 
World Health Organization, and the UN Children’s Fund.36 Other instances where human 
rights appear in development include the Millennium Development Goals, which, 
although do not explicitly mention human rights, take on major ESR issues.37 Despite this 
                                                          
35 Amnesty International, HUMAN RIGHTS FOR HUMAN DIGNITY., n.d., 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/living-in-dignity/ (accessed January 20, 2017). 
36 Under Annan too, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) worked with the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ensure that the Poverty Reduction Strategies 
Papers were human rights friendly. Solidifying this shift towards a rights-based approach to development, 
in 2005, Kofi Annan’s last action as secretary-general was the submission of the report, In Larger 
Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All, that combined Roosevelt’s four 
freedoms to highlight the freedom from want as a key component in the UN’s work in relation to human 
rights and development. 
37 The MDGs set a list of goals for states to achieve by 2015, including the eradication of extreme poverty 
and hunger, the achievement of universal primary education, reduction in child mortality, improving 
maternal health, and combating diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Haglund and Aggarwal indicate that the lack 
of success of the MDGs despite their subtle human rights underpinnings was due to the fact that they did 
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increasing recognition of ESR, though, development organizations continue to keep 
human rights at a distance, dealing with the language of rights and ethics only cautiously. 
The World Bank, the largest development organization, for example, often finds itself on 
the wrong side of the rights debate under pressure for encouraging violations with its over 
emphasis on projects to foster economic growth that often harm the most indigent. With 
development organizations, dependent on donors for funds to help poor aid recipients, 
often the needs of the latter may overtake those of the former, especially when the two 
have contradictory interests.  
In these ways, international organizations and institutions have sought to integrate 
ESR in their frameworks in recent years. In the next subsection, I look at the ways local 
movements have incorporated ESR, the tactics they use and how successful such efforts 
have been. 
ESR at the Local Level 
National and local efforts in many countries, social movements, increasingly use 
rights language too to further their claims to welfare (although local HROs’ use of ESR 
extends far before the end of the Cold War). These movements often invoke a positivist 
conception of law, where law is a concrete set of rules, implemented in national 
legislation and enforced by judges, treating courts, as Gauri and Brinks underscore, as 
“the paradigmatic institutions for identifying legal duties and responding to claims of 
                                                          
not include more of an emphasis on accountability as human rights does. In recent years, the World Bank 
released a new social guarantees model that advocates for the operationalization of ESR as concrete social 
guarantees and policies to address the relational inequality that is at the root of poverty.  
Ladawn Haglund and Rimjhim Aggarwal, "Test of Our Progress: The Translation of Economic and Social 
Rights Norms into Practice," Journal of Human Rights, (2011): 494-520. 
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violations.”38 Emphasizing the importance of the rule of law to ESR, legal scholar 
Katherine Young notes, “Economic and social rights promise to alleviate the wrongs that 
a market-oriented world perpetrates on those otherwise unequipped to enjoy its gains. If 
that promise is delivered, ESR may become part of the law’s answer to the indignities 
and pain caused by the law itself.”39 Even with the specific focus on legalization, for 
HROS seeking to promote social change, “the challenges become how best to identify 
those who ought to respond, how best to evaluate those who have attempted a response, 
and, more generally, how best to assign duties and to hold accountable those who might 
provide an effective response.”40 Activists debate, here, between promoting formal or 
substantive law. While the former symbolically establishes a right through courts and 
often does not address redistribution, the latter works through the legislature to address 
distribution but often reproduces inequality. HROs also typically deliberate a variety of 
leverages to encourage enforcement of ESR, including invoking CPR and treating the 
right as non-derogable (particularly linking the right to life and non-discrimination to 
violations of ESR) or encouraging the promotion of ESR in terms of progressive 
realization, using arguments for human dignity, or generating consensus. Each of these 
methods has significant benefits and limitations. Considering the tactic of treating ESR as 
extensions of CPR violations, Young notes that, although such argument tend to be very 
powerful, they are often too minimalist, focused on only a few rights while arguments 
                                                          
38 Gauri, Varun, and Daniel M. Brinks, Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and 
Economic Rights in the Developing World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
39 Katharine G. Young, Constituting Economic and Social Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
2. 
40 Gauri, Varun, and Daniel M. Brinks, Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and 
Economic Rights in the Developing World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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instead that address human dignity risk broadly and often impractically arguing for the 
full realization of rights.41 
More generally, social movements must determine whether to make radical 
claims to alter the legal structure itself or to call simply for reforming the current 
structure, whether to pursue litigation via courts or to lobby the government. In her study 
of the right to food campaign in India, Hertel finds that radical legal claims that invoke 
the economic right to food as a violation of the right to life in courts prove more 
successful than attempts made by the campaign to simultaneously reform the pre-existing 
system through progressive implementation by lobbying legislators.42 Moreover, 
considering the tactic of combining formal and substantive law in a process termed policy 
legalization, in their book, Courting Social Justice, Gauri and Brinks highlight the ways 
social movements innovatively have used courts to change government policy. They 
present policy legalization as a four-step process involving “legal mobilization” (where a 
case is brought before the court), “judicial decisions,” (where the judge decides the 
outcome of the case), “responses,” (where HROs decide how best to respond to the 
                                                          
41 Katharine G. Young, Constituting Economic and Social Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
42Hertel discusses “a hybrid strategy” of the Campaign to target the persistent and increasing problem of 
hunger. This “hybrid strategy” involved a combination of both radical legal demands and more moderate 
demands for progressive reform, employing strategies as diverse as direct litigation in courts, garnering 
media attention, popular protests and lobbying of the legislature. Backed by an activist court, one victory 
led to others, creating spillover effects in multiple states so that court cases brought about positive change 
in policy. On the other hand, in the Parliament, the bill that eventually passed did not fully address any of 
NGOs’ major demands and was less comprehensive than the policies of many states. As reasons for this 
failure, Hertel cites the inherent difficulty of measuring progressive implementation, the lack of assignation 
of blame, budgetary constraints unable to determine how much to allocate to a right at the cost of another, 
legislators not willing to challenge power structures, the lack of grass-roots level mobilization designed to 
raise awareness on the issue, and the popularity of policies addressing the “symptoms” of inequality rather 
than the actual causes of problems. Hertel draws these conclusions by conduction both qualitative and 
quantitative analyses. 
Hertel, Shareen, "Why Bother? Measuring Economic Rights: The Research Agenda," International Studies 
Perspectives, (2006): 215-230. 
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decision i.e. whether to lobby the legislature to encourage laws), and “follow-up 
litigation” (where states enact laws addressing the issue and reparations are given in 
accordance with the decision).43 Noting this, Gauri and Brinks ask, “will giving courts a 
more prominent role in economic and social policy make governments and others more 
accountable for responding to extreme poverty and deprivation?”44 Inspecting the use of 
policy legalization in four different cases, South Africa, Brazil, India, Nigeria and 
Indonesia, they find that, while courts do help in some instances (e.g. in South Africa), 
they may not be as helpful in others (e.g. India). They conclude, then, that although 
policy legalization provides some benefits, the tactic also imposes limitations.  
Both “demand side factors” (influencing litigants’ decisions to bring cases to 
court) and “supply side factors” (determining the likelihood of courts responding 
favorably to litigants’ demands) influence the success of the process. On the demand 
side, the inaccessibility of laws and lawyers to those in need limits the impact and the 
extent to which laws can aid those most in need. Gauri and Brinks state, “the benefits will 
be concentrated among those who already have some level of personal resources and 
access to state services – urban claimants in more modernized context with a greater state 
presence.”45 Limiting their impact, social movements, activists, and organizations also 
have limited capacity and remain divided over the best policies to realize ESR.46 Another 
major limitation is that cases brought to court concerning ESR more often implicate third 
party providers, such as businesses, landlords, and hospitals, and not the state. On the 
                                                          
43 Varun Gauri and Daniel M. Brinks, Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and 
Economic Rights in the Developing World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4. 
44 Ibid, 2-3 
45 Ibid, 21. 
46 Varun Gauri and Daniel M. Brinks, Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and 
Economic Rights in the Developing World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 15. 
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‘supply side,’ the relative favorability of judges to adjudicate on matters of ESR often 
affects the effectiveness of policy legalization. In fact, Gauri and Brinks note, 
“courts…are not likely to be engaged in imperative monologues, demanding particular 
policies on behalf of nonrepresentative elites,” focusing instead on more popular policies, 
supported by the public broadly.47 Culture and context matter too.48 In the case of 
Malawi, Gloppen and Kanyongolo find that despite the existence of a pro-poor 
Constitution, judges often refuse to uphold ESR claims, disadvantaging the most poor 
because of a legal culture that interprets rights narrowly, a weak civil society and the 
general inaccessibility of courts.49 Furthermore, in her study, conducting a regression 
analysis, and looking at all states more broadly, Kaletski et. al. investigate whether 
constitutionalizing ESR promotes their fulfillment, translating into actual outcomes, and 
finds a general positive impact of progressive Constitutions.50 For a variety of reasons, 
policy legalization, then, may not alter policy as it hopes to do. 
                                                          
47 Ibid. 
48For example, in the case of Indonesia, Susanti indicates the presence of a legal culture, based on a 
disruptive political history, that perceives the judiciary as inherently corrupt producing, from the outset, a 
limited number of cases filed at court with most people opting instead to pursue dispute resolution in more 
informal institutions.  
Bivitri Susanti, “The Implementation of the Right to Health Care and Education in Indonesia,” in Varun 
Gauri and Daniel M. Brinks, Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights 
in the Developing World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
49 S. Gloppen, S. and F. E. Kayongolo, "Judicial Independence and the Judicialisation of Electoral Politics 
in Malawi and Uganda," In Accountable Governments in Africa: Perspectives from Public Law and 
Political Studies, by D.M. Chirwa, & L. Nijzink, (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2012). 
50Using data collected from 201 constitutions as their independent variable and the SERF Index as their 
dependent variable, they find a positive correlation between constitutional provisions of ESR and fulfilment 
of the right to health. They argue that, in some cases, such as with the right to health, constitutions 
encourage states to pass enforceable laws on the issue and thereby, improve the quality of those rights in 
that state, while in other cases, like with the right to food, the evidence that constitutional provisions help is 
less conclusive. Since, more often than not, courts tend to be reluctant and conservative instead of radical 
and disruptive, litigating ESR proves increasingly difficult whether the state has a progressive Constitution 
or not, differing depending on the laws of the context, the receptiveness of the judiciary, peoples’ general 
faith in the law and the ability and willingness of the state to heed the judiciary’s orders and implement the 
policies proposed in actuality.  
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As alternatives to litigating or often alongside litigating, NGOs pursue other ways 
to promote ESR, including raising public awareness and protesting as well as grass roots 
mobilization. Looking at different communication tactics, Pruce and Budabin describe 
three categories of information that NGOs gather, namely the juridical mode, which 
involves fact-finding and delivering information from an objective and impartial source, 
the revelatory mode which is naming and shaming itself that holds actors accountable 
(which I address later as the primary focus of this paper), and the activating mode where 
HROs simply work to raise awareness through storytelling using information as a moral 
force.51 In the discussion below, local groups look to the juridical mode and the activating 
mode more prominently, illustrating the ways activists have sought to address ESR issues 
separate from shaming by international NGOs.  
The scholar Ibhawoh underscores the immense successes of local campaigns. 
Looking at a different innovative campaign, particularly one less reliant on the law and 
focused more on mass mobilization and education, Ibhawoh calls on INGOs and others to 
emulate the Ghanaian campaign in seeking to address the problem of poverty.52 Here, to 
advocate for participation by the poor in programs designed to benefit them and to call 
for redistribution by the state, local NGOs framed poverty as a human rights issue. Rather 
than lobbying legislators, though, these organizations raised awareness among service 
providers most concerned with the issue who, in turn, they encouraged to approach the 
                                                          
Elizabeth Kaletski, Lanse Minkler, Nishith Prakash, and Susan Randolph, "Does Constitutionalizing 
Economic and Social Rights Promote their Fulfillment?," Economic Rights Working Paper Series, Storrs, 
Connecticut: Human Rights Institute University of Connecticut, June 2014. 
51 Joel R. Pruce, and Alexandra Cosima Budabin, "Beyond naming and shaming: New modalities of 
information politics in human rights," Journal of Human Rights, (2016): 408-425. 
52Bonny Ibhawoh, "Beyond Naming and Shaming: Methodological Imperatives of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights Advocacy," African yearbook of international law, (2008): 49-67. 
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state to demand policy change. According to Ibhawoh, these organizations produced 
change, successfully, criticizing and altering not only government programs, but also the 
practices of international actors (particularly the World Bank) in the country.53 In another 
study on the effectiveness of different strategies NGOs use to target the issue of women’s 
rights, Murdie and Peksen find that, strategies like naming and shaming have little to no 
effect but rather, education and awareness are key tools. In these cases, they note, 
“governments that face pressure from advocacy groups are more inclined to promote and 
enforce only the rights that do not threaten their own political power and status, such as 
women’s social and economic rights,” not promoting these rights when they take on a 
more political content.54  
In their book, Stones of Hope, White and Perelman look at four main campaigns 
in three different African states, spearheaded by local lawyers and activists that use ESR 
to address the problems of poverty and structural inequality to explain when, in what 
ways, and for what reasons such activism succeeds and/or fails.55 Highlighting the utility 
of the language of rights, they find that, “ESR activism can shift the distribution of 
                                                          
53 Ibid. 
54Amanda Murdie, and Dursun Peksen, "The Impact of Human Rights INGO Shaming on Humanitarian 
Interventions," The Journal of Politics, (2014): 215-228. 
55 The first largely successful case the authors take is the anti-eviction campaign led by a local NGO in 
Lagos that combined legal efforts with education and organizing efforts to blame multiple actors for the 
evictions and to demand diverse remedies, including the redistribution of power and economic resources. 
The second, another successful case, is the South African Treatment Action campaign that used the law to 
demand structural change, calling on the state to provide treatment to prevent HIV transmission from 
pregnant mothers to their babies, mobilizing the public around the right to health by emphasizing 
redistribution. The third campaign failed to produce the change it called for, addressed mass evictions in 
Tanzania, where the government and international donors justified evictions on the grounds that they 
bolster tourism and thereby, promote economic growth. With HROs unable to provide a united front, the 
imperatives of economic growth took precedence over those of human rights and the evictions continued 
unabated. The fourth and final case is the right to health movement in Ghana that sought to frame the issue 
as a violation of the civil and political right to freedom of movement and personal security. 
Jeremy Perelman and Lucie E. White, Stones of Hope: How African Activists Reclaim Human Rights to 
Challenge Global Poverty, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
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socioeconomic goods from rich to poor.”56 Echoing Hertel’s finding that radical claims 
prove more fruitful than reformist ones, White and Perelman conclude that, “the power of 
these campaigns comes through the disruption of entrenched power relations – and the 
resulting space for renaming – that the campaigns open up.”57 Nevertheless, noting the 
limitations of the rights approach, they emphasize that, while rights have transformative 
power, they only disrupt power structures in momentary bursts so that their actual power 
stems from the reproduction of such disruptions over the years as they “will be 
remembered and replayed in ways that can open more sustained space for ideological 
challenge and institutional innovation.”58 In the process of making their argument, White 
and Perelman bring to the fore a variety of helpful models to conceptualize actors in local 
social movements. First, advocates are “pragmatic,” consciously choosing to use the 
rights rhetoric despite multiple alternative means of framing and addressing the same 
issues, indicating their considerations of the costs and benefits of the approach before 
adopting it.59 Because these advocates realize that the law is not the be all and the end all, 
they can use multiple fora to advocate their claims, blame multiple actors, demand radical 
change to alter power relations. A second model White and Perelman indicate is activists’ 
engagement in “public performances that manifest the injustice they are fighting and 
enlist the empathy of multiple audiences with the people and communities they 
represent.”60 Here, activists use claims of rights, disrupting pre-established power 
                                                          
56Ibid, 7. 
57Ibid, 14. 
58Ibid. They indicate that ESR advocates enact change in an arc, beginning with the creation of “local 
generative space,” moving to building the foundation from which ESR change can occur, proceeding next 
to pressuring national political institutions to change their practices to become more ESR friendly. After the 
change in government practices occurs, ESR activists seek to spread the changes in multiples settings. 
59 Ibid,150. 
60 Ibid,153-4. 
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hierarchies, in large measure, as a performance. In this way, advocates invoke ESR to 
initiate a long struggle to change structures and alleviate injustice. 
Considering activists as pragmatic and seeking performance, the use of rights to 
address economic and social hardship involves the weighing of the benefits and 
limitations of this discourse. Young describes rights as powerful, “inhabiting the space 
between ethical and legal arguments, rights provide a legitimate language of claim-
making.”61 Unlike the framework of needs, development, charity and rivaling 
humanitarian appeal, rights demand action. Nevertheless, traditionally, and still today, 
rights are not the only or even the most prominent lens by which to view economic and 
social problems. Listing a few alternatives, Chong notes, “If activists’ ultimate goal is an 
end to extreme material deprivation, this could occur through broad-based economic 
growth; cultural and educational changes; changes in individual behavior…national 
legislation, changes in state policies and budgets,” each of which could be accomplished 
a variety of ways, through development, humanitarian, domestic or private charitable 
organizations.62 Yet, in adopting these rights, INGOs contend that human rights can 
contribute to the alleviation of immense structural problems when alternatives cannot. 
Addressing the question of what a rights framework provides that other 
frameworks do not, Yamin outlines the many benefits of a human rights approach.63 For 
one, rights bring accountability to the debate, inserting the political into the economic and 
implicating and demanding those in power to act. Considering that the signatories of 
                                                          
61 Ibid,14. 
62Daniel P. L. Chong, "Five Challenges to Legalizing Economic and Social Rights." Human Rights Review, 
(2009): 183-204. 
63 Alicia Ely Yamin, Power, Suffering, and the Struggle for Dignity: Human Rights Frameworks for Health 
and Why They Matter, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). 
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international treaties are state parties, rights focus on holding the state accountable for its 
failures to respect, protect or promote a right. Nevertheless, considering their moral 
influence, activists can use rights to hold third party private actors and transnational 
organizations accountable as well. Another benefit is the empowering nature of rights, its 
ability to shift the burden from those in need to the state. Pieterse states, “rights-talk is 
empowering in that it affirms the inherent dignity of rights-bearers and awards political 
legitimacy to their demands for the satisfaction of their, otherwise overlooked, material 
needs.”64 Where charitable and development organizations too often reduce the sufferer 
to a passive victim, a recipient of aid, helped less out of an obligation and more as a 
favor, human rights shift the blame away from the victims and implicate those in 
positions of power who have not done enough to help.65 Another advantage of human 
rights is that its language allows for an international dialogue. In their universal 
applicability, human rights connect different corners of the globe and provide legitimacy 
to the appeals of ESR.66  
Despite all these benefits, there are many limitations of a human rights based 
approach in practice. Investigating directly the question of whether and how effective 
rights discourse is in alleviating social and economic hardship, Pieterse discusses the 
                                                          
64Marius Pieterse, "Eating Socioeconomic Rights: The Usefulness of Rights Talk in Alleviating Social 
Hardship Revisited," Human Rights Quarterly, (2007): 796-822. 
65 McNeill and St. Clair note, “The language of violation implies a relational approach between wealth and 
poverty that is difficult to ignore…moving away from the notion that poverty is the responsibility of the 
poor themselves, or of their states…calling for serious and immediate action and preventive measures.”  
Desmond McNeill and Asuncion Lera St. Clair, Global Poverty, Ethics and Human Rights, (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 114. 
66 Hajjar emphasizes that since working within the rule of law to bolster change is so limiting as to be 
almost impossible in the Israel-Palestine context, lawyers instead attempt to spread issues by publicizing 
them using human rights, appealing to an external international community to improve a local hostile one. 
Lisa Hajjar, "Cause Lawyering in Transnational Perspective," In The Law and Society Reader 2, by Patrick 
Schmidt, & Erik Larson, 166-172, (New York: New York University Press, 2014). 
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South African court’s interpretation of socioeconomic rights and its role in defeating 
social movements. He argues, in this context, that rights fail in their transformative 
function. To explain how this occurs, Pieterse first articulates the scholar Gabel’s account 
of the way the status quo assimilates rights to defeat social movements. In this 
framework, rights, by their very nature, are abstract, ambiguous, politically neutral, and 
conceptually empty, intentionally constructed this way to facilitate consensus, leaving 
them open to different interpretations by the state and other parties.67 Embedded in 
institutions, this non-enforceable, aspirational, quality of rights leaves them open to 
political abuse and instrumentalization, so that not only do they not alleviate hardship, 
but they also reinforce and legitimate the exclusionary status quo, silencing the 
vulnerable and denying the need for redistribution. Gabel contends, here, that rights 
simply signify “a passive locus of possible action,” and states deceive their citizens into 
demanding these possibilities instead of the actual satisfaction of needs.68 Expanding on 
this, Pieterse emphasizes instead the court’s role in interpreting rights, describing it as a 
key factor in South Africa in delegitimizing the original transformative potential of rights 
and maintaining the status quo. Courts, here, interpret rights too abstractly, demanding 
the state “take reasonable measures aimed at the progressive realization of the right” 
without looking to the individual’s actual needs.69 
Another objection to a human rights approach to ESR is that rights are often elite-
oriented, requiring resources and lawyers to invoke, making them inaccessible to the 
extremely indigent or disadvantaged so that they are not as empowering as they claim to 
                                                          
67Marius Pieterse, "Eating Socioeconomic Rights: The Usefulness of Rights Talk in Alleviating Social 
Hardship Revisited," Human Rights Quarterly, (2007): 796-822.  
68Ibid.  
69Ibid: 809. 
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be. Other limitations of rights are more specific to ESR and include sustained US 
opposition that makes effective action towards these rights’ realization difficult if not 
impossible, resulting in wasted funds. A related concern is that organizations and 
international institutions and even states are “over-stretching” in adopting ESR and “do 
not have the internal capacity to advocate for subsistence rights effectively.”70 McNeill 
and St. Clair add that HROs have little clout to bring about change where clout refers to 
“power in the financial/economic terms: the extent to which the organization in question 
can use its muscle to bring about change.”71 They argue too, concerning capacity, that not 
only is there little experience in legislating ESR in courts, but also that human rights 
place too much pressure on states. This objection is especially notable, considering 
HROs’ struggle to operationalize the unique concept and language of “progressive 
realization,” language that provides a convenient scapegoat for governments to use to 
both save their reputations and render the efforts of INGOs futile. Article 2 part 1 of the 
ICESCR, outlines the concept: 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, 
to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”72 
Progressive realization, then, considers a state’s resources to evaluate its 
obligations. Hence, a state can, to avoid recrimination for abuses of ESR, declare that 
they have insufficient resources and cannot fulfill said rights at the current time. Tied to 
                                                          
70Daniel P. L Chong, Freedom from Poverty: NGOs and Human Rights Praxis (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2010): 37. 
71Desmond McNeill and Asuncion Lera St. Clair, Global Poverty, Ethics and Human Rights, (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 16. 
72 UN, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, New York: United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, December 16, 1966. 
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this is prominent development discourse, outlining the ‘resource argument.’ Here, 
development workers often contend that economic growth will eventually, automatically 
lead to improvements in ESR to justify overlooking ESR.73 Considering these 
counterarguments makes rights difficult to enforce. 
This section has addressed the ways in which, for what reasons, and with what 
results local advocates demand an end to material deprivation using ESR. This has 
implications for how effective shaming ESR can or cannot be as I investigate in this 
paper. The next section takes a closer look at the theoretical and empirical literature 
concerning shaming in general. 
Naming and Shaming 
By its very nature, international law does not establish a supranational authority to 
enforce it. Due to the lack of a punitive body (an international ‘police force’) and the 
presence of sovereign states, a variety of mechanisms seek to enforce the law in less 
material or militarily coercive ways. These include mechanisms in the UN, such as 
special rapporteurs, treaty bodies and associated committees, individual complaints 
mechanisms, comments by the UN high commissioner for human rights, as well as 
international courts (such as the International Criminal Court), and in some cases, 
regional and even domestic courts, and even foreign policy. One method of international 
law enforcement, the focus of this paper and the major method INGOs have, is naming 
and shaming. In this section, I begin with an explication of the limitations and potential 
of international law enforcement in general. Next, I describe some of the theoretical 
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discussion on shaming, before explicating some of the empirical findings on shaming 
CPR. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the debate on shaming ESR. 
The Limitations and Potential of International Law 
Enforcing international law is difficult because, as Koh discusses, “human rights 
norms are vague and aspirational, because enforcement mechanisms are toothless, 
because treaty regimes are notoriously weak, and because national governments lack the 
economic self-interest or the political will to restrain their own human rights 
violations.”74 Yet, there are many actual instances where human rights played a role in 
changing states’ attitudes and policies and many others where rights backfired. According 
to Koh, nations can have four different kinds of relationships with international law, 
including “coincidence,” a situation where they simultaneously and unintentionally 
happen to follow international norms, “conformity,” where states know and follow 
international norms consciously but only because these do not inconvenience them or 
cost more than alternatives, “compliance” where states follow norms to receive benefits 
or avoid costs, and the final stage, “obedience” where laws become internalized and part 
of the value system of the nation so that sanctions are unnecessary.75 To explain why and 
under what conditions nations adopt human rights norms and internalize international 
law, Koh develops the transnational legal process theory.  
Nations, Koh presents, obey for six main reasons, including to get power, out of 
self-interest or as a rational choice to gain benefits, to gain legitimacy and solidify 
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political identity, simply to follow other states, or as a result of diffusion as norms move 
from state to state and top down from international to national. Each of these 
explanations stems from a different conception of law enforcement. The first emphasizes 
power, stresses that only coercion or bribery whether material or otherwise can force 
nations to comply with international law. In the second, the law is instrumental, created 
in the collective self-interest of states so that compliance is a rational choice.76 The third 
places legitimacy in the laws themselves and nations find themselves “normatively 
pulled” to the rules, often influenced by their democratic political identity to adopt them. 
The fourth rests on the importance of states’ memberships in an international community 
that compels them to comply with norms so as not to appear as outsiders. The fifth and 
sixth emphasize the constitutive effects of law in spreading and changing institutions and 
structures from one level to the other.77 Delving in greater detail in this last “horizontal” 
story of diffusion and the “vertical” one, Koh outlines his theory, emphasizing the 
pressure applied on states to accept norms, encouraging states’ compliance. He notes, 
“the key agents in this transnational legal process are transnational norm entrepreneurs, 
governmental norm sponsors, transnational issue networks, interpretive communities and 
law-declaring fora, bureaucratic compliance procedures, and issue linkages among issue 
areas.”78 NGOs play a significant role, here, in defining, interpreting and legitimating 
international law to operationalize norms. Koh emphasizes, “international human rights 
law is enforced not just by nation-states, not just by government officials, not just by 
world historical figures, but by people like us, by people with the courage and 
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commitment to bring international human rights law home through a transnational legal 
process of interaction, interpretation, and internalization.”79  
For international law enforcement, then, NGOs are particularly powerful actors 
because they stand as neutral and objective, not tied to the concerns of a particular state 
and not concerned with private gain nor with earning political power.80 An important 
function of theirs, arguably one of the most prominent, is their work in enforcing human 
rights norms through the practice of naming and shaming. The next subsection discusses 
this tactic in detail and the theoretical debates surrounding its efficacy. 
Naming and Shaming: Theoretical Debates 
The first scholar to use the term shaming in the context of international politics 
was Alfred Zimmern, who, in his seminal study of the League of Nations in 1936, hoped 
states’ use of the tactic would foster change. The strategy’s first application, though, 
dates all the way back to the abolition of the Transatlantic slave trade, during which 
public pressure rose to revolutionary heights, compelling Western states ultimately to 
outlaw the practice.81 A primary source of this pressure included prominent norm 
entrepreneurs, responsible for reframing slavery as an amoral injustice. Today, HROs 
rely on shaming to promote the realization of human rights, spending majority of their 
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resources and efforts on furthering its successful use. Yet, increasing debate surrounds 
the question of the efficacy of shaming with more optimistic theories under incessant 
scrutiny for their ‘irrational’ idealism. Although even the optimists steadily grow 
skeptical of the extent to which shaming can meet its goals, they still leave room for 
hope. In my analysis, later, I will draw on these theories, applying them to the case of 
economic and social rights to articulate the ways shaming functions in this overlooked 
context and under what conditions it can (or cannot) be effective.  
The more optimistic theorists predicate their models on Hedley Bull’s conception 
of international relations. Herein, the possibility exists that states will respond favorably 
to social pressure, but as Friman states, even then, “Bull discusses moral sanction as an 
effective measure in and of itself only in the case of homogenous primitive stateless 
societies.”82 In parallel, although optimists aver that shaming is effective, they do so 
while imposing significant limitations on its chance of success and citing its successful 
application only in certain (arguably) non-representative cases. Keck and Sikkink make 
the first such argument in their book, Activists Beyond Borders, wherein they outline a 
theory of ‘transnational advocacy networks’ that recounts the many ways ‘transnational 
networks’ can enforce and spread norms. The transnational human rights network 
consists of “1) parts of intergovernmental organizations at both the international and 
regional level 2) international NGOs 3) domestic NGOs 4) private foundations and 5) 
parts of some governments.”83 The members of the transnational network have a number 
of strategies at their disposal, including “information politics,” (essentially a process of 
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spreading awareness where organizations gather information), “symbolic politics” 
(wherein activists use conferences and other events to strategically frame issues and 
spread knowledge and recognition of them), “accountability politics” (where they hold 
actors accountable for the promises they have made), and “leverage politics” (where 
organizations use the threat of moral or material power to demand compliance).84 
Although Keck and Sikkink do not explicitly articulate this, naming and shaming 
encompasses all the forms of “politics” in practice. Organizations need to be able to 
gather objective information to name violations, need to use human rights norms to frame 
issues as violations and thereby, hold states accountable to international treaties and to 
finally convince the state to hear their objections, they need moral leverage.  
In Keck and Sikkink’s theory, the process of halting violations occurs in a vertical 
‘boomerang’ pattern, beginning from the bottom with domestic NGOs, who find 
themselves unable to convince their respective states to adopt/stop violating certain 
norms.85 Not finding a domestic solution, NGOs turn to the international community for 
assistance, most prominently to international HROs, who, after some investigating of 
their own, ordinarily identify a violation and start to pressure the state from the top. The 
recent case of Myanmar is an example of a potential ‘success’ story under this model. 
The state, having received criticism for its human rights record for decades, plagued by 
the pressures of economic and trade sanctions, in recent years, responded to shaming by 
taking some measures (though limited) to comply with human rights, most prominently 
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releasing many prisoners of conscience, including Aung Sun Suu Kyi, and ameliorating 
their image as a democracy in the international community.  
However, noting instances where the network does not function as expected, 
Keck and Sikkink outline certain conditions that make it likely to succeed. For one, since 
their theory relies on domestic NGOs, the number and strength of these significantly 
influences the extent to which shaming itself will occur.86 Moreover, the international 
actors who take on the cause must both be able “to mobilize their own members and 
affect public opinion” and have “powerful allies.”87 HROs, then, need to have both 
sufficient moral legitimacy and capital to make claims, invoking powerful connections 
and using reliable information, as well as the backing of other actors, such as third party 
states, to succeed. While prominent HROs, like AI, do have moral capital, shaming ESR 
fails to have the backing of any third-party actors. The state being shamed, in turn, must 
‘care’ about the effects shaming might have on its reputation in the international 
community, with the theory resting “on the assumption that governments value the good 
opinions of others” or failing that do not wish to lose trade connections or other material 
benefits that compliance with human rights might provide.88  
To illustrate their theory, Keck and Sikkink rely on selective case studies. They 
begin with an inspection of the ‘historical precursors’ to present-day shaming, taking the 
cases of the campaign to abolish slavery in the United States in the 19th century, the 
international movement for women’s suffrage in the 20th century, and early campaigns 
against foot-binding in China and female genital mutilation in East Africa. Proceeding 
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this analysis, they look to modern cases of human rights violations, referencing multiple 
Latin American countries, but focusing particularly on the Argentine violations in the 
1970s and the largely successful campaign that halted those, and consistent abuses in 
Mexico with a partially successful campaign that has produced limited change.89 They 
posit that Mexico’s extended resistance to international pressure exists in large part 
because of the weakened network, a result of the limited number of domestic human 
rights NGOs in the country. Since their theory is intended to be applicable to contexts 
wider than the human rights movement, they take some cases of the environmental 
advocacy network as well and present some speculations on the campaign on violence 
against women. Considering the final selection of cases, Jetschke and Liese note that the 
model is only intended for a limited number of states, those that are “authoritarian, 
repressive states with little political legitimacy but considerable state authority, hardly 
any experience of transnational advocacy, and with material and social 
vulnerability…this is so because these are the conditions under which we would expect 
transnational advocacy to be effective.”90 Most states shamed today, though, do not 
match all or any of these criteria,  having ratified treaties and the model would not 
necessarily apply to these cases. 
Expanding and modifying Keck and Sikkink’s model to better explain the ways 
international norms influence domestic politics, Risse and Sikkink outline the five-phase 
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spiral model. To sketch their theory, they look at “paired cases of countries with serious 
human rights situations from each region of the world” including both “well-publicized 
success stories” of international human rights like Chile, South Africa, the Philippines, 
Poland, and the former Czechoslovakia,” but also “a series of more obscure and 
apparently intractable cases of human rights violations such places as Guatemala, Kenya, 
Uganda, Morocco, Tunisia, and Indonesia.”91 Here, they sustain all the limitations of the 
‘transnational advocacy network’ theory, including its applicability to only a few cases. I 
consider the details of this prominent model in the naming and shaming literature in my 
analysis where I indicate what I learn from the optimists and realists to explain and apply 
to my study of the right to housing in Kenya.  
To exert pressure and ensure compliance, in Risse and Sikkink’s framework, 
HROs and other international actors can adopt four mechanisms of interaction, including 
“coercion,” “changing incentives,” “persuasion and discourse” (echoed from Keck and 
Sikkink), and “capacity building.” ‘Coercion’ is the direct use of military force to enforce 
international laws and in the case of gross violations of human rights law, like genocide, 
can take the form of humanitarian intervention. ‘Changing incentives’ involves the use of 
material sanctions and rewards, relying on a more powerful third party. These need not 
simply mean economic sanctions, but rather, human rights can bolster trade agreements 
and exist as conditions for aid. A prominent party in most of these transaction is the US, a 
world power and one most willing and able to exert this pressure. The tactic, “persuasion 
and discourse,” though, is where naming and shaming itself comes in as an attempt by 
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HROs to reason and convince the state that it is in their best moral, legal, or even 
economic interests to comply with human rights and internalize their validity.92 Shaming, 
also, may prompt third parties to act by coercion or changing incentives. Finally, INGOs 
can aid in capacity building, particularly in states where human rights are violated not out 
of malicious intent of the authorities, but rather, because the state lacks the capacity to 
enforce the norms. 
Further expanding on Risse and Sikkink’s model to include additional 
considerations, Goodman and Jinks introduce potential ‘crowding out effects.’93 
Correcting for Risse and Sikkink’s assumption that shaming can work together in 
harmony with coercion and other mechanisms of enforcement, Goodman and Jinks 
introduce the possibility that one mechanism may undercut the other. For example, 
coercion may undermine persuasion. They state, “the employment of material incentives 
is often incompatible with the employment of social and cognitive “incentives.””94 In 
particular, if greater emphasis is paid to material sanctions, the value of the social might 
decrease. This is what they call the ‘separability fallacy.’ A second fallacy they note is 
the ‘additive fallacy,’ assuming that adding different incentives will automatically 
increase the likelihood of attaining the desired ends.95 Applying both economic sanctions 
and coercion, though, might not halt violations. For example, then, as the network 
strengthens, Kenya may not improve its human rights record. Other complications of the 
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mechanisms include the fact that they may legitimate a practice unintentionally by 
emphasizing how prevalent it is, and in reference to monetary incentives, in particular, 
states may face a declined self-perception and a ‘bitterness’ in finding themselves 
‘forced’ to comply with norms, instead of choosing to do so as sovereign entities. If 
repeated enough, states may stop to ‘care’ about sanctions and further violate norms, like 
North Korea. Goodman and Jinks, then, argue for the addition of these considerations to 
modify the spiral model.96 
Other optimists, including Schulz, similarly, espouse the efficacy of shaming with 
limitations, particularly noting the contingency of powerful third party support. Schulz 
argues that violator-states will decide to comply (or not to) on the basis of a cost-benefit 
analysis. He states, “repressive governments may calculate that formally aligning 
themselves with virtue brings rewards that far outweigh the danger of simple criticism.”97 
He insists that, in practice, if the only punishment is a “mere loss of face or honor,” 
shaming will not change state practices.98 Adding to this contention, Franklin focuses on 
why governments choose to violate human rights, creating the “political repression 
theory.”99 Violations, he contends, must provide some benefit to the state and the state 
will only, then, cease to commit them should the potential cost outweigh the benefit. In 
this context, shaming may provide a cost not simply by hurting reputations, but also in 
the form of “increased domestic opposition, declining investment and tourism and 
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international sanctions.”100 If the resultant costs of shaming, then, are heavy, the state, a 
rational actor, will comply. 
However, Schulz proceeds to reframe the debate slightly too by defining the 
primary purpose of shaming not as enforcement, but rather, as an educative tool, used to 
spread norms. Taking a psychological perspective, Schulz argues that although shaming 
will need an external third party to back its claims to be effective in terms of enforcement 
or to act as a deterrence mechanism for a specific violation, a more important function of 
the practice is its effect in raising issues to the agenda, in creating and spreading norms, 
and not in enforcing their immediate implementation. He states, “the critical factor in 
whether the laws will be followed is less likely to be the immediate presence of law 
enforcers and more likely to be whether people decide to conform their behavior to the 
requisite norm.”101 As “norm promoters,” to be most effective, organizations need to be 
“powerful, well-funded, and legitimate…(rather) than illegitimate, hypocritical, 
underfunded or weak.” Schulz places most weight, then, on big HROs, like AI (who “has 
for years taken the candle wrapped in barbed wire as its logo and “shining light into 
darkness” as its commanding metaphor”) and HRW, and some prominent donors, such as 
the Ford Foundation.102 Schulz, then, presents an area of hope where HROs can be 
effective, independent of other powerful entities and without immediately enforcing 
norms. 
The other major camp of scholars, the more pessimistic camp often termed the 
(neo)realists, though, argue that human rights in general and shaming in particular is 
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ineffective. These theorists draw on the work of Hans Morgenthau (in Politics among 
Nations) to insist that shaming is nothing more than empty threats and cheap talk, that 
expecting states to comply with public opinion is excessively idealistic.103 In more 
concrete terms, shaming does not work because “NGOs and the media lack authority over 
states and the UNHRC, packed full of despots, lacks legitimacy.”104 For them, there is no 
instance where shaming could work, especially as simple ‘persuasion.’ As Neumayer 
puts it, “things happen if powerful countries want them to happen.”105 In fact, some 
realists, like Hafner-Burton does, argue that shaming may actually exacerbate the 
problem, increasing human rights abuses, even providing incentives to abuse. Hafner-
Burton takes the case of Nigeria in the late 1990s to illustrate this, where the ousting of 
the president and the institution of military rule led to a tremendous surge in human rights 
abuses.106 AI and HRW proceeded to shame the country heavily alongside other actors, 
including Western news agencies and states. In response, Nigeria denied all allegations. 
When the next general came to power, he strategically used human rights, instituting 
some measures of freedom to protect some rights, what Risse and Sikkink would see as 
tactical concessions, while increasing the repression and abuse of its citizens to blindside 
the international community. In making these claims too, other realists question the 
legitimacy of HROs themselves, as entities that “have selectively enforced rules to 
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support friends and punish adversaries.”107 Realists, then, argue that the human rights 
movement perpetuates and reinforces power relations in all its aspects, including when 
shaming. 
Concerning Risse and Sikkink’s prominent spiral model directly, realists often 
attack its truth. Critiquing the model, Jetschke and Liese argue that the spiral model does 
not take into account that the country being shamed may present powerful 
counterarguments to potentially attack the persuasiveness of HROs (the US’ national 
security discourse in response to the violation of the right to be free from torture is the 
most apparent example). Moreover, they note, echoing Simmons, that commitment does 
not always lead to rule following so that a state may ratify an international human rights 
treaty only to continue to violate norms, as did Tunisia and Nigeria. Moreover, 
democracies have a greater ability to counter shaming since “their policies are legitimized 
by voter approval even if these policies result in human rights violations.”108 This 
contests the important assumption that public opinion is always on the side of the 
dispossessed. For example, in the case of welfare rights in the US, politicians continue to 
overlook the system in large part due to the prevalent belief that the poor deserve their 
poverty and particularly that black matriarchs, so-called “welfare queens,” cheat the 
system to escape having to work for their living. In summary, Jetscke and Liese state, 
“The spiral model not only failed to take note of the dialogic character of the logic of 
persuasion, but lacked a concept of persuasion allowing for the possibility that various 
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domestic and international audiences might actually accept the argument of norm-
violating governments.”109 This severely limits the type of human rights that can be 
effectively shamed since “human rights campaigns are more effective when the violations 
are targeted against innocent citizens and, hence, the public fears that anyone could 
become the next victim.”110 Not every vulnerable group, though, can readily be framed as 
‘innocent’ victims. 
Realists, though, still fail to take into account and persuasively explain instances 
where human rights do succeed. Keck and Sikkink note, “realism offers no convincing 
explanation for why relatively weak non-state actors could affect state policy, or why 
states would concern themselves with the internal human rights practices of other states 
even when doing so interferes with the pursuit of other goals.”111 In fact, if power 
determined every action, many countries’ adoption and internalization of human rights 
and their integration of it into foreign policy, even the mere creation of international 
human rights treaties, is unexplainable. 
A third potential camp takes inspiration from the institutionalists in International 
Relations theory, to articulate naming and shaming (and human rights) as ineffective or 
effective depending on their interpretation of the group. The perspective focuses on the 
‘community’ nature of the ‘international community’ where states help each other with 
mutual and long term benefits. Although the perspective is more optimistic, as Neumayer 
notes, “it is somewhat questionable whether there are substantial mutual benefits from 
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greater respect for human rights across countries.”112 Refining this concept and shifting 
the focus from compliance to management of international order, Neumayer contends 
that under this outlook, one could argue that to maintain order, conformity to human 
rights may be advisable and should some countries violate norms, the regime would still 
survive as long as most states conform. He states, “full compliance is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for the effectiveness of an international regime. Instead, what 
matters is that overall compliance is at an acceptable level.”113 This perspective, then, 
although not a concrete model, presents some opportunity to modify the pessimistic 
perspectives and accommodate for human rights. 
Cited in the section above and the final model discussing the place of human 
rights in the international community, accepting the efficacy of human rights, but 
potentially lessening the importance of shaming, is the “transnational legal process 
model.” This model consists of a three-step process including “interaction, interpretation 
and internalization,” and recognizes that actors have collectively come together to agree 
to human rights treaties, making them ‘universal,’ and so will hold themselves 
accountable to these treaties. There will be some norm violators, here, but most will obey 
and perceiving others obey, more will join the rule consistent path. Here, then, “it is not 
so much persuasion – a form of rational acceptance – that matters but that regular 
interactions lead to cognitive social pressures for state actors to conform with treaty 
norms.”114 States, then, will eventually comply without necessitating naming and 
shaming. These “pressures,” it is acknowledged, though, may promote “conformity rather 
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than…acceptance and internalization,” which comes over time as norms spread vertically 
and horizontally.115 Following Schulz, then, a more important function of naming and 
shaming, here, is to spread and legitimize norms instead of enforcing them. 
Drawing on these theories, several hypotheses can be drawn about the effects 
shaming might have in the context of ESR. If third party influence is essential to the 
effectiveness of shaming, considering the US’ persistent denial of these rights, violating 
ESR and receiving shaming in turn may not affect one’s standing in the international 
community to any significant extent and so may not provoke change. For this reason, it is 
unlikely that shaming a state would provide costs that outweigh the benefits of violating 
human rights. Counter discourses, too, for ESR may be as powerful as the national 
security discourse proves to be for many civil and political rights violations because 
allegations that HROs are acting against the country’s interests and in a ‘communist’ 
fashion may appear more logical in the neoliberal climate that states make these claims 
in. Since most victims of ESR violations are the ‘poor,’ the public may agree to sacrifice 
them for the ‘greater good’ of economic growth. A challenge to the self-perception of the 
state, though, may still be effective if talk is not, in fact, cheap since a state that considers 
itself or strives to be a norm-follower may feel the need to change if shamed for violating 
even an ESR norm.  
Of naming and shaming, Pruce and Bubadin state that, “Information is a key form 
of exchange here: Northern advocates obtain first-rate intelligence while stakeholders in 
the South gain a platform for sharing their stories and building influence.”116 To an 
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audience of journalists, policymakers, and the public, HROs present a case of a violation 
of a right and demand remedies. Coming to diverse conclusions, the results of this action 
remain debated. In the section below, I look at empirical findings on the effectiveness of 
naming and shaming CPR before delving into the specifics of ESR.  
Naming and Shaming CPR: Contradictory Empirical Findings 
Since the 1950s, HROs have focused on the ‘violations approach’ to name and 
shame CPR with immense success, criticizing state failure in specific cases to bolster 
larger change. However, empirical studies come to contradictory conclusions about the 
efficacy of shaming in enforcing CPR. Nevertheless, studies increasingly establish a 
positive relationship between improvements in human rights and shaming, particularly 
when disaggregating and interacting the shaming variable with other factors that might 
influence human rights in a country. In this section, I outline some of the scholars’ works 
that look at quantitative regressions to investigate the effects of shaming on the 
realization of CPR.  
The first quantitative study, attempting to decipher the relationship between 
human rights and shaming, comes to a pessimistic conclusion. In her study, Hafner-
Burton conducts a regression analysis between the quality of human rights in a country in 
a year (using CIRI and the Freedom House Index) and the extent of naming and shaming 
(coding for AI press releases and background reports117, shaming by the news media118, 
and a dummy variable for shaming by the UNHRC119). She finds a statistically 
                                                          
117 Her data comes from Ron Ramos et. al’s study 
118 Focusing on the Economist and NewsWeek articles. 
119 Operationalized as whether a resolution is passed against a country for a violation 
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significant, positive relationship between shaming and abuses of civil rights (termed 
political terror), but a negative, statistically insignificant relationship between shaming 
and abuses of political rights.120 Theoretically, her research takes the realist frame and 
contends that governments strategically use human rights, continuing to violate certain 
rights while appeasing the international community by marginally improving others so 
that any improvements in human rights that the international community notes are only 
illusory, masking greater violations of other rights. 
Other studies come to more optimistic conclusions, applying Keck and Sikkink’s 
model. Using new events based data for more than 400 HROs, Murdie and Davis, in their 
regression analysis, find that shaming by HROs improves the quality of human rights 
(calculated using the CIRI Index) when interacted with the domestic presence of 
HROs.121 Meernick et al., similarly, note that the states that are shamed the most (subject 
to the most Urgent Actions released by AI) are those with a large domestic presence of 
HROs.122 These scholars highlight, then, the importance a domestic presence of HROs 
has on the efficacy of shaming, adding credence to Keck and Sikkink’s theory described 
earlier. Other scholars move away from analyses of shaming on all human rights to focus 
on specific ones. This includes Krain and DeMerritt, who both extol the merits of 
disaggregation in providing a more comprehensive and thorough picture of the effects of 
HRO shaming. While Krain establishes a statistically significant positive relationship 
between increases in naming and shaming (calculated in a similar way to Hafner-Burton) 
                                                          
120 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, "Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement 
Problem," International Organization, (2008). 
121 Amanda M. Murdie, and David R. Davis, "Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the 
Impact of Human Rights INGOs," International Studies Quarterly, (2012): 1-16. 
122James Meernick, Rosa Aloisi, Marsha Sowell, and Angela Nichols. "The Impact of Human Rights 
Organizations on Naming and Shaming Campaigns." Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2012: 233-256. 
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and decreases in the severity of genocides/politicides (using data from the Political 
Instability Task Force), DeMeritt finds a statistically significant, negative relationship 
between shaming by NGOs (coding data for 432 HROs) and the UNHRC (creating a 
severity scale) and government killings (using data from the Political Instability Task 
Force’s Worldwide Atrocities dataset and major international press agencies). 123 
DeMerritt also finds that shaming by the media is ineffective, even as shaming by HROs 
is effective. Focusing on the UNHRC, where governments name and shame one another, 
Lebovic and Voeten find that targeting and punishment by the commission is 
decreasingly part of a ‘meaningless’ political exercise, as increasingly states shame one 
another to hold each other accountable to their promises.124  
Still, other scholars outline mixed results, noting that although shaming is limited 
in many ways, it also aids in others. Inspecting whether signing human rights treaties 
improves the quality of human rights, Neumayer notes when analyzing the results of his 
regression that improvements in rights depend on the conditions of the country (whether 
it is democratic or authoritarian, the number of nongovernmental organization its citizens 
participate in etc.). He finds that, treaty ratification benefits more democratic countries 
with strong civil society organizations although it worsens the overall human rights 
record for all countries taken together.125 Similarly, Clark conducts a time-series analysis 
                                                          
123 Mathew Krain, "J’accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of Genocides or 
Politicides?" International Studies Quarterly, (2012): 574-589. 
Jacqueline DeMerrit, "International Organizations and Government Killing: Does Naming and Shaming 
Save Lives?" International Interactions, (2012): 597-621. 
124 James H. Lebovic and Erik Voeten, "The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human 
Rights Practices in the UNCHR," International Studies Quarterly, (2006). 
125Eric Neumayer, "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?" Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, (2005).  
Although he does not explain why the record worsens, one possible explanation, presented by Hafner-
Burton indicates that often repressive nondemocratic countries sign international human rights treaties to 
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and in her findings on the effects of shaming on domestic human rights norms, claims 
that although ratification of the Convention Against Torture when interacted with 
shaming improves human rights, ratifying the ICCPR, shaming by itself, and ratifying the 
Convention Against Torture on its own, all do not provide any benefits and may even 
worsen the human rights record of a given country. She states, “the act of ratification, on 
its own, was associated with either no change in human rights, or a slight worsening of 
rights in the ratifying countries. Similarly, shaming, on its own, was always associated in 
this model with a slight worsening of human rights in the targeted country.”126 As an 
explanation for this result, Clark indicates the importance both of pressure from 
international actors to be accountable to treaties and the agreement by states to commit to 
the treaties themselves, so that lacking one factor gives states greater incentives to 
disobey than to obey international law. Likewise, Kim inspects the effectiveness of 
shaming, considering just AI country reports on human rights practices and deciphers that 
whether a target government is a member of a human rights intergovernmental 
organization plays a significant role in the effectiveness of the practice. She notes, “third 
parties’ commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights is key to the 
effectiveness of AI’s efforts.”127 In many cases, too, shaming leads to the increased 
probability of sanctions and humanitarian interventions by third party states, what Murdie 
                                                          
legitimate their political identity, give the façade of being free, and appease the international community. 
Having signed a treaty, then, such states feel less pressure to comply with norms.  
126 Ann Marie Clark, “The normative context of human rights criticism: treaty ratification and UN 
mechanisms,” In The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance, by Thomas 
Risse, Kathryn Sikkink, and Stephen C. Ropp, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013): 142-143. 
127 Dongwook Kim, “Mobilizing “Third-Party Influence”: The Impact of Amnesty International’s Naming 
and Shaming,” In The Politics of Leverage in International Relations: Name Shame Sanction, by H. 
Richard Friman, 1-33, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillian, 2015). 
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and Peksen term the “Amnesty Effect,” which in turn reinforces the efficacy of the 
practice.128  
Moreover, although usually HROs assign blame to the state and this is the focus 
of my study, INGOs increasingly shame non-state actors and while in the cases of some 
of these, like terrorist organizations, the response is often hostile, others like businesses, 
especially under consumer pressure, respond more positively. For example, taking the 
case of Nike developing human rights friendly practices under consistent shaming 
attempts, Deietlhoff and Wolf note, “under certain considerations, corporations can be 
observed transforming themselves from norm-consumers to norm-entrepreneurs as agents 
in a socialization process.”129 Naming and shaming, then, can go beyond a state focus and 
recognize the non-state actors involved in human rights violations. 
These findings, for the most part, indicate that shaming when interacted with 
some other variables, such as the signing of treaties, the presence of domestic NGOs, and 
third parties fosters the realization of CPR. Most studies, then, find that, NGOs’ efforts in 
this arena are not wasted. Subsequently, following their acceptance of ESR, NGOs 
sought to apply this well-tested tactic to this new case. The next section elaborates on this 
trend. 
Naming and Shaming in the Context of ESR 
                                                          
128 Amanda Murdie, and Dursun Peksen, "The Impact of Human Rights INGO Shaming on Humanitarian 
Interventions," The Journal of Politics, (2014): 215-228. 
In the case of ESR and in many cases of CPR, however, powerful actors are often not willing to back 
human rights and INGOs must rely solely on their moral leverage. 
129 Nicole Deitelhoff and Klaus Dieter Wolf, “Business and human rights: how corporate norm violators 
become norm entrepreneurs,” In The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to 
Compliance, by Thomas Risse, Kathryn Sikkink, and Stephen C. Ropp, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 223. 
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Shaming is a prominent tactic for ESR realization because, as Kenneth Roth 
notes, of the many ways HROs can promote ESR, shaming, in holding states accountable 
and in countering their power, is the most persuasive and influential tactic.130 To make 
this claim, Roth considers two main alternatives to shaming, dismissing them as 
significantly less potent. The first, the litigation approach of promoting rights in courts, 
he argues, is insufficient because the international community cannot appropriately take 
such concerted domestic action (though domestic NGOs may approach the issue in this 
way). Likewise, with the other alternative, providing technical assistance, he claims, 
simply providing the assistance may legitimize a violating government, “providing a 
façade of conscientious striving that enables a government to deflect pressure to end 
abusive practices.”131 Rubenstein adds to these other ways INGOs may address the issue 
of ESR that he contends are more “future oriented, designed to protect and promote 
human rights in the long term.”132 These include collaborating and lobbying local 
governments, partnering with local HROs, and advocating for resources from wealthy 
countries. Yet, since INGOs still rely most apparently on shaming today and considering 
the importance of this tactic to ESR as well as to human rights more broadly, I focus on 
the effectiveness of this tactic rather than the many other ways INGOs may promote 
ESR. 
The Violations Approach 
                                                          
130Kenneth Roth, "Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an 
International Human Rights Organization," Human Rights Quarterly, (2004): 63-73. 
131 Ibid: 67. 
132Leonard S. Rubenstein, "How International Human Rights Organizations Can Advance Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: A Response to Kenneth Roth," Human Rights Quarterly, (2004): 845-865. 
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Today, as INGOs grow to use the ‘violations approach’ for ESR, questions about 
its efficacy arise with some scholars searching for alternative, nontraditional ways to 
name and shame these ‘new’ rights. In “Advancing Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights: The Way Forward,” Mary Robinson, a previous United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, records how shaming has traditionally involved the 
legal-centered ‘violations approach,’ demarcating a violator, a violation, and a remedy 
closely using international law with the utmost clarity.133 Encapsulating this view, 
Katarina Tomasevski, a previous Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, notes, 
“that economic and social rights are not about poverty, but policy.”134 Here, the state is 
often the violator of rights, the violation an unjust policy (or lack thereof) and the 
solution a change in policy. Moving firmly away from issues of progressive realization 
and distribution of resources, these scholars and activists articulate ESR enforcement in 
exclusively legal terms and emphasize their justiciability. 
In AI’s primer on ESR, the organization outlines cases where they shamed ESR 
and the beneficial results of these efforts to promote the realization of these rights.135 
Rather than focusing on the statistics that cover the overwhelming number of deprived 
people, they focus on individual stories. The primer encourages other HROs to shame 
ESR, even explicating what constitutes a violation of ESR. Understanding that “initial 
resistance to the recognition of economic, social and cultural rights as human rights 
                                                          
133Mary Robinson, "Advancing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The Way Forward," Human Rights 
Quarterly, (2004): 866-872. 
134Katarina Tomasevski, "Unasked Questions about Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights from the 
Experience of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education (1998–2004): A Response to Kenneth 
Roth, Leonard S. Rubenstein, and Mary Robinson," Human Rights Quarterly, (2005): 709-720. 
135 Amnesty International, Human rights for Human Dignity: A primer on economic, social and cultural 
rights, (London: Amnesty International Publication, 2005). 
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stemmed in part from the perceived difficulty of monitoring and assessing the 
‘progressive realizations’ of these rights,” AI draws on the Limburg Principles to argue 
that not only are there obligations to progressively realize rights, but that the ICESCR 
articulates certain immediate obligations, including both the minimum core136 and the 
obligation to ‘take steps’ towards full realization, as well as the non-retrogressive 
principle that protects the current level of rights in the country from worsening. The 
Limburg Principles define a violation of ESR as “a failure by a State party to comply 
with an obligation contained in the Covenant (ICESCR),” which includes the obligation 
to respect as well as to fulfill. States may themselves violate certain rights, then, for 
example, by forcibly evicting a group of people, especially those who are vulnerable.137 
Recognizing the plight of the evicted, homeless now, HROs would, then, point to the 
violator and articulate a clear policy change. Violations, here, are not the result of a lack 
of resources, but of “unwillingness, negligence or discrimination” on the part of the 
state.138 Roth notes that, “the nature of the violation, violator, and remedy is clearest 
when it is possible to identify arbitrary or discriminatory governmental conduct that 
causes or substantially contributes to an ESC rights violation.”139 
Chapman, the first theorist to articulate the ‘violations approach’ for ESR, argues 
that this approach is significantly easier to monitor and more exact than a progressive 
                                                          
136“Protection from starvation, primary education, emergency healthcare, and basic housing are among the 
minimum requirements to live a dignified life and it is the duty of governments to ensure these at all 
times.” 
ESCR-Net, Minimum Core Obligations, n.d, https://www.escr-net.org/resources/minimum-core-obligations 
(accessed March 17, 2017). 
137 "The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights," Human Rights Quarterly, (1987): 122-135. 
138 Amnesty International, HUMAN RIGHTS FOR HUMAN DIGNITY., n.d., 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/living-in-dignity/ (accessed January 20, 2017). 
139 Kenneth Roth, "Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an 
International Human Rights Organization," Human Rights Quarterly, (2004): 69. 
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realization approach, making it not only more effective, but also more feasible. 140 Similar 
to AI, Chapman recommends a way to ‘quantify violations’ with a threefold 
classification, encompassing “violations resulting from acts by the government,” 
“violations related to discrimination,” and “violations due to the state’s failure to fulfill 
minimum core obligations” (1996). Each violation can be an act of “commission or 
omission.”141 The first, an act directly performed by the state, is most similar to CPR, 
Chapman claims, where a state commits a violation or fails to halt a third party from 
violating another’s rights. Acts of omissions, less commonly shamed, are failures by state 
parties to meet all their obligations including taking steps to progressively realize rights 
and fulfilling the minimum core. Noting the difficulty of clarity in the progressive 
realization approach further, Roth claims that focusing on resources makes it difficult to 
establish a remedy to the violation (with debate over what policies are best to realize 
rights and how much a government should allocate to these).142 With violations, on the 
other hand, the remedy for the state is simply to halt its activities, to stop forcibly evicting 
or to stop discriminating in health care provision. As outlined in detail in the Maastricht 
Guidelines, acts of commission, the focus of this paper, include: 
“(a) The formal removal or suspension of legislation necessary for the continued 
enjoyment of an economic, social and cultural right that is currently enjoyed; 
(b) The active denial of such rights to particular individuals or groups, whether 
through legislated or enforced discrimination; 
                                                          
140Audrey R. Chapman, "A "Violations Approach" for Monitoring the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights," Human Rights Quarterly, (1996): 23-66. 
Following Chapman’s cue, other scholars and activists, including Leonard Rubenstein (2004), Irene Khan 
(2009), and Kalantry et.al (2010) too insist that a ‘violations approach’ can produce substantial change in 
ESR. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Kenneth Roth, "Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an 
International Human Rights Organization," Human Rights Quarterly, (2004): 63-73. 
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(c) The active support for measures adopted by third parties which are 
inconsistent with economic, social and cultural rights; 
(d) The adoption of legislation or policies which are manifestly incompatible with 
pre-existing legal obligations relating to these rights, unless it is done with the purpose 
and effect of increasing equality and improving the realization of economic, social and 
cultural rights for the most vulnerable groups; 
(e) The adoption of any deliberately retrogressive measure that reduces the extent 
to which any such right is guaranteed; 
(f) The calculated obstruction of, or halt to, the progressive realization of a right 
protected by the Covenant, unless the State is acting within a limitation permitted by the 
Covenant or it does so due to a lack of available resources or force majeure; 
(g) The reduction or diversion of specific public expenditure, when such reduction 
or diversion results in the non-enjoyment of such rights and is not accompanied by 
adequate measures to ensure minimum subsistence rights for everyone.”143 
Here, a failure to comply because of a lack of resources does not constitute a 
violation. The Maastricht guidelines note, “in determining which actions or omissions 
amount to a violation of an economic, social or cultural right, it is important to 
distinguish the inability from the unwillingness of a state to comply with its treaty 
obligations.”144 In this clear articulation, the violations approach involves a heavily 
legalistic framework, giving priority to instances where HROs can make a consistent 
deductive argument with a hypothesis that assigns blame and responsibility to a single 
perpetrator to halt a single violation. 
Today, HROs continue to use the violations approach. With the recent creation of 
an individual complaints mechanism for ESR in an Optional Protocol (2008), Kalantry et. 
                                                          
143 Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, International Commission of Jurists (1952- ), 
Rijksuniversiteit Limburg. Centre of Human Rights, "The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights," Human Rights Quarterly, (1998): 691-704. 
144 Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, International Commission of Jurists (1952- ), 
Rijksuniversiteit Limburg. Centre of Human Rights, "The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights," Human Rights Quarterly, (1998): 691-704. 
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al illustrate how the violations approach gains increasing salience.145 However, there are 
many limitations to the approach, particularly its ignorance of the importance of 
resources for the full realization of ESR. The violations approach squarely focuses on the 
obligations to respect and promote ESR, without acknowledging or committing much to 
the obligation to fulfill. Noting this, other scholars suggest alternatives to encompass this 
last obligation. In the next subsection, I look at these limitations. 
Limitations and Alternatives to the Violations Approach 
In the case of CPR, a violator, violation, and remedy is often clear. For example, 
in the case of torture, the government exists as an apparent violator with the violation the 
act itself and the remedy halting the torture. This does not necessarily apply to ESR. For 
example, a case where such clarity is apparently missing is that of the right to education. 
Here, the violator could range from the state to private actors and within these large 
groups, many other subgroups are all potentially blameworthy. Then, there is consistent 
debate on who should provide education, through what programs and in what capacities. 
According to Roth, a lack of clarity occurs because ESR inherently involve questions of 
“distributive justice” that CPR do not. INGOs are not well-equipped to address structural 
inequality and, Roth insists, nor should they have the power to influence the allocation of 
resources and public goods in a way that does not correspond to the wishes of the 
domestic public. He notes, when it comes to matters of distributive justice, “given that 
respect for ESC rights often requires the reallocation of resources, the people who have 
the clearest standing to insist on a particular allocation are usually the residents of the 
                                                          
145Sital Kalantry, Jocelyn E. Getgen, and Steven Arrigh Koh, "Enhancing Enforment of Economic, social 
and cultural rights using Indicators: A Focus on the Right to Education in the ICESCR," Human Rights 
Quarterly, (2010): 253-310. 
Beenish Riaz Honors Project: Political Science 
Page 60 of 168 
 
country in question.”146 For example, if a given country does not meet its minimum core 
obligation for free and compulsory primary education for all children because it allocates 
resources to other avenues, this is a question for local state officials and their 
constituents. For an HRO to shame said country successfully would be a difficult, if not 
an impossible, feat.  
Garnering public support for the violation itself may be difficult because, as in 
this example, perhaps those not attaining education by and large belong to already 
disadvantaged groups for whom the domestic population has no sympathy and perceiving 
domestic opposition, the international community of states and the United Nations feels 
loath to impose. Moreover, the remedy itself is difficult to allocate. What program should 
receive less funding so that more of the government’s resources may go into building 
quality schools? Some would even argue that growth will eventually eradicate the 
problem and that education should be a private rather than a public good. In the face of 
this opposition, HROs can simply request inexpensive policy changes such as 
commitments not to discriminate in schools because of gender or race. Highlighting these 
problems with the violations approach, Ibhawoh states incredulously, “sections of a 
population living in poverty would have to be living in poverty because of a state’s 
discriminatory practices…in order for the condition to be considered a human rights 
violation within the scope of the organization’s mandate.”147 Arguments based on the 
justiciability of ESR, then, have a limit.  
                                                          
146 Kenneth Roth, "Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an 
International Human Rights Organization," Human Rights Quarterly, (2004). 
147 Bonny Ibhawoh, "Beyond Naming and Shaming: Methodological Imperatives of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights Advocacy," African yearbook of international law, (2008): 49-67. 
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Nevertheless, unlike Roth, other scholars propose different avenues, encouraging 
INGOs to expand and take on more, proposing more of a reacceptance of progressive 
realization and suggesting quantitative methods that would make naming and shaming 
ESR in its complexity easier to address. Khan, for example, argues that HROs need to 
recognize material deprivation as well as discrimination, without disproportionately 
focusing on one to the exclusion of the other. She notes, “the human rights response to 
poverty cannot be partial, focusing only on people’s right to inclusion and security, while 
neglecting deprivation and voicelessness, or vice versa.”148 Echoing this sentiment, 
Donnelly calls for a shift away from the violations approach with ESR to an approach 
that recognizes social allocations and provisions, although he does not discuss the details 
of such an approach and what it would mean for human rights. He states, “We certainly 
want states to stop violating human rights. But we want much more. And even stopping 
violations is largely a matter of creating effective systems of protection and provision.”149 
Another scholar, Fiona Robinson, similarly, argues that although AI and the human rights 
movement’s acceptance of ESR is prominent especially in the context of globalization, 
simply adding ESR to CPR will lead to a failure to fulfill ESR and instead scholars need 
to re-conceptualize rights as a collective rather than an individual property.150 Likewise, 
Chong, resisting what he sees as the hegemony of the law in human rights, advocates for 
an emphasis towards the moral, away from the legal since “legalization is not the only or 
even the most natural way of understanding and engaging in human rights politics.”151 
                                                          
148 Irene Khan, The Unheard Truth: Poverty and Human Rights, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
2009):18. 
149Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights and Social Provision." Journal of Human Rights, (2008): 123-138. 
150Fiona Robinson, "NGOs and the Advancement of Economic and Social Rights: Philosophical and 
Practical Controversies," International Relations, (2003): 79-96. 
151 Chong, Daniel P. L, Freedom from Poverty: NGOs and Human Rights Praxis (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2010): 5, 27. 
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The legal system too has little to no experience tackling cases of ESR violations and 
other traditionally used, more economic, frames resist the legal articulation of economic 
concepts. St. Clair and McNeill write, “treating poverty as a violation of human rights 
simply does not fit the analytical perspectives, cognitive and policy instruments of 
economics.”152 Another argument against the violations approach for ESR is that INGOs 
risk spreading themselves too thin and compromising their independence. The Economist 
in its critique of AI’s acceptance of ESR, for example, notes that although “Cases do 
exist where violations of political rights and of economic ones are hard to separate…the 
new Amnesty is surely open to the charges both that it is campaigning on too many 
fronts, and that the latest focus comes at the cost of the old one.”153 Here, The Economist 
insists that AI’s adoption of ESR takes too many resources away from their commitment 
to CPR. 
Considering these limitations of the violations approach, some scholars propose 
ways HROs can operationalize progressive realization instead. Yamin, for example, 
promotes the use of large scale data, statistics and indicators154 in shaming efforts to 
underscore the immensity of the problems, moving away from HROs’ traditional 
emphasis on individual stories. To allow for this, Fukuda-Parr et. al. create the Social and 
Economic Rights Fulfillment Index (SERF).155 Adding further support to the progressive 
                                                          
152Desmond McNeill and Asuncion Lera St. Clair, Global Poverty, Ethics and Human Rights, (New York: 
Routledge, 2009): 127. 
153 The Economist, Amnesty International: Many rights, some wrongs, March 22, 2007, 
http://www.economist.com/node/8888792 (accessed March 1, 2017). 
154 “Human rights indicators are tools that are intended to expose violations of and monitor compliance 
with legal commitments.”  
Alicia Ely Yamin, Power, Suffering, and the Struggle for Dignity: Human Rights Frameworks for Health 
and Why They Matter, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 12. 
155 This is an aggregate indicator composed of individual disaggregated rights including the right to 
adequate food (malnutrition prevalence, and for OECD countries low birth weight for babies), the right to 
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realization approach, in a direct response to Roth, Rubenstein notes that, in fact, “while 
budget decisions can theoretically pit funds to realize one right against funds for another 
in a zero-sum game, diverting resources from one program to another where a dollar for 
health may mean a dollar less for education, that is not how these decisions tend to play 
out. Instead, pressure to realize one right tends to enlarge the pot.”156 He notes that this is 
the case because of international assistance where international audiences upon learning 
of the severity of problems from INGOs contribute monetary resources for their 
alleviation. He contends too that a commitment to violations where countries with less 
resources are simply not shamed because they lack resources will prompt some of the 
worst violators to continue with their violations unchecked.157  
The violations approach, then, presents a variety of benefits and limitations that 
activists must consider when deciding whether to adopt the approach and that have 
implications for the effectiveness of the naming and shaming. At the moment, HROs 
primarily use this approach in practice. In the next section, I look at another potential 
                                                          
housing (improved sanitation (% population with access), rural improved water (% rural population with 
access), improved water (% population with access)) , the right to education (primary school completion 
rate, gross combined school enrollment rate, gross secondary school enrollment rate, for OECD countries 
average of average math and science program for international student assessment scores) , the right to 
social security, the right to health (contraceptive prevalence rate, survival to age 65, life expectancy at 
birth, child mortality rate), and the right to decent work (poverty head count, for OECD long term 
unemployment rate, relative poverty rate). To account for progressive realization, they use Achievement 
Possibilities Curve (that work similarly to Production Possibilities Curves) which they claim allow “apples-
to-apples comparisons across countries” so that countries’ commitments to ESR can be recorded while 
taking into account their differing resources. 
Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Terra Lawson-Remer, and Susan Randolph, Fulfilling Social and Economic Rights, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
156 Leonard S. Rubenstein, "How International Human Rights Organizations Can Advance Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: A Response to Kenneth Roth," Human Rights Quarterly, (2004): 858. 
157 Ibid. 
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limitation of shaming that scholars have yet to address in the context of ESR, namely its 
potential to further an ‘imperial’ project before describing my case.158 
Applying Economic Rights in the International Context: Hegemony and 
Imperialism  
A prominent critique of the international legal regime is it contribution to the 
propagation of hegemony. ESR has the potential to back the imperial project or to exist as 
a counterhegemonic force, which, in turn, influences its effectiveness. In Pathologies of 
Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor (2003), activist-doctor Paul 
Farmer argues for an understanding of the ways in which human rights are politicized. 
Farmer claims, “promoting social and economic rights is the most important struggle of 
our time, but we can no longer speak of rights in a depoliticized way. If we forget that 
human rights are a struggle for shifting power relations and that human rights are 
fundamentally a question of structural violence, all the new rhetoric of rights will lead 
our generation to simply ‘manage social inequality’.”159 ESR itself in its ties with justice 
politicizes economic and social issues, in challenging the Western emphasis on CPR, 
placing, as Khan describes it, ‘bread before ballots.’160 One must, then, understand rights 
                                                          
158 Practically, too, in the process of naming and shaming, to refrain from propagating hegemony, activists 
must ensure that they treat those they attempt to aid with full dignity and respect. This includes 
guaranteeing that representations and photographs of those in poverty, circulated among a largely Western 
donor public, do not propagate stereotypes or turn bodies into spectacles. Pruce and Bubadin state, “We 
insist on the centrality of representation as a key variable because human rights advocates must prioritize 
the autonomy and dignity of the individuals for whom they purport to work.” Thus, HROs must remain 
cognizant of the indirect effects of their actions in shaming ESR. 
Joel R. Pruce, and Alexandra Cosima Budabin, "Beyond naming and shaming: New modalities of 
information politics in human rights," Journal of Human Rights, (2016): 408-425. 
159 Desmond McNeill and Asuncion Lera St. Clair, Global Poverty, Ethics and Human Rights, (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 52. 
160 Irene Khan, The Unheard Truth: Poverty and Human Rights, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
2009). 
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in the context of international political relations to fully appreciate their effects. In this 
section, I outline the ways in which rights, particularly ESR, can and do contribute to 
hegemony and counterhegemony. 
In her seminal article, “Counter-Hegemonic International Law: Rethinking 
Human Rights and Development as a Third World Strategy,” Balakrishnan Rajagopal 
asks whether international law can aid developing countries and if it can, what would 
help it do so better. Rajagopal stresses the separation between the hegemonic and the 
counterhegemonic in international law, providing “a critical analysis of the hegemonic 
nature of human rights and development discourses in contemporary international law” to 
allow the field to aid developing countries better.161 Considering contemporary uses of 
international law, Rajagopal illustrates the history of human rights’ use as a 
counterhegemonic weapon against apartheid, to fight for Palestinian sovereignty and for 
the self-determination of many postcolonial nation-states while, at the same time, 
stressing its consistent, recent use in legitimating the ‘imperial project,’ particularly as it 
materializes in humanitarian interventions and development.162 This last is the most 
pertinent to this paper. Rajagopal states, “The coalescing of different, often contradictory, 
agendas under the name of development, and the highly ideological role that 
development has performed since its inception, make it clear that it is a prime source of 
                                                          
161Balakrishan Rajagopal, "Counter-hegemonic International Law: rethinking human rights and 
development as a Third World strategy," Third World Quarterly, (2006): 767-783. 
162 Imperialism is the process by which countries create and maintain the Empire. The Empire is a structure, 
involving a number of powerful countries (the Global North) controlling other less powerful countries (the 
Global South. Imperialism can and, in the past has, taken the form of territorial control. Today though, 
imperialism is non-territorial, a “more informal and anonymous” project, that creates power relations 
through global networks of communication and informal networks of power. “Cultural imperialism” or 
“hegemony” works as the West proliferates its cultural ideas to ‘liberalize’ the world and by asserting the 
supremacy of its values including human rights, secures economic and political power for itself. 
J. Roberts, "The State, Empire and Imperialism," Current Sociology, (2010): 833-852. 
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hegemonic international law.” The logic of hegemony and the hold of imperialism is 
important in this thesis because INGOs potentially play a powerful counterhegemonic 
role in adopting ESR as a check on the hegemonic development, despite US 
opposition.163 INGOs shame not simply states but also international agencies including 
the World Bank and the UN in response to the needs of and with the participation of 
victims of ESR violation. Doing this, INGOs may control the hegemonic hold of the 
former.  
This is also important for the issue of effectiveness because the success of a 
human rights campaign particularly as it clashes with culture and traditional ways of 
handling issues has often depended on whether it is perceived as a hegemonic power or 
not. For example, in the international campaign against female genital mutilation in 
Kenya, the perception that the campaign was nothing more than “a symbol for colonial 
attempts to impose outside values and rules upon the population” was apparent and 
prevalent and led to the increased resistance to the campaign.164 Reversing this, the 
perception, then, that, in espousing ESR and rejecting continued US opposition to it, 
HROs are committing a counterhegemonic act suggests perhaps that the global South 
might be more receptive to correcting violations of ESR than they would be to tackling 
violations of CPR. Keck and Sikkink note, “The doctrines of sovereignty and 
nonintervention remain the main line of defense against foreign efforts to limit domestic 
and international choices that third world states (and their citizens) can make,” especially 
noting that, “the issue of sovereignty, for third world activists, is deeply embedded in the 
                                                          
163  Balakrishan Rajagopal, "Counter-hegemonic International Law: rethinking human rights and 
development as a Third World strategy," Third World Quarterly, (2006): 767-783. 
164 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 70. 
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issue of structural inequality.”165 By circumventing the issue of sovereignty and 
emphasizing the needs of the people of a particular state as opposed to ‘universal,’ moral, 
(assumedly) Western values, INGOs encourage states to comply with their 
recommendations.  
Taking ESR’s counterhegemonic potential even further, some scholars, like 
Ravlich, use ESR to address large structural issues inherent in the international system 
itself. ESR can keep neo-liberalism in check, control the effects of the free market 
economy, correcting for its ‘negative externalities’ so to speak, to reduce structural 
violence and the inequality between rich and poor.166 In his book, World Poverty and 
Human Rights, Pogge argues that the structure of the global economy and its institutions 
create poverty. They do this by taking resources from the poor without compensation and 
aiding corrupt local elites. He states, the “citizens of the affluent countries, in collusion 
with ruling elites of most poor countries, are harming the global poor.”167 ESR can call 
into question this international system of inequality. 
In this section, then, I have outlined the ways in which shaming can contribute to 
the realization of ESR, the ways it may harm, and the limitations of this approach. This 
literature review contributes to my subsequent analysis of the right to housing in the case 
of Kenya. Considering that the right to housing is an ESR and more broadly a human 
right, much of the debate that surrounds naming and shaming human rights and 
approaches to ESR advocacy applies to this context and this case. Particularly the 
                                                          
165 Ibid: 251 
166Anthony George Ravlich, Freedom from our Social Prisons: The Rise of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008). 
167Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, (Malden: Polity Press, 2012), 55. 
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theories and empirical studies on shaming broadly and on ESR explicitly present a 
variety of lenses by which to look at my case to decipher its efficacy and present many 
potential options for the results. In the analysis of my paper, then, I apply Risse and 
Sikkink’s spiral model to my case and use a realist lens to counter some of the 
assumptions of the model. This allows me to situate my findings firmly in the naming and 
shaming literature as I emphasize in my conclusion. Before exploring this in greater 
detail, though, in the next chapter, I develop a background to introduce my case. 
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Chapter 3: Case Background 
I begin this section with a brief outline of the international law related to the right 
to housing, with an account of the ICESCR before describing the right to housing itself in 
detail and how international HROs and other international institutions have sought to 
operationalize the right by focusing on forced evictions as a major violation of the right. 
Next, I give a brief background on the case of Kenya. 
The Case of Housing as part of ESR 
A specific look at the ICESCR 
The ICESCR is the main international treaty that addresses questions of ESR.168 
In 2008, an Optional Protocol added an individual complaints mechanism to the treaty 
making it easier to monitor these rights. Prominent guidelines and addendums clarified 
violations of the ICESCR.169 In its basic composition, the treaty is divided into five parts. 
The first part establishes, as does the ICCPR, the right to self-determination. The second 
part includes general provisions to realize every right. The third part lists the actual rights 
themselves, including prominently the right to work and social security, the right to an 
adequate standard of living, to basic health care, and to education. The fourth part 
discusses international assistance, implementation of treaties progressively and 
establishes the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) to monitor 
                                                          
168 Although ICESCR includes cultural rights, I do not address these because they are more often addressed 
under the nondiscrimination clause of the ICCPR rather than the ICESCR. 
169 Other treaties also have some provisions for ESR, including the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) as 
well as many regional treaties, such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (1981), the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990), the European Social Charter (1996), the 
American Convention on Human Rights (1969) and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention 
on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1988). 
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their realization. The final part is general restrictions and notes on the interpretation of 
the treaty. The ICESCR for each right enshrined provides the dual imperatives of 
“freedom from the state” and “freedom through the state.”170 There are 161 state parties 
who have signed and ratified the ICESCR.  
The primary method to enforce ESR, then, takes the form of monitoring by the 
CESCR. This treaty body has four main functions, namely to periodically review reports 
on the State’s implementation of treaties, to articulate the contents of rights and 
obligations through general comments, to examine individual complaints, and to conduct 
inquiries if it receives reliable information of grave or systematic violations of ESR. The 
UNHRC also implements special procedures, particularly Special Rapporteurs on a 
variety of ESR issues, including one on the right adequate housing, health, safe drinking 
water and sanitation. The Special Rapporteur’s tasks include investigating and publicly 
reporting the general situation of each right, responding to individual complaints by 
discussing them with state representatives, carrying out country visits in certain places 
and reporting and making recommendations to the UNHRC. From 2005, the UN also 
established a Universal Periodic Review, which involves an interactive dialogue between 
states about issues concerning their human rights records. Regional mechanisms can 
enforce ESR, including the African Commission and Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (which though it has the potential to enforce ESR has taken very little measure 
thus far), the European Committee of Social Rights, and the Inter American Commission 
                                                          
170 UN, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, New York: United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, December 16, 1966. 
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and Court on Human Rights, which has a special unit on economic social and cultural 
rights. 
In practice, when shaming, activists most often conceptualize ESR as linked to 
poverty. UN Special Rapporteur on Poverty, Philip Alston notes that, poverty leads to 
many major human rights issues, including violations of both CPR and ESR.171 This is 
because the most vulnerable to such violations tend to be the poorest, particularly in 
reference to the right to an adequate standard of living. In fact, the move to accept ESR in 
the twentieth century comes from the development of a less income-centered definition 
on poverty that became popular at the end of the Cold War.172 Here, moving beyond 
defining poverty as a simple lack of income or wealth, the economist-philosophers 
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum establish poverty as a lack of capabilities. Sen notes, 
“poverty has to be seen…as failures of certain basic capabilities (rather than of lowness 
of income per se)” where capabilities are the “various things that people are able to do or 
                                                          
171Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston, and Ryan Goodman, "Is Poverty a Violation of Human Rights?" In 
International Human Rights In Context, by Henry J Steiner, Philip Alston, & Ryan Goodman, 308-313, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
172A large factor starting the trend in human rights, in particular, was the 2003 United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)’s campaign, that ultimately failed at the time, but 
eventually led to an increasing appreciation of ESR, titled ‘Poverty as a Human Rights Violation.’ This 
campaign was set to involve a gathering of scholars to discuss the issue at prominent academic institutions. 
Spearheaded by a previous Secretary General of AI, Pierre Sane, then Assistant Director-General of 
UNESCO, the campaign sought tools to bring about a radical reframing of poverty. Yet, after the first 
gathering at Oxford, which centered on a discussion by the speaker, Thomas Pogge, on his then-recent, 
influential book, World Poverty and Human Rights, with persistent disagreements between academics, 
under increasing pressure to tone down its language, and facing a cut in funding, UNESCO cancelled future 
events. UNESCO lacked clout because the US deemed it a hyper-left wing organization hostile to the free 
market. This reputation allowed for easy backlash against the body. Still, many practitioners and activists 
of human rights subsequently started inspecting poverty and other ESR problems through the lens of human 
rights. For example, former High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, began to refer less to 
the need for poverty reduction and more to demanding a halt in the ‘violation of’ the right to be free from 
poverty. 
Desmond McNeill and Asuncion Lera St. Clair, Global Poverty, Ethics and Human Rights, (New York: 
Routledge, 2009). 
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be” that life consists of. 173 Capabilities look to the actual quality of life and freedoms of 
citizens, necessary for well-being.174 Reframing poverty as the lack of opportunities, 
HROs treat it as a multidimensional issue.175 Echoing this sentiment, the CESCR 
describes poverty as “a human condition characterized by the sustained or chronic 
deprivation of the resources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the 
enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political, 
and social rights.”176 The denial of ESR, then, often moves beyond the immediate 
violation of a right, creating a cycle. For example, denied the right to an education, many 
children find themselves trapped in a cycle of poverty, unable to find or keep work, 
lacking the resources to provide for an adequate standard of living so that the violation of 
one right also often involves the violation of many others. For example, if denied the 
right to adequate housing, women face an increased risk of harm in the form of domestic 
                                                          
173Amartya Sen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Poverty," In Poverty and Inequality, by D. Grusky, & R. 
Kranbur, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 34. 
174 Nussbaum ties the capabilities approach more closely to rights. She claims, “capabilities, I would argue, 
are very closely linked to rights, but the language of capabilities gives important precision and 
supplementation to the language of rights.”  
Martha C. Nussbaum, "Poverty and Human Functioning: Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements," In 
Poverty and Inequality, by David B. Grusky, & Ravi Kanbur, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 
52. 
175 Politicizing it further, they connect the presence of it to the convergence of manifold global and national 
forces that maintain inequalities consistently. According to Alston, “Economic and social inequalities are 
often categorized as “vertical inequalities”, referring to the distribution of something such as income, health 
or power.” Although most ideologies would accept as inevitable and even desirable a degree of social and 
economic inequality, there is widespread agreement on access to equal opportunity. “It is clear therefore 
that the most impoverished suffer the most extreme effects of inequality for a variety of reasons. In part, 
this is because their influence and capacity to exercise rights is diminished relatively, even if not 
absolutely, as others become wealthier and gain greater political and economic power, and in part because 
they are more vulnerable to the harms associated with social unrest, crime and violence.”  
Philip Alston, Promotion and Protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights, including the right to development, Human Rights Council Report, New York: United Nations 
General Assembly, 2015. 
Nevertheless, the link between poverty and inequality is debatable. For this see Beteille, Andre, “Poverty 
and Inequality,” Economic and Political Weekly 38, no. 42 (2003): 4455-463. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4414161. 
176 Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston, and Ryan Goodman, "Comment on Historical Origins of Economic and 
Social Rights," In International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals: Text and Material, by 
Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston, & Ryan Goodman, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
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abuse. ESR also affects a large number of people where inequalities in ESR lead to 
discrimination and even arguably ‘cause’ certain conflicts.177 
This interpretation of the ICESCR presents important implications for the specific 
right to housing present in the treaty 
The right to housing 
In this subsection, then, I begin by noting the international law related to the right 
to housing, including its explanation in General Comments 4 and 7. I record the ways in 
which international institutions initially sought to operationalize the right narrowly as 
‘forced evictions.’ I proceed to give an account of the limitations of law concerning the 
right. When shaming the right, HROs draw on this law, making it essential for my 
project. 
First articulated in 1948, the right to housing appears in Article 25 of the UDHR 
and Article 11 of the ICESCR. Article 11 states,  
“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing 
and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties 
will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect 
the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.”178  
Over the decades, state parties to the UN consistently solidified the right by 
including it in other major international treaties such as the Convention on the 
                                                          
177 To that effect, Irene Khan, the previous Secretary General of AI, highlights four main ‘causes’ and 
consequences of poverty that limit capabilities, including discrimination, bias often hidden behind formal 
equality; a lack of political and legal power, making the poor “voiceless;” and constant insecurity, making 
every day a struggle for survival. 
Irene Khan, The Unheard Truth: Poverty and Human Rights, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
2009). 
178 UN, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, New York: United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, December 16, 1966. 
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Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).  
In practice, since the 1987 International Year of Shelter for the Homeless, 
international institutions, the UN, and NGOs often operationalize the right to housing in a 
limited manner, though, solely as the right to be free from forced evictions. The CESCR 
holds a prominent place in this trend, explaining and elaborating on the specificities of 
forced evictions in General Comments No. 4 and 7 that serve as comprehensive 
guidelines against the practice. The CESCR also works to focus on the issue when 
reviewing country reports.179 The UN Special Rapporteur, in 2007, presented some Basic 
Principles and Guidelines for Development-Based Evictions.180 
In General Comment 4, the CESCR establishes an expansive definition of housing 
as “the right to live somewhere in security, peace, and dignity,” noting some specific 
essential components for its full realization.181 To meet the right to housing, a state must 
ensure legal security of tenure, availability of services, materials, facilities, and 
infrastructure,182 affordability, habitability, accessibility,183 and cultural adequacy. The 
                                                          
179 du Plessis, Jean, and Malcolm Langford, Dignity in the Rubble? Forced Evictions and Human Rights 
Law, (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2004). 
180 Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, 
"BASIC PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON DEVELOPMENT-BASED EVICTIONS AND 
DISPLACEMENT," United Nations, 2007, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Housing/Guidelines_en.pdf (accessed April 1, 2017).  
181 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), "General Comment No. 4: The 
Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant)," refworld, December 13, 1991, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/47a7079a1.html (accessed December 13, 2016). 
182 Ibid. Those that are “essential for health, security, comfort and nutrition,” including “sustainable access 
to natural and common resources, safe drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation 
and washing facilities, means of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency services.” 
183 to employment, health care, schools, childcare and social facilities 
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Comment defines “adequate” housing as housing that is “habitable, in terms of providing 
the inhabitants with adequate space and protecting them from cold, damp, heat, rain, 
wind or other threats to health, structural hazards, and disease vectors.” The CESCR 
recognizes that although implementation of these components will vary country to 
country with a mix of public and private actors providing services, the state should 
promote the right’s fulfillment by multiple, particularly legal means.184 Drawing on 
previous discussions on the importance of protecting people from unfair evictions, such 
as those by the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (1976), the Global 
Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000 (1988), the Habitat Agenda, and a statement by the 
Commission on Human rights, General Comment 7 establishes forced evictions, in 
particular, as a clear violation of the right to housing, stating the necessity of searching 
for appropriate alternative solutions in cases where it proves necessary.185 According to 
AI, “A forced eviction is the removal of people against their will from the homes or land 
they occupy without legal protections and other safeguards.”186 Although states are the 
main party responsible, others involved, particularly the World Bank and third party 
corporations, also find themselves subject to pressure. International law articulates that 
evictions should only occur as a last resort when all other alternatives have been explored 
and procedural protections are in place, including after consultation of those to be 
                                                          
184Ibid. Including through “(a) legal appeals aimed at preventing planned evictions or demolitions through 
the issuance of court-ordered injunctions; (b) legal procedures seeking compensation following an illegal 
eviction; (c) complaints against illegal actions carried out or supported by landlords (whether public or 
private) in relation to rent levels, dwelling maintenance, and racial or other forms of discrimination; (d) 
allegations of any form of discrimination in the allocation and availability of access to housing; and (e) 
complaints against landlords concerning unhealthy or inadequate housing conditions.” 
185 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), "General Comment No. 7: The right 
to adequate housing (Art.11.1): forced evictions," refworld, May 20, 1997, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/47a70799d.html (accessed January 20, 2017). 
186 Amnesty International, DRIVEN OUT FOR DEVELOPMENT: FORCED EVICTIONS IN MOMBASA, 
KENYA, Amnesty International, (2015). 
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affected by the eviction, deliverance of notices to the people prior to the eviction attempt, 
availability of information on the eviction to all parties involved, the presence of 
government officials during the evictions, identification of those carrying out the 
evictions, assurance that evictions do not take place in bad weather or at night, and a 
guarantee of resettlement or compensation is assured.187  
There are multiple potential causes of evictions. COHRE lists some including 
“development and infrastructure projects,” “large international events, “urban 
redevelopment and ‘beautification’ initiatives,” “property market forces,” “deteriorating 
economic conditions” and “political conflict.”188 A prominent cause, development 
induced displacement, involves the removal of groups of people (often those who have 
lived in the area for decades and have cultural ties to the land) for the purposes of 
modernization and industrialization.189 These evictions work under the façade of ‘serving 
the “public good”’ with projects intended to bolster economic growth and improve cities. 
                                                          
187 It is essential to note, however, that, “not every eviction that is carried out by force constitutes a forced 
eviction – if all the legal safeguards and protections required under international law are complied with, and 
if the use of force is proportionate and reasonable, then the eviction would not violate the prohibition on 
forced evictions.”   In the exceptional cases in which evictions do occur, they must be “(a) authorized by 
law; (b) carried out in accordance with international human rights law; (c) undertaken solely for the 
purpose of promoting the general welfare (d) reasonable and proportional; (e) regulated so as to ensure full 
and fair compensation and rehabilitation; and (f) carried out in accordance with the present guidelines.” A 
state must deliver “(a) appropriate notice to all potentially affected persons that eviction is being considered 
and that there will be public hearings on the proposed plans and alternatives; (b) effective dissemination by 
the authorities of relevant information in advance, including land records and proposed comprehensive 
resettlement plans specifically addressing efforts to protect vulnerable groups; (c) a reasonable time period 
for public review of, comment on, and/or objection to the proposed plan; (d) opportunities and efforts to 
facilitate the provision of legal, technical and other advice to affected persons about their rights and 
options; and (e) holding of public hearing(s) that provide(s) affected persons and their advocates with 
opportunities to challenge the eviction decision and/or to present alternative proposals and to articulate 
their demands and development priorities.” The sites for relocation of the evicted must be adequate. Full 
participation and agreement of the resettled is required as well as restitution if applicable, as outlined under 
the Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law 
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law. 
188 du Plessis, Jean, and Malcolm Langford, Dignity in the Rubble? Forced Evictions and Human Rights 
Law, (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2004). 
189 Globalization leading to the growing privatization of housing makes it difficult for the poor to find 
affordable housing, resulting in displacement of the marginalized. 
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Many such projects are supported by international development assistance, implicating 
foreign governments and banks in violations of the human right. As time progresses, 
more and more INGOs gain an increasing recognition that the World Bank can help 
shame the state and itself deserves shaming for the part it plays in many of these 
development projects that lead to evictions. 
The CESCR solidified its commitment to halting forced evictions when it 
consistently looked to the issue in its review of country reports. The first instance where 
the committee declared evictions in a state a violation of ESR successfully stopped the 
attempt. Here, from 1985 to 1995, the Dominican Republic sought to forcibly evict 
hundreds of thousands of slum-dwellers to ‘beautify’ the capital. Local NGOs appealing 
to international human rights NGOs, including the Center on Housing Rights and 
Evictions were able to prompt the CESCR to condemn the state’s actions in 1990 and 
persuade the state in 1991 to not evict 70,000 more dwellers.190 In another instance, in its 
review of Nigeria, the CESCR expressed concerns for the problems of homelessness and 
forced evictions in the state and recommended the state halt this practice.191  
Forced evictions too emphasize the ‘interdependency of human rights’ since not 
only is the act a violation of ESR but also of CPR including the right to be free from 
discrimination, “the right to respect for the home, right to privacy, right to life and right 
to freedom of movement and right to property,” as present in the ICCPR.192 In fact, 
                                                          
190 MODULE 13: The Right to Adequate Housing, n.d, 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/IHRIP/circle/modules/module13.htm (accessed March 10, 2017). 
191 Ibid. 
192 A report by COHRE describes the spillover effects of evictions, claiming, “the practice of forced 
eviction can result in the violation of a number of other rights including: • The right to non-interference 
with privacy, family and home • The right to be protected against the arbitrary deprivation of property • 
The right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions — many forced evictions occur without warning, 
forcing people to abandon their homes, lands and worldly possessions • The right to respect for the home • 
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Article 17 of the ICCPR implicitly directly calls on states to protect and respect the home. 
It states, “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and 
reputation.”193 In his 2004 report, the Special Rapporteur on the right notes, “The issue of 
forced evictions necessitates the examination of a range of issues related to adequate 
housing, including land, property, access to water and sanitation, health, poverty, gender, 
children, indigenous people, minorities and vulnerable groups, with security of tenure, 
security of the home and security of the person at the core.”194 In his seminal book, 
Evicted, Desmond describes the impact a lack of housing can have on the creation and 
sustenance of poverty. Without a home, those evicted find themselves in shelters or on 
the streets, suffering depression.195 Desmond finds that simply having a home motivates 
people to work harder, be happier and more civically engaged.196 Forced evictions, then, 
                                                          
The right to freedom of movement and to choose one's residence • The right to education — often children 
cannot attend school due to relocation • The right to water — as evicted people often find it far more 
difficult to access potable water • The right to life — violence during the forced eviction which results in 
death, is a common occurrence. • The right to security of the person — implementing authorities rarely 
provide evicted persons with adequate homes or any form of compensation, thus rendering them vulnerable 
to homelessness and further acts of violence. • The right to effective remedies for alleged human rights 
violations…Women suffer disproportionately from the practice of forced eviction, given the extent of 
statutory and other forms of discrimination against women. 
COHRE Africa Programme Fact-Finding Mission, Langford, Malcolm, du Plessis, Jean; Stuart, Rob, 
Listening to the Poor? Housing Rights in Nairobi, Kenya, (Utrecht: The Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE), 2006). 
193United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York: United Nations, 
December 16, 1966. 
194Miloon Kothari, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: Adequate housing as a component 
of the right to an adequate standard of living. Report by the Special Rapporteur, Miloon Kothari 
Addendum: Mission to Kenya (9-22 February 2004), (New York: United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, 2004). 
195Matthew Desmond, Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City, (New York: Crowblishers, 2016): 
5. 
196 For Desmond, in the crisis of housing, human rights principles, “two freedoms,” are at odds with each 
other, namely “the freedom to profit from rents and the freedom to live in a safe and affordable home” with 
the government protecting the latter over the former consistently (308). 
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in combining ESR and CPR are particularly appealing for INGOs looking to illustrate the 
fundamental justiciability of ESR. 
Regional treaties address the right to housing.197 The African charter on Human 
and peoples’ rights adjudicated in a prominent case in 2001 against forced evictions, 
SERAC and CESR v Nigeria.198 A non-human rights initiative that addresses housing 
rights includes the MDGs, particularly in the commitment to achieve improvements in 
the lives of 100 million slum dwellers by 2020 as well as the World Summit for 
Sustainable Development where states agreed to halve the proportion of people without 
access to adequate sanitation by 2015. Considering the Constitutions of particular 
countries, South Africa was the first to explicitly contain the right.  
However, international law’s articulation of the right to housing, as Hohmann 
indicates, has its weaknesses and characteristic difficulties.199 One issue is the definition 
of the right and a house itself, which leads to a lack of understanding about when and 
who can claim the right so that law remains vague and undefined. A second issue 
Hohmann points to is concern that “the right’s interpretation is overly procedural, even 
‘programmatic,’ privileging means at the expense of ends, and resulting in a right that 
appears to recede from potential claimant’s grasp.”200 Here, most jurisdictions list out 
                                                          
197 such as the revised European Social Charter, the European Convention of Human Rights in Article 8, 
Article 9 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the Arab Charter and the African 
charter on Human and peoples’ rights 
198 The case was brought against Nigeria by the Ogoni leaders based on the actions of the State oil 
company. The African Commission explicitly mentioning General Comment Nos. 4 and 7 to rule in favor 
of the plaintiffs. 
African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, 155/96: Social and Economic Rights Action Center 
(SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) / Nigeria, 
http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/30th/comunications/155.96/achpr30_155_96_eng.pdf, Banjul: African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, 2001. 
199 Jessie Hohmann, The Right to Housing: Law, Concepts, Possibilities, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014). 
200 Ibid, 2. 
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procedural steps to realize the right rather than establish substantive outcomes for the 
actual enjoyment of the right. Also, the legal articulation of the right does not express the 
conditions of the violation of the right and its associated suffering and marginalization 
sufficiently. Because of this, Hohmann notes, that while international actors have 
addressed and defined the right to housing in terms of respecting and protecting it from 
the threat of forced evictions, they have not sufficiently addressed the state’s duty to 
fulfill. She states, “Although the Committee has dealt extensively with the issue of forced 
evictions in relation to security of tenure, it has not paid sufficient attention to the 
systemic issues underlying the inability of large proportions of the world’s population to 
enjoy security of tenure.”201 The right to housing in international law, then, comes with 
some problems.  
Nevertheless, in recent years, advocates, prompt the state not simply to halt 
evictions and put procedural protections in place, but also to reform the system to ensure 
adequate housing, prompting substantive change. On 3 October 2005, World Habitat 
Day, Kofi Annan connected the negative right of freedom from forced evictions to the 
positive right of freedom from homelessness in stating that, the ‘build-up of slums and 
informal settlements occurs in large part because of policies and exclusionary practices 
that deny public services and basic facilities…to informal settlements’ and that ‘evictions 
and demolitions are not the answer to the challenges of rapid urbanization. We must have 
propoor, participatory urban development… with respect for human rights.’202 This 
                                                          
201 Ibid, 135. 
202 Kofi Annan, "IN MESSAGE TO MARK WORLD HABITAT DAY, SECRETARY-GENERAL 
STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF PRO-POOR, PARTICIPATORY URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN LINE 
WITH HUMAN RIGHTS," United Nations: Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, September 27, 2005, 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sgsm10130.doc.htm (accessed March 1, 2017). 
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considering that, according to UN-HABITAT, as of 2015, one in eight people or around a 
billion people live in slums where dwellings are often inadequate. 203  
The focus of this paper, civil society organizations, including the Centre for 
Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), Amnesty International, Habitat International 
Coalition - Housing and Land Rights Network (HIC-HLRN) and the World Organization 
Against Torture seek to address this problem of adequate housing in many ways. They 
use “urgent actions” to disseminate information in the media and among members, 
conduct ‘fact-finding missions’ to gather information on the case at hand, document and 
survey individuals affected to attain impartial information, mobilize locals (individuals 
and organizations), prompt international and regional human rights bodies to act such as 
by submitting reports to treaty bodies and commissions and aiding with litigation at the 
local, national and regional level. There is also a consistent attempt to prioritize 
vulnerable groups, particularly women, children, and indigenous groups. Having 
explicated the law INGOs invoke in these attempts, establishing a base for my later 
discussion, below, I begin with a background of my case, Kenya. 
Kenya 
I begin this subsection with an explanation of why Kenya makes a good case for 
my analysis and conclude with a brief history of the state’s relationship with housing 
rights.  
Context of Kenya: Background 
                                                          
203 "Slum Almanac 2015-2016," UN-HABITAT, n.d, https://unhabitat.org/slum-almanac-2015-2016/ 
(accessed March 20, 2017). 
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I take the case of Kenya as a representative typical case of countries INGOs most 
often shame. 204 Risse and Sikkink outline five factors that influence shaming and Kenya 
stands at about the same level as many other shamed countries on these factors.205  
The first factor establishes whether the regime is democratic or authoritarian. As 
are most countries in the world today, Kenya (according to the Freedom House Index) 
classifies as “partly free.”206  Although it is officially a democracy with elections, the 
state lacks many civil and political liberties that would ensure the country’s full freedom. 
Whether a state is democratic or authoritarian has significant impact on whether it will 
comply with shaming with different theories suggesting that democracies can be either 
more or alternatively less likely to respond to shaming. More likely because they are not 
outliers like authoritarian regimes and are more attuned to complying with international 
norms to maintain their self-image as law abiding states. However, in some cases, 
perhaps particularly with many ESR, democracies can be less likely to comply with 
human rights because having already complied with one set of international norms simply 
with their democratic status, states are often loath to address others, especially if their 
image in the international community will not change significantly if they refuse to 
                                                          
204 Conducive to shaming, Kenya is party to a number of international and regional human rights treaties, 
including the ICCPR (as of 1976), the ICESCR (as of 1972), CEDAW (as of 1984), CRC (as of 1990, 
including the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict as of 2002 and on 
Prostitution and Pornography as of 2000), ICERD (as of 2001), ICRPD (as of 2008), CAT (as of 1997), 
The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families (as of 2003), CSR (as of 1966), the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (as of 2005), 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child (as of 2000) and on the Rights of Women in Africa (as of 2003). Kenya has also ratified 49 ILO 
Conventions. In 2000, Kenya committed to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. 
205 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, "The socialization of international human rights norms into 
domestic practices: introduction," In The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change, by Kathryn Sikkink, Thomas Risse, & Stephen C. Ropp, 1-38. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
206 Ibid. 
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comply. Also, for a lot of third party nations that may contribute to the shaming effort 
like the US, a commitment to democracy may seem more important than one to human 
rights and many may believe that over time, democracy will inevitably lead to 
improvements in quality of life including human rights. On the other side of the coin, 
autocratic regimes too may either be more or less likely to respond favorably to shaming 
attempts. They may be unlikely to commit to human rights since they already possess a 
‘bad’ reputation and shaming would have no significant costs. Alternatively, these same 
regimes may be more likely to comply with human rights norms to gain some credibility, 
legitimacy, and reputation in the international community. 
A second factor that would significantly influence a state’s compliance with 
human rights is whether it has consolidated or limited statehood. Statehood signifies the 
institutional capacity of states. In “Human Rights in areas of limited statehood: the new 
agenda,” Borzel and Risse note that many states fail to enforce laws and cannot 
implement human rights norms not out of a lack of political will, but rather, out of a lack 
of resources and infrastructure. In these instances, states are unable to respond to shaming 
and fail to enforce international law out of no or little fault of their own. Commitment, 
here, may not lead to compliance.207 In their study, Risse and Borzel decipher a means to 
measure statehood, using Stephen Krassner’s (1999) definition of “domestic sovereignty” 
as “the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public 
authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity.” Risse and 
Borzel rank countries on their relative level of statehood according to three broad 
                                                          
207Tanja A. Borzel and Thomas Risse, “Human rights in areas of limited statehood: the new agenda,” In 
The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance, by Thomas Risse, Kathryn 
Sikkink, and Stephen C. Ropp, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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indicators the “failure of state authority,” the “portion of country affected by fighting,” 
and “bureaucratic quality.” According to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Kenya 
has a “defective democracy,” one that is not fully consolidated but not fully autocratic 
either.208 Kenya is not a failed state and not a completely consolidated one, representative 
of majority of the states in the world that NGOs will seek to shame. Many NGOs have 
circumvented the issue where the state has limited authority by appealing to international 
donors, funding many operations in the country and often complicit in violations of 
rights. In the case of Kenya, INGOs shame both the state and external actors to bring 
about change.  
Like most other countries shamed too Kenya’s population, GNI per capita, and 
annual GDP growth continue to rise over the years. As of 2015, Kenya’s GNI per capita 
is $1,340, its annual GDP growth is 5.6% and its population is up to 46.1 million 
people.209 The poverty rate in 2005210 was 33.6%, up from 21.5% in 1997.211 The poverty 
headcount ratio at national poverty lines, though, is 45.9% of the population. An 
indication of increasing economic growth, unemployment is low and decreasing at 9.2% 
as of 2014. According to a study conducted by the Institute for Security Studies, termed 
“Reasonable Goals for Reducing Poverty in Africa – Targets for Post 2015 MDGs and 
Agenda 2063,” Kenya is sixth among the “top 10 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with 
                                                          
208 Bertelsmann Stiftung. BTI 2016 — Kenya Country. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016. 
209 All statistics from the World Bank 
World Bank, Kenya, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/country/kenya (accessed March 1, 2017). 
210 Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day. With the poverty headcount at less than $3.10 a day instead, the 
percentage of people in poverty increase to 58.9% of the total population.  
211 This, however, might be more an indication of improvements of the measure rather than an actual 
increase in poverty. 
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large populations living in extreme poverty.”212 Despite Kenya’s increasing economic 
growth, the state has failed to translate this into poverty reduction, refusing to implement 
pro-poor policies. According to UN-HABITAT, “depending on the city, 60-80 percent of 
Kenya’s urban population live in slums that are characterised by lack of access to water 
and sanitation, insecure tenure, lack of adequate housing, poor environmental conditions, 
and high crime rates.”213 Many other countries failing to meet the right to housing are in a 
similar condition.  
A third factor that influences the effectiveness of naming and shaming, according 
to Risse and Sikkink, is whether the state is centralized or decentralized. In Kenya, as in 
most countries, particularly democracies around the world, the state is largely 
decentralized and continues to be more so, presenting a powerful problem to naming and 
shaming as a tactic. 
The fourth and fifth factor that influence a state’s response to the effectiveness of 
shaming are material and social vulnerability. Kenya is a lower middle income country, 
indicating a degree of material vulnerability, making it more susceptible to shaming by 
powerful donors who, in turn, might be prompted to the cause by INGOs. Social 
vulnerability indicates an actor’s “desire to be an accepted member of a social group or a 
particular community.”214 This varies from state to state and is a subjective measure that 
                                                          
212Samuel Karanja, Kenya ranked sixth on extreme poverty index, February 18, 2015, 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Poverty-Africa-Index-Kenya-Inequality/1056-2628224-vqlg4v/index.html 
(accessed February 10, 2017). 
213Raakel Syrjänen, Tom Osanjo, and UN-HABITAT KENSUP Team, UN-HABITAT and the Kenya Slum 
Upgrading Programme: Strategy Document, (Nairobi: United Nations, 2008). 
214 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, "The socialization of international human rights norms into 
domestic practices: introduction," In The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change, by Kathryn Sikkink, Thomas Risse, & Stephen C. Ropp, 1-38. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
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is difficult to measure. A factor that influences the extent to which shaming occurs in a 
country too is the presence and the number of domestic NGOs in that country. 
Having noted the factors that make Kenya a typical case, next, I move into a 
subsection that looks at the history of housing rights in the case.  
History of Housing Rights in Kenya 
The first forced eviction in Kenya was the elimination of a bazaar as a health 
hazard in Nairobi in 1904 by the British colonial government.215 Following this initial 
attempt, the government proceeded to forcibly evict thousands of indigenous peoples 
from their homelands with the promise of resettlement, overlooking the fact that land for 
many Kenyans has special cultural, social, political, and economic significance. In doing 
this, the British created a massive displacement, placing natives on marginal lands so that 
a small group of white settlers could exploit their fertile agricultural land, ignoring 
communal land ownership, imposing private ownership and hefty taxes. In the 1950s, the 
land crisis reached its apex and as reserves (where Kenyans were placed) proved 
increasingly difficult to survive in, one of the factors that drove the move towards 
independence was the problem of adequate housing. After independence, though, the new 
government elite replaced the British elite and maintained the latter’s discriminatory 
policy.216 With increasing urbanization and globalization, more people moved to the 
cities, resulting in an increase in slums. An AI report notes, “Between 1971 and 1995, the 
                                                          
215Kefa M. Otiso, "FORCED EVICTIONS IN KENYAN CITIES," Singapore Journal of Tropical 
Geography, (2002): 252-267. 
216 The Moi government of 1978 to 2002 exacerbated the problem by following the British trend of 
irregularly privatizing public lands, and transferring native lands to well-connected individuals and land-
buying companies. Jacqueline M. Klopp, "Pilfering the Public: The Problem of Land Grabbing in 
Contemporary Kenya," africaTODAY, (2000): 7-26. 
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estimated number of informal settlements grew from 50 to over 130, and their population 
rose tenfold, from some 100,000 to over 1 million people.”217 In the late 1970s and 
1980s, the government responded with a policy of demolition, working to destroy 
informal settlements on the grounds of health hazards or for beautification (following 
British standards of viewing slums as “eyesores”), rendering many who were already 
poor and vulnerable homeless. Moreover, government public policy overlooked informal 
settlements in city planning projects. However, later, taking a firm step in the right 
direction, the government moved towards improving slum conditions rather than 
attempting to eliminate them altogether (at least in rhetoric). Nevertheless, starting in the 
late 1990s and into the 2000s, evictions for the ‘greater good’ of development 
increased.218 
Today, in Kenya, evictions and inadequate housing in informal settlements arise 
for a variety of reasons including “widespread poverty,” “over-urbanisation,” “shortages 
of decent low income housing,” “iniquitous patterns of land ownership,” “lack of land 
and absence of tenure for the urban poor,” “poor enforcement of building and zoning 
laws leading to the deterioration of formal residential areas” and “use of inappropriate 
urban planning policies and standards that limit sufficient supply of and access to good 
quality housing.”219 The perpetrators of evictions are most often central governments, 
                                                          
217 Amnesty International, KENYA: THE UNSEEN MAJORITY: NAIROBI’S TWO MILLION SLUM-
DWELLERS, Amnesty International, 2009. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Considering the origins of forced evictions, Otiso argues that violations of housing rights result from 
“factors embedded in the country’s political economy, in particular, the grossly inequitable land ownership 
structure which makes it difficult for the poor to access land and decent shelter,” calling for Kenya to 
“make its political economy more inclusive, implement land reform, domesticate its municipal planning 
and related by-laws and create a proactive slum settlement policy.” 
Kefa M. Otiso, "FORCED EVICTIONS IN KENYAN CITIES," Singapore Journal of Tropical 
Geography, (2002): 252-267. 
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private organizations, state corporations and foreign businesses. Most evictions involve 
the use of force and violence by police forces. 
Communities have responded to the crisis of evictions primarily with legal action. 
Multiple local NGOs have responded to the issue, often offering legal advice, dedicated 
in large part to ending forced evictions, including Muungano wa Wanavijiji Maskini 
(Federation of the Urban Poor), and Kituo Cha Sheria (Legal Aid Centre). Government 
opposition to change, though, has limited the power of local NGOs and campaigns, 
prompting the need for international assistance and shaming.  
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Chapter 4: Analysis 
In response to human rights violations and atrocities, INGOs can shame the state 
from the top down in a variety of ways. In this section, I look at the ways in which 
international organizations have sought to shame Kenya for its violations of the right to 
housing. When first beginning my analysis, I compared the state’s responses to shaming 
of negative rights such as evictions and positive rights, such as to improve the quality of 
housing in slums, looking at whether the question of resources influences the policies the 
state chooses to implement, considering the theoretical arguments. I recognized, though, 
that addressing evictions themselves can involve both negative rights in the form of short 
term immediate aid and an instant call to halt the practice and end the 
violence/harassment as well as a more positive right related to long term reallocation, 
rehabilitation, and reparations if applicable. What I found to be a more pertinent 
distinction instead, in the course of my analysis, was the separation of shaming attempts 
themselves. I found that INGOs shame either specific attempts at evictions by the state in 
urgent actions and press releases, calling for immediate action, or shame the state’s 
treatment of the right to housing more broadly in a sustained manner. Where Kenya often 
responded to the latter by implementing new laws and policies to address the issue, it 
rarely if ever halted evictions in response to the former. 
In this section, then, I begin with an account of a few cases of specific violations 
INGOs addressed and the state’s responses to those attempts. I, then, present some 
analysis. Next, I look at INGOs’ attempts to shame the state in general and the state’s 
responses to that, following with some analysis. Before I go into these, though, I briefly 
indicate some nascent attempts at shaming when INGOs and other international 
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institutions had just started to consider the potential of ESR and many still noted 
violations of the right to housing as violations of the ICCPR rather than ICESCR. 
Nascent Attempts at Shaming 
While some early attempts at shaming Kenya looked to the right to housing, 
particularly defined as evictions, as enshrined in the ICESCR, most shaming attempts 
instead labelled evictions violations of the ICCPR. In this subsection, I mention some 
such attempts. 
Although delivering only one comment specific to the right itself, the CESCR 
prompted one of the earliest shaming attempts by an international body in the case of the 
right to housing in Kenya. On the occasion of Kenya’s first periodic review, in 1993, the 
Committee noted “with great concern that practices of forced evictions without 
consultation, compensation or adequate resettlement appear to be widespread in Kenya, 
particularly in Nairobi.”220 At this early stage, then, the CESCR began to define the right 
to housing closely with a right to be free from forced evictions. This concern is the 
product of a report from Foodfirst Information and Action Network (FIAN)221 submitted 
to the committee that documented “large-scale, forced evictions of hundreds of thousands 
of ethnic groups.” Moreover, though not specific to housing, the CESCR insists that 
development itself can be discriminatory, involving disparities in the treatment of 
different regions of the country, leaving the vulnerable continually dispossessed. Later, 
                                                          
220 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Summary Record of the 12th Meeting. Record, 
Geneva: United Nations: Economic and Social Council, 1994. 
221 “FIAN International was founded in 1986 as the first international human rights organization to 
advocate for the realization of the right to adequate food and nutrition.” 
FIAN International, A human rights organization, 2017, http://www.fian.org/who-we-are/who-we-are/ 
(accessed March 30, 2017). 
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INGOs and international institutions will note the prominence of development based 
evictions.  
Nevertheless, for the most part, the shaming of evictions (and the right to 
housing) in the 1990s was connected to and de-emphasized in the face of the violation of 
other more fundamental, often civil, and political, rights. For example, the 1995 US State 
Department Report on Human Rights describes the forcible eviction of the Kikuyus by 
the Maasai from the Rift Valley region of the country where they had been living. 
However, rather than emphasizing the resultant violation of the right to housing, the State 
Department lists the case as an example of the use of excessive force in internal conflicts 
and the discriminatory treatment of minority ethnic groups.222 Similarly, HRW and the 
UNDP highlight the discriminatory treatment of internally displaced persons that lead to 
evictions as violations instead of the act itself, noting the lack of security and protection. 
HRW notes, “The government is slowly, but surely, consolidating and legalizing the 
illegal gains from the “ethnic” violence in such a way as to reduce permanently land 
ownership of certain ethnic groups in the areas which it has promised to its 
supporters.”223 This follows the trend set by the Vienna Declaration in the World 
Conference on Human Rights in 1993, centering on the violent and persecutory nature of 
forced evictions to stress its fundamental civil and political injustice as a facet of ESR.224 
Seeing an opening with the regime change from authoritarian to democratic that 
occurred in 2002 when President Moi Kibaki stepped down, considering the expectation 
                                                          
222 U.S. Department of State, Kenya Human Rights Practices, 1994, U.S. Department of State, 1995. 
223 Human Rights Watch, Government Undermining of the UNDP Program, 1997, 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/kenya2/9.htm (accessed March 1, 2017). 
224 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, "Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action," United 
Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, June 25, 1993. 
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that democracies are more receptive to human rights than dictatorships, international 
shaming intensified. The emphasis, though, remained on viewing ESR through the lens 
solely of discrimination connected to CPR. By the start of the 21st century, international 
human rights bodies described evictions more concretely as major violations. For 
instance, in 2003, HRW released a report and related news releases on the issue of 
property rights violations and their link to AIDS, evictions, and poverty, specifically 
considering women in Kenya.225 HRW frames this case as an issue of discrimination 
since customary law often evoked concerning women’s right to property, particularly 
when inheritance is a concern, places women in a dependent and subservient position in 
comparison to men.226 The international treaties invoked include CEDAW and the 
ICCPR, with brief mention of a violation of the right to housing as present in the 
ICESCR. HRW, though focusing on women, seeks to engage its audience by 
emphasizing the harm to everyone if women are left destitute, homeless, and poor, noting 
the effects on development and economic growth and connecting violation of the right to 
property for women to the violation of other rights, including children’s rights to an 
education and basic needs, including food. Presenting a partnership of sorts between 
rights and development, HRW cites the UNDP and states, “If Kenya is to meet its 
development aims, it must address the property inequalities that hold women back.”227 
HRW assigns blame explicitly to the state for its failure to protect women and its 
maintenance of unjust laws. As a remedy, it calls on the government to alter these laws 
                                                          
225 Human Rights Watch, Women Stripped of Property in Kenya: AIDS, Evictions, and Poverty Linked to 
Property Rights Violations, News, Nairobi: Human Rights Watch, 2003. 
226Ibid. In a similar vein, noting the impediment of legal participation, a report by COHRE illustrates how 
threats and intimidation by the police prevented many potential plaintiffs from filing a case against the state 
for evictions, highlighting discrimination against the homeless and slum dwellers. 
227Ibid. 
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and to include provisions defending women’s rights in the Constitution and prioritization 
of women’s specific vulnerability in the government, with gender specific programs in 
the Department of Housing. HRW includes recommendations for others that might shame 
the state into altering its practices, including the World Bank, other international donors, 
and the United Nations.228 
Other than shaming by INGOs, UN human rights bodies, including the Special 
Rapporteur on adequate housing at the time, Miloon Kothari, addressed the issue. After 
visiting the country at the invitation of the state (illustrating in part the new democratic 
state’s formal commitment to the right to housing), Kothari submitted an oft-cited report 
to the Commission on Human Rights on the general status of the right in Kenya, framing 
violations of ESR in light of discrimination, echoing HRW’s report.229 Likewise, the 
                                                          
228 Even as other INGOs moved away from only inspecting the right to housing through the lens of 
discrimination, HRW continued to focus on discrimination. In early 2013, HRW more distanced from 
shaming the right to housing in Kenya took on the issue of evictions as they concern refugees. Emphasizing 
a violation of thousands of refugees’ right to freedom of movement and of basic economic and social 
rights, HRW issued a press release against the proposed eviction and relocation of Somali refugees in 
Kenya. By November 2016, as the issue gained media recognition, AI shamed the Kenyan government for 
its forced displacement of Somali refugees, living in the state. The emphasis was on violations of civil and 
political rights, though, with the word eviction not used by AI. 
Human Rights Watch, Kenya: Don’t Force 55,000 Refugees Into Camps, Human Rights Watch, 2013. 
Amnesty International, KENYA: NOWHERE ELSE TO GO: FORCED RETURNS OF SOMALI 
REFUGEES FROM DADAAB REFUGEE CAMP, KENYA, November 14, 2016, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr32/5118/2016/en/ (accessed February 14, 2017). 
229 Echoing HRW’s report, the Rapporteur concerning discrimination against women describes how 
customary law negatively affects women who are denied de facto property ownership, noting an example 
of how widows are often forced to marry their dead husband’s brother or relative “to ensure her economic 
and social protection.” Female headed households often struggle the most, with women forced often into 
prostitution, risking HIV/AIDs and other problems. The Rapporteur indicates some cases of evictions that 
were not highly popularized by INGOs and the media and others that were in the spotlight for years. This 
includes displacement in the Kieni forest of survivors of politically instigated clashes from 1992-3, of 
around 3,000 people. The state justified evictions by expressing concerns about the natural resource, the 
forest, and its environment. The state promised those evicted land until a proper reallocation could occur, 
but the land promised was small and, as of the Rapporteur’s visit a decade following the evictions, the 
relocation program had not begun. Another case the Rapporteur mentions is of land cartels in Nairobi’s 
urban slum areas, involving the illegal allocation of land. Yet another is a case of evictions, conducted in 
2004, this one by the at-the-time current regime by the Kenya Railways Corporation and Kenya Power and 
Lighting Corporation, targeting poor slum residents. This lead to the demolition of 2,000 structures, leaving 
thousands homeless. “According to information received from non-governmental sources, over 150,000 
people would have been made homeless by the evictions and 17,600 structures destroyed. An estimated 
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Special Rapporteur emphasizes putting in place a rights-based approach to development, 
ensuring that efforts to ‘upgrade’ slums follow the basic tenets of international law. 
Responses by the State to these Attempts  
The state responded to these early shaming attempts in much the same way it 
would shaming attempts later. It failed to address questions of the specific instances of 
evictions conducted and instead underscored its main policies in relation to the right to 
housing broadly, regardless of whether such policies and promises in rhetoric led to 
actual changes in conditions. 
In the report, it submitted to the CESCR in the early 1990s, rather than focusing 
on or even addressing evictions and other negative rights, Kenya emphasizes its 
commitment to progressive realization and implementing the positive right aspects of the 
broad right. To address the problem of affordability, Kenya mentions its enactment of the 
Housing Act, which “provides for loans and grants of public money for the construction 
of dwellings and establishes a Housing Fund and a Housing Board.” The state also 
stresses its other initiatives to encourage “cooperative housing schemes, mortgage 
lending and institutional housing programs” as well as mentioning its provision of 
housing to civil servants in urban areas.230 Kenya’s commitment to the right to housing, 
                                                          
330,000 people living in Kibera would be affected, including by displacement.” This case, in turn, became 
very popular among INGOs shaming. 
Miloon Kothari, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: Adequate housing as a component of 
the right to an adequate standard of living. Report by the Special Rapporteur, Miloon Kothari Addendum: 
Mission to Kenya (9-22 February 2004), (New York: United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2004). 
230 Kenya, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: 
Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report, New York: 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1993. 
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though, more often than not, involves an adherence to market economics, such as 
promoting economic growth and development, ignoring ESR.  
In January 2003, in partnership with UN-Habitat, the Ministry for Roads, Public 
Works, and Housing committed to the Slum Upgrading Program. The aim of this 
program is to improve housing, infrastructure, and livelihoods in slum areas with the 
project set to start in Nairobi and Kisumu with implementation to begin between 2005-
2020.231 It seeks to contribute to decentralization, negotiation, participation, and 
empowerment of local communities. However, invoking rights, multiple stakeholders, 
shack owners, rent collectors and slum dwellers are afraid of forcible eviction as a result 
of the project, noting that although it strives to ensure participation, it does not seem to 
maintain this as a priority of the project.232 In 2004, the Ndungu Commission issued a 
lengthy report, citing the illegality of evictions, and drawing heavily on international 
guidelines to do so.233 Concerning the actual specific issue of evictions, following a case 
filed in the High Court, the government ordered a temporary ban on the evictions. 
Nevertheless, with the problem of enforcement and implementation continuing to this 
                                                          
231Raakel Syrjänen, Tom Osanjo, and UN-HABITAT KENSUP Team, UN-HABITAT and the Kenya Slum 
Upgrading Programme: Strategy Document, Nairobi: United Nations, 2008. 
232 One example the Rapporteur gives is of a slum upgrading project in the Mathare slums, funded by 
Germany, which since it did not consult the slum dwellers raised rent prices to levels prior tenants could 
not afford, causing them to have to move as other families who could afford the prices moved in. 
Miloon Kothari, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: Adequate housing as a component of 
the right to an adequate standard of living. Report by the Special Rapporteur, Miloon Kothari Addendum: 
Mission to Kenya (9-22 February 2004), (New York: United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2004). 
233 The Ndungu Commission itself, though, rose more out of a local push for land rights than an 
international one, established in 2003 in response to local pressure on land rights. The new (post-Moi) 
regime also sought to assure its place in the international community and created the National Human 
Rights Commission. It recommended the implementation of two general rules. One rule prompts the 
government to take back illegally allocated public land from private actors only if the public interest 
outweighs private interest. Implementation of these rulings though is complex as there exists no way to 
value public against private interests and because there is a general lack of political will on the part of 
government officials to enforce this ruling.  
Casty G. Mbae-Njoroge and Joseph Kieyah, Ndung'u Report on Land Grabbing in Kenya: Legal and 
Economic Analysis, Nairobi: Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), 2010. 
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day, there has been no actual change in outcome as the number of women who own 
property stays at 5% from the early twentieth century. 
States, then, fail to alter their practices or halt evictions in response to shaming, 
although they do institute general policies. 
Specific Attempts at Shaming: Case of the Forest Peoples 
The forest peoples in Kenya suffered and continue to suffer greatly under forced 
evictions. Still, because of a confluence of interest in the area between human rights and 
environmental groups and the prominence of the issue as a question of indigenous 
peoples’ rights, shaming efforts are more intense and consistent for the two main cases of 
the forest peoples suffering in Kenya, the Ogiek and the Sengwer. In this subsection, I 
begin with an account of shaming efforts targeting the Ogiek, then delve into the state’s 
responses to these efforts. Next, I illustrate shaming efforts concerning the Sengwer and 
the state’s responses to these. I follow with a brief account of other specific shaming 
attempts, prominently for evictions occurring in slums. In the next subsection, I develop 
an analysis of my results. 
As early as the 2004 report by the Special Rapporteur, the eviction and related 
marginalization of the Ogiek people was in the spotlight.234 Although eviction attempts 
against this group date back to British resettlement efforts, shaming pressure intensified 
with recent eviction attempts by the Kenyan government. These cite a law dedicated to 
protecting the environment that argues for the defense of the forest’s natural flora and 
                                                          
234 Miloon Kothari, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: Adequate housing as a component 
of the right to an adequate standard of living. Report by the Special Rapporteur, Miloon Kothari 
Addendum: Mission to Kenya (9-22 February 2004), (New York: United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, 2004). 
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fauna, proscribing any groups from residing in or using forest land without permission, 
where permission is set to be given only when the person requesting it works to conserve 
the land. Using this law, the state has argued that the Ogiek threaten natural forestry and 
conservation and since 2001 demanded evictions of the group, while permitting private 
logging companies to settle on and use the land. Responding to the call for help, HROs 
began shaming efforts alongside an existing network of environmental organizations 
shaming to stop the logging. Both these groups noted that logging harms the land while 
the Ogiek’s natural practices conserve and better it so that the latter should stay and the 
former be banned. In 2004, COHRE, an INGO working specifically on the issue of 
housing rights, first shamed the state for the continuation of eviction, the number rising to 
more than 50,000 in 2005 with 7 schools demolished.235 COHRE called for intensified 
shaming at the international level from other INGOs and third parties to bolster its 
efforts.236 In 2006, “an interim fact-finding mission report from the Kenya National 
Commission on Human Rights states that the settlements were burned, property and food 
stocks destroyed, children (half of the affected population) can no longer attend school, 
all residents, particularly children, lack food, proper clothing and shelter, no relief food 
has been sent by the government or any other agency and there are no medical services to 
deal with the likely increase in disease.”237  In 2007, AI, COHRE and news sources in 
                                                          
235du Plessis, Jean, and Malcolm Langford, Dignity in the Rubble? Forced Evictions and Human Rights 
Law, (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2004). 
236 Ibid. 
237 Other evictions include 120 families in Nakuru, 30 houses demolished in Kibagare, leaving 140 
homeless and destitute, the homes of 850 families in the Deep Sea settlement, 20 families from the Tudor 
Estate, 4000 residents of the Eburu Forest (reported by Relief Web), and 3000 residents of the Mt. Elgon 
Forest. In 2006, fires in Mukuru, leaving 20,000 homeless, were allegedly too a government land grabbing 
ploy.  
Human Rights Education Associates and Niels J. Harbitz, Forced evictions reach crisis levels, Press 
Release, Human Rights House, 2006. 
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partnership primarily with Hakijamii, KNHCR and the Kenya Land Alliance continued 
shaming the repeated forced evictions of the Ogiek in the Mau Forests.238 They indicated 
that laws in Kenya continually fail to match international guidelines despite the state’s 
promises. Increasingly shifting from stressing evictions as violations of ICCPR, these 
reports note the fundamental role the ICESCR plays. Following an extensive 
investigation, INGOs explicitly assign blame to the state, tracing orders for the evictions 
to the District Commissioner’s office, which, in turn, gets its orders directly from the 
Office of the President with a 2004 cabinet decision purportedly giving the original 
orders. As remedies, they stress an immediate ban on evictions, the necessity of 
guidelines and a resettlement plan that includes compensations and investigation into 
illegal land allocation.239  
As of 2008, a second major, environmental-based HRO, the Forest Peoples 
Program created in 1990 to support “the rights of people who live in forests and depend 
on them for their livelihoods,” also issued press releases and reports concerning the 
evictions of the Ogiek.240 As evictions continued, in 2010, with the help of multiple 
INGOs, the Ogiek brought their case before the African Commission. In 2012, the 
African Commission referred the case to the African Court and called for a halt to the 
evictions. At the same time, an INGO report, backed by the ILO Committee of Experts, 
brought the forced evictions of the Endorois and the Ogiek to the notice of the UN 
                                                          
238 Amnesty International, KENYA: NOWHERE TO GO: FORCED EVICTIONS IN MAU FOREST - 
BRIEFING PAPER, MAY 2007, Amnesty International, 2007. 
239Ibid. 
240 Forest Peoples Programme, "Appeal to protect the rights of all the indigenous Sengwer / Cherangany 
people who are threatened with eviction from Embobut Forest, Kenya," Forest Peoples Programme. 2014, 
(accessed March 27, 2017). 
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Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.241 The Committee “noted with 
concern that Kenya had not acted on the decisions of the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights regarding the forced evictions of the Ogiek and Endorois from their 
lands, and urged it to provide them with redress.”242 A collective meeting of the KFS, 
World Bank and multiple INGOs established that rather than harming the land and 
adversely affecting conservation efforts, the Ogiek benefited and preserved the land.243 In 
2013, then, the African Court issued an order in favor of the Ogiek, halting both evictions 
and the proliferation of logging companies in the region.244 The decision placed particular 
emphasis on the right to housing. In February 2014, Survival International, an 
organization working for the rights of tribal people all over the world, reported further 
eviction attempts of the Ogiek as well in violation of this ruling, a domestic court order, 
and its own Constitution.245 More recently, Conservation Watch, reported in August 2016 
that KFS had again burned Ogiek homes.246  
The state has not responded as expected (by halting evictions) in response to these 
shaming attempts. Even as the state consents to listen to INGOs under pressure and 
agrees to help in rhetoric, it fails to implement its rulings and evictions continue to the 
                                                          
241 Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review Kenya, Geneva: United Nations, 2015. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Rachel Savage, Kenya's Ogiek people forced from homes amid 'colonial approach to conservation', 
August 18, 2016, (accessed March 27, 2017). 
244 This is an important case not just for Kenya but for the international human rights movement since it is 
the first case referred by NGOs to the Commission to make it to the Court and set legal precedent. It is also 
the first case to consider the rights of indigenous peoples.  
Minority Rights Group International, Kenya: Guaranteeing Ogiek rights, November 14, 2016. 
http://minorityrights.org/law-and-legal-cases/the-ogiek-case/ (accessed March 10, 2017). 
245 Survival International, Ogiek are violently evicted from ancestral home in Kenya, February 15, 2014, 
(accessed March 27, 2017). 
246 Rachel Savage, Kenya's Ogiek people forced from homes amid 'colonial approach to conservation', 
August 18, 2016, (accessed March 27, 2017). 
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present, more than a decade after the first shaming attempt. First, under sustained 
pressure from both the human rights and the environmental network, the state banned 
logging in 2001, but left the ban unenforced with the Rapporteur indicating its de facto 
continuation. At the same time, the state argued that the Ogiek were detrimental to the 
forest lands.247 Seeking to start a dialogue, though, INGOs recognized the strength of the 
state’s counter. COHRE notes, “Whereas the official reason for the eviction – protection 
of water catchment areas – has some merit, none of the correct procedures were followed: 
there was no prior consultation with the affected residents on alternatives to eviction, no 
due process and no adequate resettlement.”248  In May 2005, concerning the evictions of 
the Ogiek, the Kenyan government told the UN of its commitment to comply with 
international human rights standards. In 2006, though, the state continued evictions and 
said it would settle only 250 residents.249 In 2007, it briefly halted the practice for a year 
while at the same time attempting innovative ways to legitimize evictions, namely by 
cancelling title deeds of all the residents in the area. Likewise, the state established no 
resettlement plan. When a domestic High Court ruling in Kenya in 2014 affirmed the 
Ogiek’s right to their land as put forth by the African Court, with the National Land 
                                                          
247 Miloon Kothari, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: Adequate housing as a component 
of the right to an adequate standard of living. Report by the Special Rapporteur, Miloon Kothari 
Addendum: Mission to Kenya (9-22 February 2004), (New York: United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, 2004). 
248 These evictions were illegal under international law under these conditions: “The notice provided was 
inadequate and confusing and there was no consultation with residents or effort to find an alternative to 
evicting them from their homes. None of the evictions was carried out on the basis of a court order; on the 
contrary there a court injunction halting evictions was ignored. Evictions were executed with excessive 
force and the authorities responsible for ensuring respect for the law failed to take appropriate action to stop 
the abuses or to investigate allegations of human rights violations. Many people were left without shelter, 
livelihoods, and many lost their possessions.” 
COHRE Africa Programme Fact-Finding Mission, Malcolm Langford, Jean du Plessis and Rob Stuart, 
Listening to the Poor? Housing Rights in Nairobi, Kenya, Utrecht: The Centre on Housing Rights and 
Evictions (COHRE), 2006. 
249 Ibid. 
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Commission set to protect their rights, evictions still continued.250 Moreover, in this case, 
international donors including the EU and the Finnish government overlooked the fact 
that the money they provide to KFS goes into threatening the Ogiek. 
In January 2014, continuing on the trend of condemning evictions, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, expressed discontent over 
the forcible evictions of the Sengwer indigenous people in the Embobut forests of 
Western Kenya.251 In February, an Intercontinental Cry, a publication of the Center for 
World Indigenous Studies, described the forcible eviction of the Sengwer from their 
ancestral forest home by the KFS despite a court order banning these evictions in 2013 
and then in 2014.252 The publication traces the project that led to the evictions, the 
Natural Resource Management Project, to funds from the World Bank, allocated with the 
goal of protecting the forest and urban water supplies. The publication notes instead that, 
the KFS sets fire to Sengwer homes and food for years to prompt evictions, using this 
strategy in 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013 after the government signed the Indigenous 
Peoples Planning Framework. As multiple environmental organizations formed to oppose 
the evictions, as part of the No REDD network, the Sengwer case gained immense 
popularity, placing particularly the World Bank under immense pressure.253 Considering 
                                                          
250 NO REDD in Africa Network, FORCED RELOCATION OF SENGWER PEOPLE PROVES URGENCY 
OF CANCELING REDD, World Rainforest Movement, 2014. 
251 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Kenya / Embobut Forest: UN rights 
expert calls for the protection of indigenous people facing eviction, January 13, 2014. (accessed March 27, 
2017). 
252Curtis Kline, SENGWER OF KENYA FORCIBLY EVICTED FROM ANCESTRAL FOREST, February 1, 
2014. (accessed March 27, 2017). 
253 REDD is a UN backed initiative to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. The No 
REDD campaign, though, describes the ways in which REDD affects indigenous peoples to bring about 
genocide. Their website indicates, “But really what REDD means is Reaping profits from Evictions, land 
grabs Deforestation and Destruction of biodiversity.” Global Alliance Against REDD http://no-redd.com/ 
(Accessed March 10, 2017) 
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this case, in an appeal to the state and third party actors, the campaign declared, “We, the 
No REDD in Africa Network (NRAN) together with the Sengwer Indigenous Peoples 
Programme and the undersigned 66 organizations and over 300 individuals, strongly 
condemn the massive evictions and forced relocation of the Sengwer Indigenous People, 
one of the few remaining hunter-gatherers of the world, from their ancestral home in 
Kenya’s Cherangany Hills.”254 This network emphasizes the Convention on Genocide. A 
review by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) “alluded to the 
role of the Kenyan government's relationship with RaiPly Ltd, a Kenyan company 
involved in manufacture of wood products” as a factor in the evictions.255 This private 
company is one of the few exempt from the general government ban on logging. In 
September 2014, an organization heavily involved with the Sengwer peoples’ case, the 
Forest Peoples Program issued an appeal for the Sengwer to relevant UN bodies and the 
government to protect the rights of all Indigenous people who are threatened with 
eviction from the Embobut Forest. Numerous human rights and environmental 
organizations signed this document and it centers on shaming the eviction of 6-7000 
Sengwer people.256 The Forest Peoples Program begun shaming the state publicly on the 
                                                          
254 NO REDD in Africa Network, FORCED RELOCATION OF SENGWER PEOPLE PROVES URGENCY 
OF CANCELING REDD, World Rainforest Movement, 2014. 
255 Chris Lang, Enough is enough! Stop the evictions of the Sengwer indigenous peoples in Kenya, May 27, 
2016. (accessed March 27, 2017). 
256 Signed by Forest Peoples Programme, Global Forest Coalition, Friends of the Earth International, World 
Rainforest Movement, Survival International, Greenpeace Africa, Center for International Environmental 
Law, Indigenous Peoples’ & Community Conserved Territories & Areas, Cherangany Multipurpose 
Development Programme, Sengwer Indigenous Peoples Programme, Timberwatch, National Association of 
Professional Environmentalists, JA! Justiça Ambiental, Mali Folkecenter, Sustainable Development 
Institute, Health of Mother Earth Foundation, Centre pour l'Environnement et le Développement, 
Abibimman Foundation, ADECRU, Maison de l'Enfant et de la Femme Pygmées, NRAN (No REDD In 
Africa Network), Save the Forest Movement Jarkhand, Wahana Bumi Hijau, Acción por la Biodiversidad, 
Mekong Energy and Ecology Network, South Asian Dialogues on Ecological Democracy – Nepal, 
Jikalahari, Econexus, Synchronicity Earth, Friends of the Earth US, FERN, Sengwer Aid, Transition Free 
Press, Indigenous Peoples Links (PIPLinks), Biofuelwatch, Amigos de la Tierra América Latina y El 
Caribe, REDD Monitor, The Corner House, Enlace Continental de Mujeres Indígenas de las Américas, The 
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issue since 2010 when they did their first report on the ‘Burning and Destruction of the 
Sengwer Peoples’ properties.’ Subsequently, in 2013, the organization issued an urgent 
appeal against the forced evictions, and in 2014, reported the continued threat in a press 
release and called for the signing of an AVAAZ petition by international supporters, 
ultimately collecting 950,000 signatures worldwide.257 The organization delivered 
another appeal in February 2014, and then in December 2015, in January 2016, March 
2016 and finally to prevent the repetition of the problem in the future a letter to the EU on 
their €31 million Water Tower Protection and Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation 
Project in December 2016, since this new project has replaced the World Bank project as 
a threat to the Sengwer and the Ogiek.258 For this final appeal to the EU, the organization 
partnered with FERN, a NGO dedicated specifically to ensuring that EU programs and 
measures achieve the environmental and social justice they set out to. In March 2015, 
another environmental justice group, Both ENDs, focused pressure on the World Bank, 
but also mentioned the state’s responsibility.259 AI emphasized the problematic burning 
of Sengwer houses and mentioned the case in multiple reports including its 2015 
submission to the CESCR.260 The Coalition for Human Rights in Development including 
                                                          
Oakland Institute, Mangrove Action Project, Coorg Organisation for Rural Development, Centro de 
Culturas Indígenas del Perú, Budakattu Krishikara Sangha, Corporate Europe Observatory, Humane Trust / 
CAFAT, SONIA, Carbone Guinée, Y outh's Network to Educate and Empower the Weak, World Family, 
S.Faizi, and New Wind. 
Forest Peoples Programme, "Appeal to protect the rights of all the indigenous Sengwer / Cherangany 
people who are threatened with eviction from Embobut Forest, Kenya," Forest Peoples Programme. 2014, 
(accessed March 27, 2017). 
257 Ibid. 
258 Forest Peoples Programme, fern, Swedish Society for Nature Conservation et. al. URGENT – Re: 
European Union, Water Tower Protection and Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation Project 
(WaTER) in Kenya. Forest Peoples Programme, 2016. 
259 Both ENDS, SENGWER PEOPLE EVICTED FOR CONTROVERSIAL - WORLD BANK FUNDED - 
PROJECT IN KENYA, March 3, 2015, (accessed March 27, 2017). 
260Amnesty International, KENYA: AUTHORITIES MUST INVESTIGATE VIOLENT ATTACK BY FOREST 
GUARDS ON SENGWER ACTIVIST, New York: Amnesty International, 2017. 
Beenish Riaz Honors Project: Political Science 
Page 104 of 168 
 
HRW stressed World Bank involvement in the evictions.261 The issue gained so much 
prominence that alongside other issues, Kenya addressed the problem of the Sengwer in 
its second universal periodic review in 2015. This developed from observations made by 
CERD on the Sengwer people.262 By March 2016, with the help of No REDD, the 
Sengwer wrote to President Uhuru Kenyatta to affirm their right to their ancestral land, 
describing how their identities remain inextricably tied to the land and indicating that 
evictions breached both the Kenyan Constitution and multiple international treaties, 
particularly the ICESCR. In May 2016, No REDD released an article assigning blame for 
the evictions not only to the state, but also the World Bank.263  
Both the state and the World Bank responded to shaming differently. Where the 
state continues evictions to this day unapologetically, the World Bank pulled out of the 
project. Following the court injunction served in April 2013 to halt evictions, in 
November, the President of Kenya, the Deputy President, and a Senator for the area 
offered 400,000 Kenyan shillings to the 2,784 families living on the land as 
compensation, giving the Sengwer until January 2014 to leave willingly.264 The Bank, in 
turn, now, only threatened to withhold funding but let the project continue de facto. 
Following the January 2014 deadline set by the President, the government intensified 
violence against the Ogiek, causing degradation of the forest265. As of October 2014, the 
                                                          
261 Coalition for Human Rights in Development, World Bank Accuses itself of Failing to Protect Kenya 
Forest Dwellers, September 29, 2014, http://rightsindevelopment.org/news/world-bank-accuses-itself-of-
failing-to-protect-kenya-forest-dwellers/?lang=world-bank-accuses-itself-of-failing-to-protect-kenya-
forest-dwellers (accessed December 10, 2016). 
262 Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review Kenya, Geneva: United Nations, 2015. 
263Nafeez Ahmed, World Bank and UN carbon offset scheme 'complicit' in genocidal land grabs – NGOs, 
July 3, 2014, (accessed March 27, 2017). 
264 Ibid. 
265 Ibid. 
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World Bank finally took notice and its president Jim Yong Kim personally reached out to 
the state to help resolve the problem. This, though, was only after a World Bank panel’s 
ignored report noting that they were effectively funding the evictions was leaked and 
publicized by the Guardian newspaper. By April of 2015, the World Bank stopped 
funding the forest conservation project, distancing itself from the evictions.266 The 
differing responses of the state and Word Bank showcase how effective shaming is 
concerning these two different actors. It suggests that INGOs’ tactic of influencing 
Western public opinion can heavily impact INGOs that rely on Western donors 
concerned about human rights, but do not affect the state to as great an extent. Almost as 
if to distance itself from potential shaming attempts by INGOs, in 2008, UN-HABITAT 
also released a report on KENSUP that enhances this theory. UN-HABITAT’s report 
establishes its strict and restricted role in providing technical advice, capacity building, 
basic infrastructure and testing novel approaches through pilot projects for KENSUP so 
that actual authority rests in the hands of the state.267 
Many other specific efforts to shame evictions occurred, particularly of slum areas 
where the state often evicted residents for development reasons, all of which government 
forces sanctioned, ordered, or carried out. In response, along with other INGOs, as part of 
its Global Dignity Campaign, AI released multiple Urgent Actions, demanding 
immediate assistance to those left homeless without resources. One such specific eviction 
AI emphasizes is that of the Deep Sea settlement. The state overlooked the settlers’ 
residence for decades until from 2003-2005 when a private company sought ownership of 
                                                          
266 Jacob Kushner, Anthony Langat, Sasha Chavkin, and Michael Hudson, Burned Out: World Bank 
Projects Leave Trail Of Misery Around Globe, April 15, 2015, (accessed March 27, 2017). 
267Raakel yrjänen, Tom Osanjo, and UN-HABITAT KENSUP Team, UN-HABITAT and the Kenya Slum 
Upgrading Programme: Strategy Document, Nairobi: United Nations, 2008. 
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the land. Subsequently, a domestic court granted an order to demolish the homes of 850 
families, only giving newspaper notice of the demolitions to the residents after it had 
occurred. In response, the church, local and international NGOs including AI began an 
instant backlash in the media until the High Court of Kenya outlawed the evictions. Yet, 
in 2007, AI released an urgent action, documenting a fire that destroyed a further 200 
homes, with suggestions that the fire was illegally set to forcibly evict residents.268 In 
2009, AI noted a further threat of the evictions of more than 100,000 people along the 
Nairobi River basin for a river clean-up project. AI and COHRE in partnership with two 
local organizations Hakijamii and Shelter Forum wrote to the Kenyan government in 
protest. In March 2011, AI reacts against evictions of the Deep Sea informal settlements 
burned down by fire, noting the occurrence of similar so-called ‘accidents’ in the Kibera 
slums. “According to the Kenya Red Cross, up to 10,000 people may have been affected 
by the fire – a majority of them having been made homeless.”269 In October 2012, AI pre-
emptively released a report on the country, describing the fear around evictions in the 
Deep Sea settlement of 3,000 people for a road construction project funded by the EU.270 
AI situated blame firmly on the state, indicating the problematic lack of security of tenure 
for residents since the land of the settlement is partially on private land and partially on 
land reserved for road construction, noting prior eviction attempts. In July 2015, AI 
released an urgent action after the threat of forced evictions of 3000 residents of the Deep 
Sea informal settlement due to the road construction project became imminent despite the 
                                                          
268 Amnesty International, KENYA: THOUSANDS FORCIBLY EVICTED FROM KENYA'S FORESTS, 
Amnesty International, 2007. 
269 Amnesty International, KENYA: FIRE SHOWS NEED FOR PROTECTION FOR SLUM-DWELLERS, 
Amnesty International, 2011. 
270 Amnesty International, Slum dwellers across Africa urge governments to respect housing rights, 
Amnesty International, 2012. 
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consistent shaming AI put the state through over the years.271 The Kenya Urban Roads 
Authority (KURA) has offered some compensation, but it is not sufficient to adequately 
resettle with. In fact, according to AI, “on 8 July 2015, KURA told residents that unless 
they withdrew their court action challenging the eviction, KURA would not negotiate 
with them.”272 
In response to the shaming of evictions in the Deep Sea settlements, as of 2012, 
although the state did attempt a community meeting and an enumeration of the people to 
be affected by potential eviction, they did not consult the residents and have not shared a 
plan for resettlement. While AI was able to halt evictions for a time, it was not the state 
that decided to this, but rather the EU, having heavily funded the road construction 
project.273 
Other urgent actions AI issued and specific cases targeted include an urgent action 
after 3,000 people were evicted from their homes in Githogoro village near Nairobi, 
given only 72 hours to dismantle their homes and evicted as part of a plan to build a new 
road in Nairobi, left without shelter in winder.274 In October, on World Habitat Day, AI 
mentions the state’s refusal to act on these evictions and the lack of due process, 
consultation, adequate notice and compensation, calling readers to sign a petition.275 In 
April 2010, AI released another urgent action against the evictions of 50,000 people, 
mostly slum dwellers in Nairobi living around railway lines for the improvement of the 
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railway who were given no resettlement options.276 In July 2010, AI issued press releases 
and an urgent action calling for the halting of forced evictions of hundreds and 
destruction of market stalls in Kabete NITD that were authorized by the Nairobi City 
Council.277  
In 2010, after the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights 
condemned the expulsion of the Endorois people for the purpose of tourism development, 
shaming rose. The Commission’s ruling also legitimated INGO action in the state by 
including as evidence reports by prominent INGOs including a video by WITNESS278, 
testimony by HRW. A local NGO, the Center for Minority Rights Development 
(CEMIRIDE) and an international group, Minority Rights Group International brought 
the case. “The African Commission found that the Kenyan government has continued to 
rely on a colonial law that prevented certain communities from holding land outright, and 
allowed others, such as local authorities, effectively to own their traditional land on 
"trust" for these Communities.”279 It also called on the state to immediately correct the 
problem.  
In September 2011, AI issued a public statement on the explosion and fire (after a 
petrol pipeline exploded) in an informal settlement, Sinai, located in Nairobi. More than 
100 people died, and AI argued that the incident showed the need to address inadequate 
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living conditions in slums, a positive right.280 In November 2011, AI issued a public 
statement addressing evictions near the Jomo Kenyatta airport, carried out by police 
under orders from the Kenya Airports Authority.281 During the African Commission’s 
50th ordinary session, AI made a statement on Kenya, shaming the eviction of 50,000 
people living along railway lines, claiming, “the government should ensure full and 
effective implementation of the constitutional guarantee to the right to adequate housing, 
by prohibiting forced evictions, adopting national eviction guidelines and providing all 
persons with a minimum degree of security of tenure.”282 AI arranged for slum residents 
from Kenya to go to Gambia and address the African Commission itself. An opinion 
piece in Kenya’s Daily Nation newspaper described the sentiment at the address: “Us 
ordinary Kenyans living in informal settlements face many challenges. The authorities 
fail to adequately provide us with essential services, such as water, sewers, roads, 
schools, health clinics and police posts. But the biggest violation of our human rights we 
face is the threat of forced evictions.”283Other evictions shamed occurred in the Mitumba 
informal settlement near the Wilson Airport and in settlements close to the Moi Airbase 
in Nairobi. In some places, evictions went ahead despite court issued injunctions against 
evictions. 
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In 2012, AI continued its international shaming efforts, with a press release on the 
fires that destroyed 700 homes in Kibera and Mathare. In April 2012, AI addressed the 
underlying causes of forced evictions, by supporting a local radio project seeking to 
challenge peoples’ perceptions of slum dwellers and increase an emphasis on human 
rights.284 In 2013, AI partnered with WITNESS and the design firm Pentagram to create a 
video for the campaign against evictions. At the same time, it issued an urgent action on 
the violent, forced eviction of 400 families in City Carton and on the same day evictions 
in neighboring Opendo, home to at least 600 families, calling for immediate attention to 
the families without access to food, water, and shelter.285 
Later in the year 2015, AI reported on another forced evictions case this time in 
Mombasa at night on the Jomvu informal settlement along the A109 highway in 
Mombasa with many more evictions threatened in the settlement and in a nearby 
settlement, Bangladesh.286 The project was part of Vision 2030, “financed by the African 
Development Bank, the German Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, the 
EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, and the Government of Kenya.”287 Settlers, here, 
already faced evictions in 2002 without consultation of the community.  
The state seemed to respond to all these urgent actions by promising rhetoric that 
failed to play out in practice as evictions continue unabated. In 2004, the Ministry of 
Lands said they would draft guidelines concerning the issue of forced evictions though 
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none were forthcoming until shamed in different ways later.288 “In March 2005, Kenya’s 
Attorney General, Hon. Amos Wako, during his appearance before the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee in New York, stated: that the Government of Kenya had 
stopped evictions in Kibera and other informal settlements and that future eviction, if 
necessary, will be done according to the established international and United Nations 
standards on evictions.”289 On World Habitat Day, AI announced that Kenya’s highway 
authority (KEHNA) had agreed that it was wrong in forcibly evicting people from an 
informal settlement and promised to right the wrongs in a letter sent to AI.290 In its 
December press release, AI focuses on the case of evictions in Mombasa, presenting it as 
a victory for the organization’s shaming attempts, highlighting the importance of the 
local response in getting KENHA to recant.291 Nevertheless, the government continued 
evictions of thousands of people living alongside the country’s railway lines in the next 
few years and up to the present. 
Despite failing to produce actual change in the specific cases shamed, such 
shaming persists. A recent report by Cultural Survival, 292 submitted to the CESCR in 
2015, looks at land rights as they relate to indigenous peoples. This organization shames 
a case of evictions other INGOs often overlook, namely the evictions of over 4,000 
families of the Maasai people to build the ‘Olkaria geothermal plant,’ funded by the 
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World Bank and supported by the UN Environmental Program. On March 12, 2017, 
Cultural Survival write a letter to the state addressing the escalation of this issue.293 
Considering its responses in the past, though, the state may not respond as favorably as 
expected.  
Analysis 
The effectiveness of international NGOs can be inspected at every stage of the 
process of shaming. Examining Keck and Sikkink’s model, one can note the effectiveness 
of NGOs, first in their framing of debates by noting whether the issue successfully rose to 
the agenda, then looking at the “discursive commitments from states and other policy 
actors,” then at whether the INGOs’ action of shaming prompted “procedural change at 
the international and domestic level,” whether it affected policy and finally whether there 
was actual improvement and the behavior of actors involved significantly changed.294 To 
best understand the effects of these specific shaming attempts noted above, I apply Risse 
and Sikkink’s prominent spiral model mentioned in the literature to the case and consider 
realist responses to it. This model is helpful, here, for responding to previous literature on 
shaming and helping to situate shaming of the right to housing in Kenya in this discourse. 
Risse and Sikkink’s model involves a five-step process that I elucidate below, indicating 
where the case of specific shaming in Kenya stands in relation to each step.  
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The first stage of Risse and Sikkink’s spiral model is ‘repression’ wherein a state 
violates certain norms. In response, international NGOs, hearing the pleas of domestic 
groups, pressure governments with a specific focus on alerting “Western public opinion 
and Western governments” to the violations to encourage these third parties to intervene. 
At the same time, domestic NGOs continue their efforts from the ‘bottom-up,’ 
collectively conducting what Risse and Sikkink term “a process of socialization” on the 
violator state (a shift from the terminology of the “boomerang effect”). 295 
Following the model closely in this first step, international shaming efforts in 
Kenya remain tied closely to the local response which bolsters and is bolstered by the 
international. Local campaigns have been working in Kenya to hold the state accountable 
for its actions using rights language for much longer than international efforts existed 
even as the Moi regime was in power. For example, in 1996, a network of local NGOs, 
termed the Habitat Task Force, launched a major local campaign on the issue of the right 
to housing. The organizations termed the campaign “Operation Firimbi” (Operation Blow 
the Whistle) because it called on Kenyans to commit to a twofold strategy to respond to 
illegal land allocation, both to “"blow the whistle on someone" and "blow the whistle on 
something."”296 According to Habitat for Humanity’s note on the campaign, “The fact 
that Kenyans today are blowing the whistle everywhere in the country on land grabbing 
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and grabbers, including the corrupt public officials and politicians involved, is an 
achievement, which to a large extent can be attributed to the Campaign.” 297 In another 
example, many slum dwellers, facing eviction on public land now sold to private 
developers, organized under associations. One such is a group that represents 86 
communities, mostly in Nairobi, termed the Community Action Against Forced Evictions 
and Land Grabbing (Muungano in Swahili). These organizations often look to the law 
and rights to advocate for a halt to forced evictions. One of the main slogans of 
Muungano, for example, is “Land and Shelter is a Right.”298  
Efforts to bolster this pre-existing local effort with international support occurred, 
for example, in the solidarity campaign, termed ‘Viva Nairobi Viva,’ which got 6000 
people and 100 institutions to support it in the first few weeks of its inception.299 This 
campaign was the product of a collaboration between an international NGO, the 
International Alliance of Inhabitants (IAI)300, and a local organization, the Kutoka 
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Network of Parishes in the informal settlements, to mobilize people globally in the 
conversation against evictions. Backed by international support, the local settlers 
approached the Government and the Mayor to halt evictions.301 Another initiative of IAI, 
as part of the Zero Eviction Campaign, was its establishment of the W Nairobi W! 
Campaign to target evictions that occur for infrastructure projects. The Campaign worked 
locally, mobilizing organizations in the state, having judicial appeals and meetings, and 
internationally by creating a website that resulted in around 10,000 solidarity emails and 
helping to convert Kenya’s debt to Italy into a fund to improve living conditions in two 
towns in Kenya. AI too works closely with local actors as in the ‘eviction torch’ initiative 
brought as part of a grass roots movement protest from the Kenya Rapid Response to 
Forced Evictions Team (who work in partnership with AI) while an international 
campaign for petitions was ongoing.302 Local NGOs too may learn and adopt tactics used 
by international HROs. For example, after AI begun to use #endforcedevictions on 
Twitter to consistently shame problems of the right to housing in Kenya, following the 
trend, local NGO Hakijamii and local politicians and activists adopted the hashtag. 
In prominent direct cooperation between the local and the international, in late 
2011, Hakijamii too asked ESCR-Net to help craft an amicus curiae brief for their court 
case against the state about an attempt at forcible evictions. The case brought by Ibrahim 
Sangor Osman was on his own behalf and on behalf of 1,122 evictees of a location in the 
municipal council of Garissa.303 Each of the amici are HROs concerned with the issue of 
the right to adequate housing, having already provided assistance in other cases in many 
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domestic and international fora.304 The report describes the case as a violation of the 
ICESCR, the ICCPR, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights [implied right 
to housing in the African Charter in Articles 14 (property), 16 (physical and mental 
health) and 18 (family)]. It calls on the Kenyan Court to emulate a decision by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal of the Republic of South Africa in the case of Tswelopele Non-
Profit Organisation and Others v. City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, where the 
court considered forced evictions part of a violation of the right to adequate housing as 
enshrined in the Constitution of the state.305 Considering the immense success of local 
international partnership, it is possible too that INGOs' emphasis on following 
international law and guidelines (in its invocation of hegemony) may limit the strength of 
their argument unless they also have sustained backing from local NGOs. 
In the second stage of Risse and Sikkink’s spiral model, the state denies the 
allegations against it, finding ways to delegitimize INGOs’ claims and failing that, under 
ever-increasing international pressure, contesting international norms in ‘outrage.’306 In 
the case of Kenya, the state rarely denies allegations, agreeing that it has evicted a group 
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of people. Rather, the state attempts to counter INGO arguments by justifying its eviction 
attempts, often with logical arguments. So, for example, it defends evictions along 
railway lines by articulating the dangerousness of settlements near railways.307 It stresses 
an inability to resettle the evicted because of a lack of resources. It uses its pre-existing 
laws and other interests including preservation of the environment to justify eviction 
attempts as in the case of the Ogiek. 
The next step in Risse and Sikkink’s model is where the state softens to pressure 
and agrees to certain ‘tactical concessions,’ committing to human rights inadvertently. 
These concessions are small, “low cost,” relatively inconsequential measures, but still 
commitments that provide human rights organizations a foothold to shame further. These 
include, but are not limited to “releasing a few political prisoners, showing greater 
tolerance for mass public demonstrations, and/or signing international treaties.”308 The 
Kenya case matches these in that the state promises to halt evictions and takes some steps 
in that direction. 
 At the fourth stage, states start to approach compliance. Subject to continued 
shaming, they take on “prescriptive status,” altering domestic practices to match the 
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international standard by “changing related domestic laws, setting up new domestic 
human rights institutions, and regularly referring to human rights norms in state 
administrative and bureaucratic discourse.”309 Over time, Kenya does alter domestic laws 
to match international ones, sets up committees to address the issue and even by 2010, 
changes its Constitution to include a provision on the right to housing. 
 The last step in Risse and Sikkink’s model, though, is where states, having 
adopted and accepted human rights, self-enforce ‘rule consistent behavior,’ fully 
complying with human rights norms. Kenya has yet to enter this stage. In their case 
studies, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink emphasize that eventually every state including those 
currently at the stage of tactical concessions or of compliance will eventually reach this 
stage.310 The most compelling case for their theory is that of South Africa. For decades, 
labelled a pariah state for maintaining the apartheid well into the late 20th century, South 
Africa moved from denial to rule consistent behavior, eventually responding to pressure, 
and now not only has a stable democracy, but also increasingly serves as a leader/model 
of human rights. For countries that do not yet comply with human rights, then, like 
Kenya, Risse and Ropp claim, they are on the way to doing so as transnational networks 
strengthen and INGOs continually tarnish the country’s image and reputation to the point 
that other states systematically exclude them from the community’s “in-group.”311 They 
argue too that in many cases, states comply even without third party states having to exert 
additional pressure, citing this as proof that “talk is not cheap.” The primary example for 
this is Morocco. Although Morocco’s main ally, France, did not impose any pressures on 
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the country to comply with human rights, the monarch perceived the dissonance between 
his views of his actions and the international community’s perceptions. Seeking to 
reconcile the two and improve the country’s reputation, the monarch instituted a variety 
of human rights friendly measures, complying with international law. To explain other 
countries like Tunisia that fail to fit the model and even retrogressed under shaming from 
implementing tactical concessions back to denial, Risse and Ropp situate them as the 
outliers, not the norm.312 
Critiquing this assumption, though, Simmons, for example, takes particular issue 
with the shift from phase 2 to 3, where states move from denial to providing tactical 
concessions, arguing against the contention that governments would repeatedly adopt 
measures that only entrap them into eventual compliance, describing it as a ‘naïve’ 
assumption. The model, Simmon notes, then, fails to answer the legitimate realist 
question: “why can’t repressive governments foresee the communicative quicksand they 
are about to wade into and steer clear of it in the first place?”313 Retrogression and failure 
to achieve rule consistent behavior may be the norm. Concerning ESR in Kenya, I 
contend, the state potentially in simply reaching the tactical concession and compliance 
stage without moving into rule consistent behavior may be maximizing its cost-benefit 
ratio. Without having to spend on the actual enforcement of rights and approach rule-
consistent behavior, by adopting improvements in rhetoric and policy, the state can gain 
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the benefits of international approval without fully altering its institutions and 
internalizing norms.  
Another interesting note on shaming is the significance of third party actors. 
INGOs help place pressure on non-state actors in the case of ESR to keep in check 
development by shaming the World Bank, EU and other prominent donors contributing 
to violations of human rights. These donor organizations, in turn, sometimes exert 
pressure on the state to uphold human rights and other times strive to distance themselves 
from the violators as rapidly as possible. The state proceeds to deny allegations of 
wrongdoing. However, courts do often respond to these specific shaming attempts since 
shaming often complements legal action by local actors to halt evictions and gain 
compensation for them. In the next subsection, I look at the responses of courts to these 
specific shaming attempts more closely. 
Response by the Courts 
Although the state does not alter its practices in response to specific shaming of 
evictions, court do respond under this pressure and such specific attempts often involve a 
legal focus. However, as the state refuses to enforce or heed court rulings, evictions 
continue unabated. My findings are similar to those of Shankar and Metha in their study 
of the successes to litigating ESR in India. Here, although there exists an activist court 
dedicated to the cause, cases of success overshadow the manifold other instances where 
“the judges were reluctant to strongly penalize the government even when the state failed 
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to fulfill its statutory obligations.”314 In fact, paradoxically, Shankar and Metha find that, 
while “in the last two decades, the higher judiciary in India transformed non-justiciable 
economic and social rights such as basic education, health, food, shelter, speedy trial, 
privacy, anti-child labor, and equal wages for equal work into legally enforceable rights,” 
courts, at the same time, hardly if ever influence actual public policy and fail to actuate 
change in society.315 For activists, then, litigation proves costly, time-consuming, and 
ineffective as judges more often promote restraint as opposed to activism. In the case of 
Nigeria, Odinkalu, similarly, highlights the ways in which the courts fail to provide any 
change.316 Just as the state refuses to provide rights, the judiciary responds with a refusal 
to intervene, problematically leaving the people with no possible recourse to enforce their 
rights. In this subsection, I list some of the major cases in Kenyan courts related with 
housing rights and their outcomes. 
The earliest major case for evictions received a verdict in 2000. The Ogiek had 
sued the government for evicting them in 1999, and the High Court of Kenya ruled in 
favor of the state, finding justification in the state’s argument in favor of the environment 
and conservation where the Ogiek were deemed detrimental to it. This regardless of the 
fact that from early on “human rights bodies accuse the government of being insensitive 
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to the community's basic needs, saying the Ogiek's right to land and natural habitat has 
been trampled upon for too long.”317 
The next few cases concerned evictions of slum areas including Kibera by the 
Kenya Railways Corporation. Communities initiated two separate cases after the mass 
eviction in 2004. In the first case, Nderu & Others v Kenya Railways Corporation, the 
High Court granted an injunction, stopping the eviction, but only for an additional ten 
days upon the 30-day notice period.318 In the second case, Kirwa and Nine Ors v. Kenya 
Railways Corporation, the court ruled differently. It noted that the notice was arbitrary 
and unjustified and indicated the necessity of compensation for the removal of the 
settlers. The court asked, “They have allowed the plaintiffs to occupy its land for a period 
of over 30 years without removing them. Why would it now give such citizens a 30 days 
notice to remove what they have invested for such a length of time?” Nevertheless, the 
Kenya Railways Corporation had no representation in this last case.319 
By 2010, a new progressive Kenyan constitution came into effect, and judges 
initially started to rule more in favor of sufferers of violations of the right to housing. The 
Constitution includes all the international provisions requested by INGOs in shaming 
attempts and incorporates ESR from the right to food and health to the right to housing 
and education. The right to housing and the attendant right to a reasonable standard of 
sanitation appears in Article 43 (1b). Article 21 (2) establishes positive rights, calling for 
                                                          
317Tervil Okoko, "Judges Rule In Favour Of Environment," Archive 2000, March 27, 2000. 
http://www.ogiek.org/news/news-post-00-03-4.htm (accessed March 20, 2017). 
318 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, Civil and Political Rights in Kenyan Informal Settlements: 
Submission to the Human Rights Council, The Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
2005. 
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the progressive realization of the right to housing while Article 2 (6) ensures that ratified 
international law will be part of the state’s laws. Article 23 solidifies a commitment to 
negative rights, making the right enforceable through courts in cases of their violation.320 
In the same year, then, in the case of Satrose Ayuma and Ors. vs. The Registered Trustees 
of the Kenya Railways Staff Retirement Benefit Scheme and Ors, after demolitions by the 
Kenya Railways Authority, the Petitioners claimed, “various violations of fundamental 
rights and freedoms including the right to accessible and adequate housing…right of 
every child to be protected from inhuman treatment.” The High Court was receptive to 
the claims, calling the state to put in place security of tenure and a “legal framework for 
evictions based on internationally acceptable guidelines.” 321 
In 2011, though, the Court ruled against a group claiming the right to housing in 
the case of Charo wa Y aa v Jama Abdi Noor & 4 others, indicating that “the right to 
housing (is) only aspirational, subject to progressive realization.”322 Nevertheless, by 
November 2011, in an oft-cited court case of Ibrahim Sangor Osman & 1222 Others v 
the Minister of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security and 10 Others, 
the High Court of Kenya showed an element of judicial activism.323 Receptive to the 
plaintiffs, “the Court issued a permanent injunction compelling the State to return 
petitioners to their land and to reconstruct their homes and/or provide alternative housing 
                                                          
320Amnesty International, DRIVEN OUT FOR DEVELOPMENT: FORCED EVICTIONS IN MOMBASA, 
KENYA, Amnesty International, 2015. 
321 "Petition 65 of 2010: Satrose Ayuma & 11 others v Registered Trustees of the Kenya Railways Staff 
Retirement Benefits Scheme & 3 others," Kenya Law, 2010, 
http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/90359/ (accessed March 1, 2017). 
322Dennis Onsongo, Four landmark court rulings in Kenya’s battle over forced eviction, October 10, 2016, 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Key-court-rulings-in-battles-over-forced-evictions/1056-3410964-14n5614z/ 
(accessed March 10, 2017). 
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and other facilities including schools and awarded each of the petitioners Kshs 
200,000.00 (approx. $2,000.00) in damages,” a total of $2.2 million. 324 This set an 
important precedent in national courts as it was the first ruling to order a remedy and 
compensation for the evicted, ensuring government accountability. However, in practice, 
the state paid little to no compensation. Another case in 2011, Susan Waithera Kariuki & 
4 others v Town Clerk, Nairobi City Council & 2 others faced a similar ruling with the 
High Court judge referring to the case of South Africa and international law.325 
Continuing this positive trend, in 2013, in Satrose Ayuma and Others versus The 
Registered Trustees of the Kenya Railways Staff Retirement Benefits Scheme and 3 
Others, the High Court ruled that the railway pension board had violated the right to 
adequate housing and sanitation and children’s rights after it bulldozed hundreds of 
homes. Since the country lacks domestic laws on the issue, the ruling called on the state 
instead to look to international law and standards on forced evictions. One of the judges 
at the case, Isaac Lenaola stated, ““I must lament the widespread forced evictions that are 
occurring in the county…which are justified mainly by public demands for infrastructural 
developments…The right to adequate housing cannot be aspirational and merely 
speculative.”326 
Another case in 2013, Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Attorney General and 2 others, 
concerning 15,000 residents, living near Nairobi’s Wilson Airport who the state evicted 
because they were in flight path received a favorable ruling with a court order to both halt 
                                                          
324ESCR-Net, Constitutional Petition No. 2 of 2011 (Garissa), ESCR-Net, 2011. 
325 "Susan Waithera Kariuki & 4 others v Town Clerk, Nairobi City Council & 2 others," Kenya Law 
Reports, 2011, http://kenyalaw.org/Downloads_FreeCases/80847.pdf (accessed March 1, 2017). 
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the evictions and resettle the residents.327 The court cited the constitutional right to 
housing, respect for human dignity, equality, and non-discrimination. Combining CPR 
and ESR, Justice Ngugi looked to international guidelines on evictions, including General 
Comment 7, noting, “Any forceful eviction or demolition without a relocation option is 
illegal…It robs them (settlers) of their dignity, jeopardises their right to health, and 
threatens their right to life.”328 Once again, though, implementation was lacking as 
authorities ignored the court order, continuing demolitions in 2011. The Kenya Airports 
Authority argued too that they did not have sufficient funds to resettle the settlers and that 
said people were simply violating the right to property.329  
In March 2014, a high court judgement ruled on the Ogiek case again, noting that 
evictions violated their right to life and involved discrimination against the indigenous 
group.330 In 2015, the High Court of Eldoret, although ruling on a separate issue at the 
time, noted that evictions of the Sengwer were unlawful.331  
Despite these strides forward, in 2016, the Court of Appeals took the state a step 
backward when it overruled the 2013 Wilson airport decision, asking that Courts be more 
restrictive and less activists. The judgement stated, “Courts have no role to play in policy 
formulation.” Further considering the consistent invocation of international law in these 
cases the ruling averred that, “Neither the U.N. nor any international organisation 
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legislates for Kenya.” 332 Moreover, implementation and enforcement of all court rulings 
mentioned before is lacking.  
Nevertheless, as a final note, although it appears, here, in their retrogression, that 
courts are not an effective means to prompt response, the scholar Pieterse notes in his 
study of the South African judicial system that enforcement of ESR may not be “by 
nature ill-suited for domestic application.”333 Rather, Pieterse states, “the development of 
a dynamic and coherent domestic jurisprudence on social rights that resonates with 
international standards and translates into tangible rights enjoyment, depends on judicial 
willingness to depart from outmoded approach to rights-adjudication.” In other words, 
Pieterse claims that if willing to refer to and acknowledge positive rights as well as 
negative rights as attached to ESR without taking over budgetary concerns left to the 
Parliament, courts will be able to prompt change.334 Without adequate lack of 
enforcement even when the court is activist in Kenya, though, this argument may not 
apply. 
Specific shaming attempts, then, may instigate rhetoric in compliance with 
international law particularly in domestic courts, but they do not assure implementation. 
States can also regress as Kenya’s recent resistance to passing legislation and guidelines 
for forced evictions and the court’s refusal to legislate on the issue indicate. Kenya, then, 
does not appear to be moving towards rule consistent behavior, but may perpetually 
                                                          
332 Nevertheless, since INGOs have made legal action prominent, other groups continue to rely on the 
courts to assert their rights.  
Katy Migiro, "Four landmark court rulings in Kenya's battle over forced eviction," Daily Mail, October 10, 
2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/reuters/article-3830260/Four-landmark-court-rulings-Kenyas-
battle-forced-eviction.html (accessed March 10, 2017). 
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remain trapped between tactical concessions, approaching compliance. In the next 
subsection, I look at the ways in which INGOs shame Kenya for violations of the right to 
housing in general and how the state responds to these allegations, presenting an analysis 
of my results at the end.  
Shaming the Right to Housing in General 
In addition to shaming specific eviction attempts as they occur, major HROs 
shame evictions in general in Kenya, particularly focusing on the multiple forcible 
evictions that occur in Kenya’s slums. In this subsection, I go through the changing 
attempts at shaming in general, over the years, before indicating the state’s responses to 
these shaming attempts in the next subsection.  
Moving towards recognizing evictions and other inadequate housing conditions as 
violations of ESR, in beginning the general shaming effort, COHRE framed future 
understandings of housing rights in Kenya. In 2004, the INGO began shaming forced 
evictions from settlements in the Kibera, Mukuru, Korogocho, and Kiambiu slums, 
affecting an estimated 1-2,000 people. Other than looking at the eviction itself, in its 
general inspection, COHRE looked to other closely related issues as well, including 
“access to water and sanitation, rights of women to housing and land, rights of Nubian 
community to land in Kibera, harassment of tenants and participation rights within 
housing programmes,” shaming all these violations together.335 The report also discusses 
the limited scope of the National Slum Upgrading Policy and calls for the implementation 
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of the Ndungu Land Commission’s report. In 2004, COHRE too sent letters to the 
President of Kenya and other Ministers, underscoring that forced evictions in general 
were violations of the right to adequate housing. In 2005 again, COHRE collectively 
shamed the 2003 evictions of inhabitants in multiple communities rather than focusing on 
one or two specific cases to make a more general claim to the government of Kenya to 
address the right to housing.336 
Later, in 2006, multiple INGOs, including COHRE, AI, the Kenyan National 
Commission on Human Rights and Hakijamii Trust as well as a number of other foreign 
organizations, most focused in a number of foreign countries including Egypt, Pakistan, 
Philippines, India, South Africa and Brazil gathered together to form a joint appeal on the 
right to housing in Kenya and other African states at the African Ministerial Conference 
on Housing and Urban Development in Nairobi relating to slums and the MDGs.337 The 
organizations specific to foreign countries having dealt with urban housing crises in their 
states and having evidence that forced evictions only exacerbate pre-existing difficulties, 
called for their cessation. Another report by the Human Rights House (originally by 
COHRE) in 2006 emphasized the repeated need to enforce the Ndungu Report on 
                                                          
336Ibid. Including “Kibera, Korogocho, Kahawa Soweto, Kamae, Kware, Kamwanya, Kanguku, Kandutu, 
City Cotton, Mutumba, Kareru, Kirigu, Muria-Mbogo, Mutego, Njiku and others of the most populated 
among the 199 Nairobi slums,” affecting 300,000, on the grounds that these people were living “illegally 
on road and rail servitudes, electricity wayleaves and other reserved land.” COHRE also notes another 
eviction of the ‘Raila Village’ in 2004 that demolished 400 structures, leaving around 2,000 people 
homeless. Another eviction of over 2000 families and 4000 people in the Sururu Forest of the Rift Valley 
occurred despite the government’s guarantee that the land they occupied belonged to the residents. 
337 Amnesty International, KENYA: A JOINT APPEAL TO AFRICAN MINISTERS ON URBAN HOUSING: 
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Irregular allocation of Public land and to use international guidelines to create national 
laws outlawing evictions.338 
Other than the immediate meeting of basic needs and halting the continuation of 
evictions as in specific shaming attempts, in these general attempts, COHRE and other 
HROs more often advocated for positive rights, such as adequate sanitation or security of 
tenure to ensure future protection from evictions. COHRE notes, “Merely preventing an 
eviction and allowing people to stay where they are is not sufficient. Under current 
circumstances, they are still vulnerable and living in highly inadequate housing 
conditions.”339 In September 2006, multiple community organizations and groups, over 
1000 community members, including international organizations such as AI and 
prominent local NGOs such as Hakijamii and KNHCR as well as coalitions and faith 
based organizations such as the Coalition on Violence Against Women – Kenya and 
Kenya Basic Rights Catholic Diocese of Kitale, Kenya gathered for a National 
Symposium on Eviction Guidelines.340  
These general shaming attempts most often called for compliance, demanding the 
state translate international law into domestic law. In 2007, UN-HABITAT’s Advisory 
Group on Forced Evictions released a report on solutions to the issue, demanding the 
state establish guidelines on forced evictions and adhere to internationally established 
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standards.341 Multiple AI press releases and submissions by INGOs, particularly COHRE, 
to the CESCR address this issue of the evictions and mention multiple particular 
examples, but only generally, including concerns about KENSUP’s implementation as 
well as problems with associated rights, including the right to safe water in informal 
settlements so that they shame violations of the right to housing in general. In 2008, with 
CESCR’s review of Kenya upcoming, several civil society organizations submitted 
reports to the committee to address the issue of housing rights and evictions. A 
partnership of INGOs including the Economic and Social Rights Center (Hakijamii, 
which is also a founding member of the International Network on Economic and Social 
Rights), Dignity International, COHRE, and others342 submitted such a report. Their 
report depicts a subtle shift in the shaming stance, arguing that the state must comply 
with both an obligation of conduct and one of result.343 Indicating the structural nature of 
the problem, the report notes, “The forced evictions…reflect the unjust socio-economic 
history and circumstances of systemic housing rights violations and unequal land access 
that most communities in Kenya experience.”344 The report also expresses concerns about 
long-term implications.  
                                                          
341Ibid. 
342 Including African Women’s Development and Communications Network (FEMNET, a regional NGO 
focused on women’s development, equality, and human rights), Building Eastern Africa Community 
Network, International Commission of Jurist – Kenya Section, the Kenya Human Rights Commission, the 
Centre for Minority Rights and Development (Local/Regional Organization that works for indigenous 
people in Kenya and East Africa), COHRE, International Students Association for Legal Aid and Research 
(affiliated with the University of Nairobi), Children’s Legal Action Network, Kenya Land Alliance, 
Federation of Women Lawyers in Kenya 
343not simply Article 11 but also Article 1(2) that maintains that, “In no case may a people be deprived of 
its own means of subsistence.” As examples of instances of evictions, the report cites the heavily publicized 
evictions of the Ogiek among others. Including evictions of the Mukuru kaw Reuben including 4,000 
houses and approximately 12,000 people, expected evictions in Kwale for the establishment of a mining 
company, the ignorance of local community’s wishes in prompting mining in Ortum and evictions of the 
Endorois community for the purposes of tourism.  
344 Economic and Social Rights Centre-Hakijamii, Amnesty International-Kenya, et. al, JOINT CIVIL 
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Launching the Global Dignity Campaign, in 2009, AI intensified its shaming 
efforts. In June of the year, the Secretary General at the time Irene Khan herself led a 
march of members of informal settlements in Nairobi to the city center to promote basic 
human rights for residents of slums, with a general emphasis on the right to housing and 
on ending forced evictions all over the state. Many participants in the march had lost their 
own homes and possessions. At this time, AI facilitated the first “SMS action” for an 
ESR centered project.345 In the same month, AI released an influential report on human 
rights in Kenyan slums, drawing on interviews and focus group discussions and 
describing the two million slum dwellers in the country as an “unseen majority.” The 
report focuses on what it sees as the primary obstacle to the right to adequate housing, 
namely the lack of legal security of tenure.346 The report also addresses KENSUP while 
citing evictions, expressing concerns about affordability, accessibility, addressing 
immediate needs, and lack of security of tenure. AI notes, ““The recent commitment to 
slum upgrading is a positive step. However, this commitment falls short of the 
comprehensive plan that is needed to recognize informal settlements and slums.”347  
AI too often emphasizes the influence violations of the right to housing have on 
women. In late 2010, AI, calling for the implementation of a positive right based on the 
failure to respect a negative right in discussing how a lack of sanitation in slums 
                                                          
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS ON THE OCCASION OF THE REVIEW OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
KENYA, New York: United Nations, 2008.  
345A “SMS action” is a free text message that, in this case, many slum dwellers sent to the Kenyan 
government to protest its discriminatory actions. 
Amnesty International, Nairobi slum-dwellers march for better conditions and basic human rights, 
Amnesty International, 2009. 
346 Security of tenure is a key issue because most of the land on which informal settlements rest is 
government owned so that landlords and structure owners demand rent on land they don’t own. 
Amnesty International, KENYA: THE UNSEEN MAJORITY: NAIROBI’S TWO MILLION SLUM-
DWELLERS, Amnesty International, 2009. 
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exacerbates the problem of violence against women in its briefing to the UN Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.348 In January 2011, AI delivers an 
oral statement along with settlers to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights emphasizing how a lack of adequate sanitation and housing leads to gender based 
violence.349 2013, then, marked a high point of the #endforcedevictions campaign led by 
AI as AI’s newsletter the WIRE featured Kenya and the country was also prominent on 
AI’s press release for World Habitat Day, which sought to highlight the particular 
challenges evictions pose for women.350 The Center for Women’s Land Rights, Landesa 
submitted a prominent report to the CESCR in 2016, stressing that evictions 
disproportionately affect women, who lack equal rights to property or inheritance.351 The 
organization emphasizes that the government has many laws in the books that are 
progressive, but fails to put in place measures to implement these laws, including the 
Marriage Act and the Matrimonial Property Act. 
Working with AI, others like UN-Habitat also began to recognize the severity of 
the issue, forming the Kenyan Housing Coalition. UNHABITAT recounts the many 
evictions made by the state including those from early 2003 and discusses KENSUP. It 
finds problems not in political will as much as in the state’s lack of coordination.352 In the 
                                                          
348Amnesty International, KENYA: EXAMINATION OF KENYA'S STATE REPORT UNDER THE 
CONVENTION: ORAL STATEMENT BY AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL TO THE UN COMMITTEE ON 
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349 Daily Nation, Forced evictions are callous; end them now, November 8, 2011, (accessed March 27, 
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increasing push for participation by slum dwellers, in March 2012, AI and other INGOs 
organized a week of action against evictions and to ensure as well positive rights for 
those living in slums including the right to adequate water and sanitation.353 One major 
event part of the week was the African Ministerial Conference on Housing and Urban 
Development, attended by representatives from Nairobi’s slum communities. Another 
was a roadshow entertainment truck, travelling through the Nairobi slums, including 
Kenyan rapper Juliani.  
In Kenya’s Universal Periodic Review in 2015, multiple INGOs brought up 
different issues. Some joint reports stressed outcome indicators, others process and yet 
others both. One indicated that despite inclusion of the right to housing in the 
Constitution, “more than 34% of Kenya’s total population lived in urban areas and of 
this, more than 71% were confined in informal settlements” where the conditions in these 
settlements where the most vulnerable and marginalized lived were substandard and 
dangerous.354 A report by AI indicated that forced evictions in slums and informal 
settlements continued in Nairobi despite the government’s statements prohibiting it and 
the Constitution. AI emphasized passing the Evictions and Resettlement Bill as a 
potential solution. In response, the Human Rights Committee “recommended the 
development of transparent laws and policies for conducting evictions.”355 A country to 
comment on the right to housing in Kenya was Brunei Darussalam, commending Kenya 
on the inclusiveness of its housing policy. Another, Switzerland, though, was more 
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critical, urging the state to follow its international obligations and protect its citizens from 
forced evictions.356 
As time passed and Kenya adopted progressive measures, INGOs emphasized the 
problem of implementation and enforcement. In 2016, AI submitted a report to the 
CESCR in advance of Kenya’s periodic reporting.357 As before, AI illuminates both the 
state’s failure to commit to a negative right in its continued ignorance of international law 
in reference to forced evictions and a failure of the state to enforce positive rights by not 
ensuring adequate housing in informal settlements where residents often do not have 
equal access to water and sanitation which has a particularly powerful impact on violence 
against women and girls, forcing many to use the unsanitary method of waste disposal, 
termed “flying toilets.”358 It stresses how the state does not adhere to its laws. Other civil 
society organizations submitted to the CESCR to shame the state too. This includes a 
report by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. Their report describes laws 
that are liberal, but that the state has yet to implement, particularly the Land Act and the 
Land Registration Act passed in 2010, the Housing Bill of 2012, guidelines and report by 
the National Land Commission in 2013 and multiple court decisions.359 This report 
assigns blame to the state not for a lack of political will as much as for incoherence. 
Some reports are joint including one by HakiJammii (as part of the Economic Social 
                                                          
356 Ibid. 
357Amnesty International, KENYA: UN EXPERT BODY CONCERNED ABOUT CONTINUED FORCED 
EVICTIONS IN KENYA, Amnesty International, 2016.  
358 “Flying toilets:” polythene bags used to defecate which are then thrown out. The report cites multiple 
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Rights Center), the Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) Kenya (premier women’s 
rights organization), and the Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(non-profit NGO in US, special interest in women’s property rights).360 This report 
stresses the detrimental effect evictions have on women. Again, it emphasizes that 
although multiple domestic laws address this issue, implementation is lacking due in 
some part to a lack of political will in the Parliament and contradictory customary laws in 
place. A second joint report includes multiple more INGOs and LNGOs including 
Hakijamii, AI-Kenya, and others.361 They look at the state’s repeated promises to stop 
forced evictions and its consistent failure to do so in practice, particularly concerning the 
plight of women. A third joint civil society report was published by the Kenya Section of 
the International Commission of Jurists, Human Dignity, the Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric 
Aids Foundation, KELIN, and Save the Children Kenya, underscoring the problem of 
evictions and a failure to implement court orders.362 A fourth civil society report by the 
Pamoja Trust, the Centre for Economic and Social Rights (Hakijamii) and EACOR, 
                                                          
360 Hakijamii, Federation of Women Lawyers Kenya, Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, JOINT SHADOW REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL 
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, New York: United Nations, 2016. 
361Kituo Cha Sheria, Umande Trust, Copa-Kenya, COT, African Platform for Social Protection, Muungano 
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supported by the UNDP Amkeni Wa Kenya, Bread for the World-Protestant 
Development Services, and ICCO Cooperation echoed the arguments made above.363  
Shaming in general in this way involves referring to both positive and negative 
rights all over the state at once.364 In the next subsection, I indicate how the state 
responds to these attempts. 
State Responses 
Under increasing pressure, the government expressed willingness to engage with 
civil society groups to find solutions to the problems and moved towards more human 
rights friendly laws and policies. In this subsection, I introduce some of these responses.  
Under continued pressure, the state expressed a desire to address the issue. In 
January 2006, the Ministry of Lands committed to developing guidelines on evictions and 
prepared a draft. The Ministry of Housing worked on a Housing Act that commits to 
progressively realize the positive right to housing. The state developed a relocation plan, 
the Relocation Action Plan for Improving the Safety along Kenya Railway Line, 
supported by the World Bank.365 At the time, the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme 
                                                          
363 Eastern Africa Collaboration for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Kenya Civil Society Shadow 
Report on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New York: United Nations, 2014. 
364 To briefly address shaming by the news media: While some (mostly local) newspapers often stress 
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the Standard Digital, describes eviction of hundreds from the Mau Forest, an eviction shamed very little by 
NGOs, while The Star quotes Amnesty International activist in discussing evictions in Kibera caused by a 
lack of security of tenure. To attract greater sympathy, many newspapers too emphasize the effects 
evictions have on children, lacking now a right to education alongside a right to housing. Concerning the 
cases of the Ogiek and Sengwer, moreover, the international newspaper, The Guardian, prominently cites 
INGO shaming attenmpts, particularly by Forest Peoples Programme. The Huffington Post and Women 
News Network also occasionally shames the state for evictions, particularly focusing on the two key issues 
of the Ogiek and the Sengwer. 
365 Kenya, National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights 
Council resolution 16/21: Kenya, Geneva: United Nations, 2015. 
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after its pilot project in Kibera-Soweto mapped out structures and been allocated $US8.4 
million. The National Housing Policy adopted in 2004 put in place slum upgrading as an 
objective.366  
For review by the CESCR, the state too submitted a report, elaborating on its 
policies to aid the poor and ways it sought to realize the rights enshrined in the ICESCR. 
Emphasizing economic growth as the main way of reducing poverty, programs initiated 
include “the Land Resettlement Reform Programme; the Special Rural development 
Programme; the Rural Works Programme; the District Focus for Rural Development 
Strategy.”367 Concerning the issue of poverty more broadly, the state adopted the 
National Poverty Eradication Plan to reduce poverty by 50% by 2015, the Poverty 
Reduction Strategies Paper (promote participation of poor), the Medium-Term 
Expenditure Framework, the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment 
Creation and the Millennium Development Goals to halve poverty to reduce this rate. It 
boasts a decline in the poverty rate from 52.3% in 1997 to 49.2% in 2006.368 Other 
helpful policies include the Water Act of 2002 to ensure sanitation, a National Water 
Services strategy paper to ensure every citizen has access to water supply. Kenyan 
Constitution debate and particularly inclusion of the right to housing begun in 2005 and 
                                                          
366 The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions and Hakijamii Trust, Submission to the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights On the Occasion of Pre-Sessional Working Group 
Discussion Kenya Right to Housing and Water (Article 11(1)), New York: United Nations, 2007. 
367 Although interestingly the state insisted on its commitment to ESR from even before the state’s adoption 
of the treaty, describing the signing of Sessional paper number 10 of 1965, titled “African socialism and its 
application to planning/Development.” However, the state has significantly moved away from this 
socialism approach towards privatization, attesting to reduce “role of the Government from direct 
involvement in economic activities to that of a facilitator; promoting public-private partnerships in the 
delivery of public goods and services; and reforming public enterprises and the civil service.” 
Kenya, National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council 
resolution 16/21: Kenya, Geneva: United Nations, 2015. 
368 Ibid. 
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continued into 2008 and the right to housing was present in the new 2010 Constitution. 
Kenya acknowledges that due to increasing demand for housing and reduced supply, the 
quality of housing tends to be poor especially for the most vulnerable groups. To correct 
this problem, the government created a Ministry of Housing to implement policies 
including the National Housing Bill to facilitate housing provision by third party actors, 
the Civil Servants Scheme to grant housing for civil servants, and started to upgrade a 
greater number of slums in collaboration with UN-HABITAT. Concerning eviction 
particularly of women, the Ministry established special gender desks since the 
Constitution prohibits sex based discrimination. According to the government, here, the 
shift from customary land system to individual tenure systems benefit women. 
Specifically, on the issue of the Kenyan Slum Upgrading Programme, a registration 
system of residents of areas to be upgraded kept by the Ministry of Housing, which 
collaborates with the Settlement Committee to ensure residents take part in decisions and 
benefit from the relocation project. Throughout the report, the state appears to directly 
respond to criticisms by INGOs on its policies.369 In October 2009, the Ministry of Lands 
published the promised Kenya Eviction and Resettlement Guidelines, emphasizing the 
prevalence of “development-based evictions.” These guidelines are comprehensive and 
recognize “that forced evictions affect the livelihoods of individuals and households and 
always have a devastating impact and sometimes loss of livelihood on individuals and 
households.” In the summer of 2010, Kenya had its first Universal Periodic Review 
where it emphasized its achievements under KENSUP.370  
                                                          
369 Ibid. 
370 “To ensure the right to housing, the Government has: Created a specific Ministry for Housing to ensure 
better implementation of programmes; has developed a National Housing Policy for Kenya and passed a 
Sessional paper for the same leading to the development of a National Housing Bill; and has been 
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In July 2013, Kenya submitted a second report to the CESCR, emphasizing that 
the quality of life of individuals is a priority for the state along with economic 
development.371 The state notes its political will to prompt change in the Kenya Vision 
2030, which attests to promoting a high quality of life, including social, economic, and 
political aspects. A draft Eviction and Resettlement Bill exists as of 2012 that provides 
guidelines on what to do in the event of an eviction. The state also indicates its 
commitment with the Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement Program (2011-2016), a 
partnership between the Kenyan Government and the World Bank to undertake tenure 
regularization and install social and physical infrastructure in informal settlements in 15 
municipalities. The Ministry of Housing reviewed the Housing Policy to include social 
housing and many other bills in progress address the right, including “the Housing Bill, 
the Built Environment Bill, the Evictions and Resettlement Procedures Bill, the Landlord 
and Tenant Bill, the Metropolitan Areas Bill, the Spatial Planning Bill to repeal the 
Physical Planning Act, the Community Land Bill and the Public Private Partnerships Bill 
2012. The National Slum Upgrading and Prevention Policy is also being developed to 
guide the slum upgrading and prevention work.”372 As part of KENSUP, the state notes 
that it had constructed 600 housing units, relocated 1800 households, opened 200 acres of 
                                                          
upgrading informal settlements under the Kenya slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP).” Other states 
were mostly receptive, praising Kenya for its accomplishments on the right including Cuba that highlighted 
Kenya’s programs to combat poverty and its many socio-economic development achievements. Spain 
recognized Kenya’s progress and its review of the Constitution, but did call for increased consultation with 
affected community and civil society organizations in its development projects “aimed at ensuring adequate 
housing for all.” 
Kenya, National report submitted in accordance with paragraph 15 (a) of the annex to Human Rights 
Council resolution 5/1, Geneva: United Nations, 2010. 
371 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Consideration of reports submitted by States 
parties under articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Combined second to fifth periodic reports of State Parties due in 2013, New York: United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, 2014. 
372 Ibid. 
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land for development, completed a road in Kibera, begun the construction of 915 houses 
to benefit 1500 people, constructed 2,592 housing units in a county for EDPs scheduled 
to complete in 2013, begun ongoing construction of 450 housing units in Mavoko under 
the Sustainable Neighborhood Program, and the formation of 25 housing cooperatives in 
informal settlements to increase the affordability of housing.373 Recognizing these 
advances by the state in a statement on economic, social and cultural rights to the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights at the 55th Ordinary Session of the 
Commission, AI praised the state for drawing attention to forced evictions and proposing 
laws to address it in Parliament.374 
Even with general shaming, though, there are limits to what the state is willing to 
do. Customary laws and practices sustain an exclusionary and discriminatory housing 
distribution, particularly disadvantaging women. In its failure to pass the Eviction and 
Resettlement Bill, the state failed to implement concrete guidelines on the issue of 
evictions, instead drafting an alternate Land Laws Amendment Bill that dilutes some of 
provisions of the original bill. Similarly, the Community Land Bill although a step in the 
right direction fails to include consultation and participation of informal settlers.375 
Likewise, most slum upgrading projects do not include slum dwellers in decision-
making. Moreover, for the positive aspect of the right, allocation of resources is essential, 
established in the budget. In their study of the “nexus between adequate resource 
allocation and land reforms,” a local NGO, affiliated with many international bodies, 
                                                          
373 Ibid. 
374 Amnesty International, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT TO THE AFRICAN COMMISSION 
ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: STATE OF HOUSING RIGHTS AND FORCED EVICTIONS IN 
AFRICA, Amnesty International, 2011. 
375 Amnesty International, KENYA: SUBMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, London: Amnesty International, 2016. 
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Hakijamii found that “the government was not matching its policy commitment to lands 
sector by adequate financial budget.”376 To that effect, Hakijamii suggested the 
government make the budget process more participatory and allocate more funding to 
realizing land rights. 
State responses, though, are largely favorably despite their limitations. In the next 
section, I present an analysis of these findings. 
Analysis 
In the case of Kenya, the state seems to deflect its failure to stop specific instances 
of evictions and discrimination by noting the resources it spends on housing in general, 
citing progressive policies and slum upgrading programs. Lending credence to my theory 
on the state’s calculation of a cost-benefit ratio in decision-making, the state often simply 
avoids INGOs’ statements on the problems of corruption and coordination and the lack of 
sustainability of such programs since its indication of political will helps lessen the 
impact of INGO shaming, making it harder to malign the violator. In these cases, the state 
does not deny allegations of wrongdoing, but moves straight to tactical concessions, 
encouraging minor improvements, and establishing a commitment to improve in rhetoric. 
However, the state never approaches rule consistent behavior.  
Considering White and Perelman’s model, also, the case of Kenya is 
counterhegemonic, prompting redistribution, but only to a certain extent. Shaming does 
create “local generative spaces” and even change policies of institutions, but this does not 
necessarily lead to a shift in the legitimacy of an action or the actual behavior of states 
                                                          
376 Economic and Social Rights Centre (Hakijamii), Report on Housing Sector Financing in Kenya, 
Nairobi: Economic and Social Rights Centre (Hakijamii), 2013. 
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and actors to produce change.377 Institutions are static. In fact, once the gaze shifts a little 
or the issue loses its salience in the media, conditions regress and evictions continue.  
Shaming, then, aids in some ways and has no effect in others. In the next 
subsection, I present the state of Kenya today, measuring its ‘quality of ESR’ using an 
indicator developed by the OHCHR to conclude my argument. 
Measuring ESR 
NGOs, academics, and others have sought to measure the effectiveness of ESR 
and housing so as best to evaluate the condition of the right in a particular state. For some 
indicators, outcome is key. Chong, for example, notes that “the most important question 
to ask of human rights is not “Are they valid legal instruments?” – a question that kept 
economic and social rights in the shadows for decades – but “Are they effective in 
changing widespread behavior?”378 Effectiveness, though, need not mean change in the 
quality of rights in the country shamed, but rather, can be evaluated at various stages. In 
outlining potential human rights indicators, the OHCHR attempts to operationalize the 
right to housing by explicating both an “obligation of conduct,” defined as the procedural 
protections in place for the right and government action bolstering it (an example in the 
case of the right to health is the state’s adoption and implementation of a policy to reduce 
maternal mortality) and the “obligation of result,” which evaluates whether the state has 
actually successfully realized the right (for example whether the state and its policies 
                                                          
377 Jeremy Perelman and Lucie E. White, Stones of Hope: How African Activists Reclaim Human Rights to 
Challenge Global Poverty, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
378Daniel P. L Chong, Freedom from Poverty: NGOs and Human Rights Praxis (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 141. 
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brought about an actual reduction in maternal mortality).379 The OHCHR finds fault with 
quantitative indicators because they predominantly focus on results, overlooking the 
state’s conduct. Instead to evaluate both conduct and result, the OHCHR looks to 
structural, process and outcome indicators.380 In looking at the case of Kenya, I take 
inspiration from OHCHR’s indicators on the right to housing. Using their criteria, the 
table below lists the current state of the right in Kenya. 
                                                          
379 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Indicators: A Guide 
to Measurement and Implementation, 2012, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Human_rights_indicators_en.pdf (accessed January 1, 
2017). 
380 Ibid. For structural indicators, the OHCHR indicates the ratification of international human rights 
treaties relevant and related to the right by the state, the date of its entry into force, coverage of the right in 
the state’s constitution and other forms of law, including domestic law, the number and nature of active 
NGOs involved in promotion and protection of the right, the time frame and coverage of any national 
policy or strategy for the progressive implementation of measures for the right, and the time frame and 
coverage on policies on rehabilitation and resettlement of individuals. Concerning process indicators, the 
organization outlines the proportion of received complaints related to the right that are investigated and 
adjudicated by national human rights bodies and responses to them by the government, the number and 
total public expenditure on housing reconstruction and rehabilitation for evicted persons in the time period, 
the official development assistance received, the proportion of residents reporting satisfaction with their 
involvement in decision-making related to the right, the “proportion of homes (cities, towns and villages) 
brought under the provisions of building codes and by-laws in the reporting period • Share of public 
expenditure on social or community housing • Habitable area (sq. m.) added through reclamation, including 
of hazardous sites and change in land-use pattern, in the reporting period • Habitable area (sq. m. per 
capita) earmarked for social or community housing during the reporting period; Share of public expenditure 
on provision and maintenance of sanitation, water supply, electricity and other services of homes • 
Proportion of targeted population that was extended sustainable access to an improved water source, 
improved sanitation, electricity and waste disposal in the reporting period; • Proportion of households that 
receive public housing assistance, including those living in subsidized rental and subsidized owner-
occupied housing • Proportion of targeted households living in squatter settlements rehabilitated in the 
reporting period • Proportion of homeless population that used public or community-based shelters in the 
reporting period.” Concerning outcome indicators, the OHCHR lists, “proportion of population with 
sufficient living space (persons per room or rooms per household) or average number of persons per room 
among target households • Proportion of households living in permanent structure in compliance with 
building codes and by-laws • Proportion of households living in or near hazardous conditions; Proportion 
of urban population living in slums* • Proportion of population using an improved drinking water (public / 
private) source, sanitation facility, electricity and waste disposal • Proportion of household budget of target 
population groups spent on water supply, sanitation, electricity and waste disposal; Proportion of 
households spending more than “X” per cent of their monthly income or expenditure on housing or average 
rent of bottom three income deciles as a proportion of the top three • Annual average of homeless persons 
per 100,000 population; • Reported cases of “forced evictions” (e.g., as reported to the special procedures), 
in the reporting period • Proportion of households with legally enforceable, contractual, statutory or other 
protection providing security of tenure or proportion of households with access to secure tenure • 
Proportion of women with title to land or property.” 
Beenish Riaz Honors Project: Political Science 
Page 144 of 168 
 
As of 2017381 
Structural Indicators (for the 
sake of expediency Kenya’s 
ratification of international and 
regional laws and treaties is 
summarized above) 
Process Indicators 
(maintaining that 
corruption is a 
prominent issue and 
both transparency and 
accountability hard to 
maintain) 
Outcome Indicators 
Constitution that includes a 
provision for the right to adequate 
housing (signed as of 2010) 
Complaints related to 
right and addressed by 
courts: multiple (key 
ones that set precedent 
addressed already) 
Complaints to the 
Kenyan Commission on 
Human Rights: 15 
complaints, 1% of the 
total (as of 2010)382 
Complaints to the 
African Court: African 
Commission of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights v 
Kenya (the ‘Ogiek 
case’). Ruled in favor of 
the commission for the 
Ogiek (March 2013) 
recommendations not 
implemented yet 
Proportion of 
households living in 
squatter settlements: 
Varies from 60-80% 
depending on estimate 
used. African 
Population and Health 
Research Center 
recorded in 2014 from 
a survey conducted in 
2012: “approximately 
2.5 million slum 
dwellers in about 200 
settlements in Nairobi 
representing 60% of 
the Nairobi population 
and occupying just 6% 
of the land. Kibera 
(largest slum in 
Africa) houses about 
250,000 of these 
people”383 According 
to the World Bank 
(data retrieved from 
the MDG database as 
of 2014, 56% of 
Kenya’s urban 
population lived in 
slums.384 
                                                          
381 Data for the table from a variety of sources including government sources, the World Bank, and 
Hakijamii. Other sources mentioned in footnotes. 
382 KENYA NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE 2009 – 
2010 FINANCIAL YEAR, Nairobi: KENYA NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 2010. 
383 Kibera UK, Kibera Facts & Information, n.d. http://www.kibera.org.uk/facts-info/ (accessed March 1, 
2017). 
384 World Bank, Population living in slums, (% of urban population), 2017, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.SLUM.UR.ZS (accessed February 1, 2017). 
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Laws: Land injustice at the turn of 
the 21st century became a 
prominent issue in Kenyan 
politics with citizens demanding 
the state address problems left 
over from colonialism and early 
independence:  
Draft Evictions and Resettlement 
Bill (as of 2012, resurfaced in 
2013, but never passed took the 
form of an amendment to sec. 152 
of the Land Act included in the 
omnibus Land Laws Amendment 
Bill, 2015) 
Community Land Law (2016): 
guarantees a community’s rights 
to their land 
Lands Act (2012): particularly 
relevant to the vulnerable in urban 
areas, need to get a court order to 
evict, resettlement guaranteed, 
looks at informal settlements and 
calls on governments to institute 
mechanisms for the removal of 
squatters and to put in place a 
legal framework of evictions 
based on international guidelines 
Establishes a Land Settlement 
Fund for resettlement 
Land Registration Act (2012) 
National Land Commission Act 
(2012) 
IDP Act (2012): establishes 
compensation though less 
specific. 
National Land Policy (2009): 
assures security of tenure for land 
Physical planning Act (1996): 
ensure “proper execution” of 
development plans 
Land Acquisition Act (1968): 
provide notice to all stakeholders 
(potentially including informal 
settlers) on the issue of land 
Public Health Act (1921): 
maintain district in clean and 
Total public expenditure 
on housing 
reconstruction and 
rehabilitation for evicted 
persons: 
Budget dedicated to 
Land and Housing 
Reform (projected for 
FY 2016/2017): approx. 
US$ 844,112,874. 
Required amount: US$ 
1,049,682,592.44 
Reported cases of 
“forced evictions:” 
thousands annually 
(specific major 
instances referenced in 
detail below) 
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sanitary condition, remedy 
anything dangerous to health 
Kenya Airports Authority, Kenya 
Ports Authority Act, and Kenya 
Railways Corporation Act (1978): 
apply to High Court for 
demolition for occupied land. 
Landlord and Tenant Act (1965): 
protects corporations more 
Rent Restriction Act (1959): 
provides protection against forced 
evictions but mostly redundant in 
practice   
Trespass Act (1963): misused to 
carry out evictions 
Limitations of Action Act (1968): 
contradicts Trespass Act 
implicitly  
Environmental and Management 
Coordination Act (1999). 
National Housing Policy (2004): 
enables access to housing and 
basic services and prompts 
participation of slum dwellers in 
slum upgrading to combat 
poverty, though, does not directly 
prohibit forced evictions nor 
ensure security of tenure. 
Number of NGOs: hundreds both 
nationally and internationally, 
extremely active. A prominent 
local NGO with ties to the 
International Network for 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights is Center for Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 
(Hakijamii Trust). Before it 
ended, the INGO Center on 
Housing Rights and Evictions was 
a prominent INGO working on the 
cause. Amnesty International has 
also addressed the issue. 
Official Expenditure in 
US dollars for FY 
2016/2017 for Slum 
Upgrading and Housing 
Development: 
approximately 
20,630,613.66 (a minor 
reduction from the past 
fiscal year) 
Recurrent Expenditure: 
approx. 64,147.47 in US 
dollars 
Ministry of Land, 
Housing, and Urban 
Development:385 approx. 
Proportion of 
households living in or 
near hazardous 
conditions: (study of 
one slum 2015 but 
representative of 
conditions in other 
slums in Kenya: 
“eighty-five 
households in Mathare 
share one toilet, only 
15% of households 
have access to a 
private toilet, and the 
average distance to a 
                                                          
385 “responsible for Lands Policy Management, Rural Settlement Planning, Land Transactions, Physical 
Planning, Survey and Mapping, Land Reclamation, Land Registration, Administration of Public Land as 
designated by the Constitution, Settlement Matters, National Spatial Data Infrastructure, Land and Property 
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US $ 265,444,300 for 
FY 2015/2016  
National Land 
Commission Budget: 
approx. $14,870,338.43 
Foreign funding for 
Housing Projects Total 
(estimated for 
2016/2017 in US 
dollars): 59,391,955.56 
public toilet is over 52 
meters. Eighty-three 
percent of households 
without a private toilet 
report poor health. 
Mathare women report 
violence (68%), 
respiratory 
illness/cough (46%), 
diabetes (33%), and 
diarrhea (30%) as the 
most frequent physical 
burdens.”386 
Commissions:  Committee on 
Land Clashes 
(1999), Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission 
(2000), Njonjo Commission of 
Inquiry into the Land Law 
System of Kenya (1999), 
Commission of Inquiry into the 
Illegal/Irregular Allocation of 
Public Land (2003), the Truth, 
Justice, and Reconciliation 
Commission (2008) 
National 
Land Commission (2010): 
“manage public land, monitor 
land-use 
planning (including exploitation 
of natural resources) 
and investigate into present and 
historical land injustice” 
 
Plan to allocate 800,000 
titles in FY 2016/2017 
(but often miss target) 
Build more units as part 
of the slum upgrading 
project Proportion 
reporting satisfaction 
with decision-making 
involvement: no exact 
figure but intermittent 
surveys by HROs find 
dissatisfaction as 
populations are rarely 
informed of evictions, 
and have no power to 
participate in decision-
making 
Proportion of women 
with title to land or 
property: 5% by 
women jointly with 
men, 1% just by 
women (Women 
Lawyers of Kenya) 
Foreign Funded Projects related to 
Housing:  
Share of budget 
allocated to 
Environment Protection, 
 
                                                          
Valuation, Housing Policy Management, Public Works Policy and planning, management of Building and 
Construction Standards and codes, Management of Housing for Disciplined Forces and Civil Servants, 
Public Office Accommodation Lease Management, Management of Civil Servants Housing Scheme, 
Registration of Contractors and Materials Suppliers and Registration of Architects and Quantity Surveyors 
and other Public Works” 
Ministry of Land, Housing and Urban Development, 2017, 
https://www.kenyans.co.ke/government/ministry-land-housing-urban-development (accessed January 9, 
2017). 
386Jason Corburn and Chantal Hildebrand, "Slum Sanitation and the Social Determinants of Women’s 
Health in Nairobi, Kenya," Journal of Environmental and Public Health, 2015. 
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Korogocho Slum Upgrading –
Nairobi 
Korogocho Community Strategy 
Project Technical 
Assistance 
Slum Upgrading Project in Kilifi 
Primary and Secondary Phase II 
Kisumu Urban Project 
Kenya Informal Settlements 
Improvement 
Nairobi Metropolitan Service 
Improvement Project 
Water and Natural 
Resources includes 
encouraging access to 
water sources, 
sanitation, electricity, 
and waste disposal: US$ 
720,077,992387 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
387John Kinuthia and Jason Lakin, "Kenya: Analysis of the 2016/17 National Budget Estimates," 
International Budget Partnership, June 2016, http://www.internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/ibp-
kenya-analysis-of-2016-17-national-budget-estimates-6-2016.pdf (accessed March 3, 2017). 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Limitations 
Literature seeking to explain the (in)effectiveness of naming and shaming remains 
divided into two opposing camps. The optimists, Risse and Sikkink, attest that eventually 
all states approach rule consistent behavior under pressure from shaming.388 Realists, like 
Hafner Burton, resist this simple articulation of the effects of shaming. They indicate that 
the state may improve certain human rights only to appease the international community 
while continuing and even intensifying other violations. When we narrow the debate on 
shaming to focus only on ESR, the divisions become even more complex. Some, like 
Roth, are pessimistic about the extent to which INGOs can shame ESR. Roth argues that 
only instances of negative rights, of arbitrariness and discrimination respond to shaming 
efforts, not questions of distributive justice and positive rights inherent to ESR.389 Others, 
like Khan, are more optimistic about shaming ESR. After noting these contradictory 
theories, I looked at a specific ESR, the right to housing, in one country, Kenya, to 
decipher whether and how effective shaming ESR is in this context. My paper builds on, 
contradicts, and reinforces some of the theoretical debates on shaming as a whole and on 
shaming ESR in particular. Hence, although, my specific focus has been on the case of 
housing in Kenya, this study presents lessons for ESR more broadly. 
Dividing shaming into two types, the shaming of specific eviction attempts and 
general shaming of the right to housing in Kenya, I find that while states respond 
favorably to the latter to a certain extent, violations shamed in the former continue 
                                                          
388 Thomas Risse, Kathryn Sikkink, and Stephen C. Ropp, The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From 
Commitment to Compliance, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
389 Kenneth Roth, "Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an 
International Human Rights Organization," Human Rights Quarterly, (2004): 69. 
Beenish Riaz Honors Project: Political Science 
Page 150 of 168 
 
unabated. In response to shaming, Kenya adopted progressive laws and a Constitution 
and vowed, in rhetoric, to defend ESR. Courts upheld the right to housing in some cases, 
taking cues from international law brought to the country by INGOs. However, all these 
initiatives went unenforced and unimplemented so that evictions themselves, the 
violations most often shamed, continued for decades to the present. Even while Kenya 
moves towards compliance, then, it may never move towards rule-consistent behavior 
where costs outweigh the benefits of human rights compliance. Placing my findings in 
the context of my literature, then, the case of the right to housing in Kenya grants 
credence more to a realist than an optimist notion of shaming human rights. Kenya 
appears to respond to shaming attempts with only marginal change, appeasing the 
international community, while continuing violations de facto. Considering the naming 
and shaming literature specific to ESR, though, the case of the right to housing in Kenya 
counters Roth’s assumptions by illustrating the ways in which simply shaming instances 
of negative rights, of arbitrariness and discrimination does not help. Instead, taking into 
account progressive realization and shaming the right to housing more broadly does lead 
to change even if such change is only marginal.  
These findings have many implications for what HROs can and should do to 
improve economic and social inequalities in the future. Although I cannot provide 
concrete recommendations, I do raise a variety of questions for future consideration. For 
one, INGOs must debate whether to emphasize and spend more resources on shaming in 
general as opposed to shaming specific cases. More importantly, though, noting that at 
least in this case shaming does not seem to lead to a halt in violations, INGOs must 
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question the extent to which they should spend on shaming and whether it might be 
fruitful to invest in and explore alternatives to promote international law enforcement. 
In looking at these findings, then, I believe that shaming should move away from 
attempting to use and change laws themselves. Rather, perhaps, as Schulz notes, the aim 
of shaming should not be enforcement but an attempt to change norms, institutions and 
raise awareness.390 Moreover, even if enforcement is the aim, HROs should address both 
positive and negative rights and look to the right to housing in a country as a whole 
instead of simply shaming specific instances of evictions. As shaming becomes an 
increasingly common tactic today, my study becomes especially pertinent. In a recent 
statement, the World Bank declared its intent to shame ESR violations, stating that it too 
would start to name and shame “countries that fail to tackle the malnourishment and poor 
growth of their children, as part of a mission to rid the world of stunting.”391 HROs and 
other organizations, then, can expect their efforts if only marginally and ephemerally to 
contribute to change that may provide more sustained results in the long run. Still, 
shaming by itself has many limitations, suggesting the need for the development of an 
alternative method of enforcement to bolster shaming efforts. 
Nevertheless, my paper has many limitations. For one, I only look at one country 
case in a qualitative analysis and cannot draw conclusions and causal inferences about 
ESR shaming broadly from it. My results, then, would benefit from a quantitative 
                                                          
390 William F. Schulz, "Caught at the Keyhole: The Power and Limits of Shame," In The Politics of 
Leverage in International Relations: Name, Shame, and Sanction, by H. Richard Friman, (Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillian, 2015) 
391Sarah Boseley, World Bank to name and shame countries that fail to prevent stunting in children, 
September 30, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/sep/30/world-bank-name-
and-shame-countries-fail-stunted-children?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Gmail (accessed March 1, 2017). 
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analysis akin to one Hertel does in her study, looking at a greater number and variety of 
cases.392 I also only take the case of housing. INGOs may respond differently to health, 
education, and other rights. Finally, shaming ESR is so new that long run changes and 
responses have yet to appear and it may be decades before we may know the actual 
effects of the shaming attempts. However, my study starts this research and preliminarily 
addresses critical issues HROs need to consider today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
392Shareen Hertel, "Why Bother? Measuring Economic Rights: The Research Agenda," International 
Studies Perspectives, (2006): 215-230. 
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